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ARTICLE
DOUBLE INCHOATE CRJMES*
IRA P. ROBBINS**
American criminal law treats the inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and solicitationas substantive offenses punishable by criminalsanctions. The legal system criminalizes the types. of behavior that constitute
these offenses to intervene before an actor completes the intended illegal
act. Some jurisdictions now recognize the concept of double inchoate
crimes, punishing inchoate offenses that are the immediate objects of
other inchoate offenses.
In this Article, ProfessorRobbins examines the concept of double inchoate crimes, first by tracingthe evolution of inchoate offenses and then
by reviewing the judicial development of double inchoate crimes. Arguing
that double inchoate crimes are needed to fill gaps and criminalize behaviors not covered by exisiting statutes, the Article then examines the
case law upholding double inchoate constructions. The Article goes on to
evaluate cases that reject and criticize this concept and advocatesa policybased approach.Finally,ProfessorRobbins recommends retainingcertain
double inchoate crimes, proposes model statutes for inchoate offenses,
and urges a certain degree of judicial discretion in using these
constructions.
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The refinement and metaphysical acumen that can see a
tangible idea in the words an attempt to attempt to act is too
great for practical use. It is like conceiving of the beginning
of eternity or the starting place of infinity.'
Perhaps philosophers or metaphysicians can intend to attempt to
act, but ordinary people intend to act, not to attempt
2
to act.
INTRODUCTION

The inchoate crimes 3 of attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation
are well established in the American legal system. "Inchoate"
offenses allow punishment of an actor even though he has not
consummated the crime that is the object of his efforts. 4 Indeed,
the main purpose of punishing inchoate crimes is to allow the
judicial system to intervene before an actor completes the object
crime. 5
Most American jurisdictions treat inchoate offenses as substantive crimes, 6 distinct and divorced from the completed
crimes toward which they tend. Accordingly, attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are defined broadly to encompass acts lead' Wilson v. State, 53 Ga. 205, 206 (1874).
175 Colo. 113, 117, 485 P.2d 886, 888 (1971).
this Article, an "inchoate" crime is a prohibited act performed in
anticipation of committing a "completed" crime. A "completed" crime is an act that
itself achieves a harmful consequence prohibited by statute. Murder is the prime example of a completed crime, in that the prohibited act results in the intended harmful
consequence, rather than in a realization of a stage of preparation in anticipation of
another harmful consequence.
4 Failure to consummate the ultimate crime, however, is not essential to conviction
for an inchoate offense. In most jurisdictions, no rule of merger exists for conspiracy
and several states allow prosecution for an attempted crime even when the defendant
has realized the ultimate crime. See infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text (conspiracy cases); infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (attempt statutes).
5 This is the main premise of the Model Penal Code's provisions for inchoate offenses.
See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 commentary at 294 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
For purposes of this Article, an "object" or "target" crime is an offense to which an
inchoate or anticipatory crime relates. An inchoate crime must have another crime as
its object.
6 For purposes of this Article, a "substantive" crime is one that is defined by statute
or common law to prohibit a specific act or category of acts. Thus, the term "substantive" clearly encompasses completed crimes, such as murder. The broad application of
inchoate offenses, however, makes it unclear whether they are substantive crimes or
instead are general doctrinal categories that give courts discretion to extend criminal
liability to acts that tend toward completed offenses.
The latter position suggests that crimes in the nature of attempt, although they are
applicable to a narrower category of acts than attempt, are not substantive crimes. One
can argue that assault is not a substantive offense when it is defined as an attempt to
commit a battery. Similarly, burglary can be viewed as a species of attempt limited by
the means (illegal entry) and setting (an enclosed structure). In addition, possession
offenses, although narrowly defined, punish acts preparatory to traditional completed
offenses.
2 Allen v. People,
3 For purposes of

HarvardJournal on Legislation

[Vol. 26:1

ing to the commission of any completed crime. Rather than try
to enumerate every act to which inchoate liability attaches,
however, legislatures have enacted relatively short statutes containing abstract conceptual terms with universal application.
The Model Penal Code's provision for attempt liability, for example, represents a middle-ground approach to this problem. It
prohibits an act that constitutes a "substantial step" toward the
completed offense. The Code then fleshes out the abstract term
"substantial step" by listing several nonexclusive examples that
have application to numerous completed crimes. 7 It has fallen
to the courts to elaborate on the scope of inchoate offenses and
decide when to administer them.
Thus, the concept of substantive inchoate crimes, by requiring
a high degree of judicial interpretation, has vested great discretion in the judiciary. This discretion is similar to that of earlier
courts in creating common-law offenses. In both circumstances,
the court analyzes the policies underlying the criminal law and
decides whether those policies require courts to punish certain
acts.
My thesis is that, in inchoate offenses, courts should adopt a
two-part analysis, asking: (1) whether the policy of the criminal
law indicates that an individual's acts are sufficiently dangerous
to society to warrant judicial intervention and punishment; and
(2) whether the definition of attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation
allows a court to punish those acts. The development of inchoate
offenses in different jurisdictions has often resulted in a divergence in the answers to these two queries.
To punish a dangerous act not covered by established inchoate
concepts, courts have two options. First, they may ignore precedent, extend statutory language, and change the definitions of
concepts contained in inchoate offenses. For example, A decides to kill B, but wants the aid of another. A approaches C to
ask him to help in the murder. C feigns agreement, and later
informs the police.
The government indicts A for conspiracy to commit murder.
The prosecution's success depends on how the court, within the
guidelines set by the jurisdiction's conspiracy statute, defines
the central term "agreement." Does it require that both parties
intend to commit the object crime of murder, or that only one
Nevertheless, every American jurisdiction treats burglary, possession offenses, and
at least some forms of assault as substantive crimes. Indeed, the prevalent view is that
attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are substantive offenses in that they proscribe a
specific category of acts.
7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01

(Proposed Official Draft 1985).
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act with such intent? In many American jurisdictions, the indictment for conspiracy would fail because there was no agreement. Nevertheless, most commentators agree that criminal liability should attach to A's actions.
The second option, however, is that the court could allow the

prosecutor to bring an indictment for the double inchoate crime
of attempt to conspire to commit murder. Over the past century

and a quarter, prosecutors have brought indictments making an
inchoate offense the immediate object of another inchoate offense, with a completed crime as the ultimate object. This approach allows courts to extend liability to actions such as those
of A, above, without distorting the concepts inherent in estab-

lished inchoate offenses. But the courts faced with such indictments have divided over the validity of double inchoate
offenses .'

Judicial inquiry into the validity of double inchoate offenses
has focused on the question of whether an inchoate offense can
have as its object another inchoate offense. 9 Treating attempt,
conspiracy, and solicitation as the general inchoate offenses,
8 The issue to be discussed in this Article-the validity of double inchoate offensesmust be distinguished from the issue of the validity of multiple convictions for discrete
inchoate crimes that are designed to culminate in the same offense. Double inchoate
offenses are characterized by the use of two inchoate offenses within a single count of
an indictment. Prosecutors generally use double inchoate constructions, such as attempt
to attempt and attempt to conspire, to circumvent the normal proximity requirements
of inchoate offenses. At present, only three states explicitly prohibit by statute the use
of such constructions. See infra note 153.
By contrast, the term "multiple convictions for inchoate crimes" refers to convictions
for two or more inchoate crimes arising out of the same course of conduct toward a
single substantive offense.
For example, A conspires with B to kill C. B, the hit man, is apprehended just as he
is about to detonate a bomb that he has planted in C's car, which C is driving. The
prosecutor brings charges against B for both the attempt to commit murder and the
conspiracy to murder.
Another example: A solicits B to kill A's wife. B refuses, so A solicits C to perform
the same crime. Is A guilty of two counts of solicitation or only one? Many American
jurisdictions prohibit conviction for more than one statutory inchoate crime for conduct
designed to culminate in the same completed offense. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.31.140(b) (1983); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-531 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-53(a) (West 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 506.110(3) (Baldwin 1984); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 906 (Purdon 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1987); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.05(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1985): "A person may not be convicted of more than
one offense defined by [Model Penal Code art. 5, defining all inchoate offenses] for
conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime." Id.
For a more extended discussion of limitations on indictments for multiple offenses and
the distinction between double inchoate crimes and multiple convictions for inchoate
crimes, see generally I P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 84(c) (1984).
9 In addition, courts have questioned whether they have the authority to create double
inchoate crimes. This argument suggests that double inchoate crimes are analogous to
ex post facto laws or, more aptly, common-law conspiracy, which allowed courts the
discretion to convict a party for committing a lawful act by unlawful means. Modem
conspiracy statutes limit this discretion by making only criminal acts the proper objects
of conspiracy. See infra notes 100, 110 and accompanying text.
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this inquiry can extend to attempts to attempt, attempts to
conspire, attempts to solicit, conspiracies to attempt, conspiracies to conspire, conspiracies to solicit, solicitations to attempt,
solicitations to conspire, and solicitations to solicit. Analysis of
the issue has arisen most frequently, however, with respect to
three of these constructions-attempt to attempt, attempt to
conspire, and conspiracy to attempt.
By surveying and analyzing the case law regarding these three
constructions, this Article seeks both to establish the proper
approach for assessing the validity of double inchoate offenses
and to delineate the limits of judicial discretion to "create" such
crimes. This Article argues that, although some double inchoate
crimes are unnecessary, others do serve important purposes of
the criminal law. This approach presupposes that the proper
criterion for deciding the validity of double inchoate constructions is the need to fill gaps in the definitions of single inchoate
crimes. To the extent that single inchoate crime statutes are
refined, therefore, the need for judicially created inchoate
crimes will diminish.
In Part I, the Article considers the crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation, and discusses certain crimes in the
nature of attempt, such as assault, burglary, and possessory
offenses. Part II surveys and analyzes the case law upholding
double inchoate constructions. This section elaborates on the
rationales provided by the courts-as well as those not explicitly
stated-for use of these constructions. Part III examines the
case law that rejects and criticizes reliance on double inchoate
constructions. This section also compares the analytical approaches used by courts to examine critically double inchoate
formulations and concludes that a policy-based approach is the
most appropriate. Part IV applies this policy-based analysis to
determine which inchoate constructions are necessary to the
effective functioning of the criminal law. This section also delineates the limits of judicial discretion by formulating model
statutes for inchoate offenses. The Article concludes, however,
that a degree of judicial discretion is necessary to ensure that
liability attaches to those actions that, in tending toward completed crimes, pose a significant danger to society.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF INCHOATE CRIMES

Inchoate-or anticipatory or relational-crimes allow the judicial system to impose criminal liability on conduct designed
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to culminate in the commission of a substantive offense. 0 The
inchoate offenses of attempt and solicitation, for example, provide the legal basis for courts to punish the actor who has
performed every act necessary to effect his criminal design, but
has failed to achieve the prohibited result due to an intervening
fortuity." More importantly, however, attempt and other inchoate offenses allow law-enforcement officials to prevent the
consummation of substantive offenses by permitting intervention once an individual's actions, though not criminal in themselves, have sufficiently manifested an intent to commit a criminal act. 12
Like a completed offense, an inchoate offense requires both
a mens rea and an actus reus. 13 Unlike the actus reus in a
completed offense, however, the proscribed act in an anticipatory crime is not prohibited because of its harmful effect, but
because it demonstrates a firm purpose on the part of an indi'o MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 commentary at 293 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). The
Code's drafters suggest that inchoate crimes all share the characteristic that the conduct
they make criminal "is designed to culminate in the commission of a substantive offense,
but has failed in the discrete case to do so or has not yet achieved its culmination
because there is something that the actor or another still must do." Id. This basic rule,
however, does not apply wholly to conspiracy. Because conspiracy is designed not only
as an inchoate crime but also as a means of punishing illegal group activity, the completion of a substantive offense generally does not preclude conviction for both the
completed offense and the conspiracy. See infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
Because inchoate crimes are defined not only as discrete substantive offenses but
also in terms of the ultimate offenses at which they aim or to which they relate, they
are also called "relational" crimes. E.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 575 (2d ed. 1960).
" MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 commentary at 294 (Proposed Official Draft 1985); see
also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 498-99 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that the
original purpose behind punishing attempts was to prevent crime). See generally Robbins, Attempting the Impossible: The Emerging Consensus, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 377,
passim (1986).
12MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 commentary at 294 (Proposed Official Draft 1985);
GREAT BRITAIN LAW COMMISSION, INCHOATE OFFENSES: CONSPIRACY, ATrEMPT AND
INCITEMENT 73 (Working Paper No. 50, 1973); see also Meehan, Attempt-Some
Rational Thoughts on its Rationale, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 215 (1977).
The law of attempt permits the authorities to intervene before the crime is
consummated. The English Law Commission urges extensions of the law by
arguing that "one of the main reasons for a law of attempt is to allow the
authorities to intervene at a sufficiently early stage to prevent a real danger of
the substantial offence being committed ....
The distinguishing factor here,
as with impossible attempts, is that no actual harm is prevented by intervention
on the part of the authorities, for by definition, it was impossible to achieve
the harm intended. Nevertheless, potential harm can be prevented, as the
person's dangerousness has been manifested-the unsuccessful poisoner who
uses sugar may next hit with rat poison.
Id. at 236 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). For further discussion of the predictive and preventive capacities of attempt liability, see infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
13See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 605 (3d ed. 1982).
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vidual to act in furtherance of a criminal intent. 14 The mens rea
for inchoate crimes, therefore, is the specific intent to commit
a particular completed offense, or target or object crime.' 5 A
central premise of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence is
that a court may not punish a bad intent that is not accompanied
by a bad act.16 Nevertheless, inchoate crimes focus on the mens
14 The term "harmful" in this statement refers to actual harm to person or property.
Most legal commentators, however, use the term in a broader context to refer to an
increase in the potential risk to these legally protected interests. See, e.g., Meehan,
supra note 12, at 237-39 (arguing that a person who creates risk causes harm even if
the intended consequences do not occur); see also Robbins, supra note 11, at 383-419
(discussing objective and subjective harm in attempt crimes).
For purposes of this Article, the term "harmful" is a concept of harm independent of
particular laws defining crimes and specifying punishments. The terms "harm" or "ultimate harm" describe the kind of damage or injury to a legally protected interest that
is ordinarily compensable in a civil action. This concept of harm includes not only
damages or injury to a specific individual, but also injury to the interests of the collectivity-e.g., failure to pay taxes, pollution of the environment, or some other verifiable
social disutility.
The term "statutory harm" refers to any consequence of conduct constituting a
necessary element of a specific offense as defined by law. Although ultimate and statutory harms may overlap, as with the death necessary to a murder, some consequences
that are proscribed by the criminal law fall short of a meaningful injury to a legally
protected interest. For example, the criminal law attributes significance to the act of
agreement in a conspiracy and the act of breaking and entering in a burglary, although
the consequences of either act alone are not sufficiently important to be considered an
ultimate harm. The ultimate harm that is associated with conspiracy and burglary is the
intent to commit some other crime.
Furthermore, not all crimes have a statutory harm. For example, criminal attempt is
defined as a certain kind of conduct, without regard to its actual consequences, and the
offense does not require proof that a particular harm actually occurred. See Schulhofer,
Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the
Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1505-06 (1974). But see J. HALL, supra note
10, at 219-20 (suggesting that inchoate crimes cause ultimate and statutory or potential
harm in that the proscribed conduct impairs the quality of daily life by increasing
apprehension in the community and creating a higher probability of actual injury to
members of the community).
Is As used here, the term "specific intent" refers to a special mental element required
above and beyond any required to commit the actus reus ofthe specific inchoate offense.
For inchoate crimes, that special mental element is an intent to effect the consequences
or ultimate harm that is proscribed by the completed object crime, even if the object
crime requires no such intent. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 11, at
224-25. For example, although an actor may commit murder without an intent to kill,
he cannot normally commit attempted murder without such an intent. Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 660, 180 S.E. 395, 398 (1935).
16 Most crimes that the law punishes are individual or social harms. This emphasis
on the results of conduct necessarily requires some kind of act as a basis for penal
sanction. Although the intent behind conduct takes on legal significance when that
conduct results in certain proscribed consequences, criminal intent that remains within
the mind of the individual or manifests itself only in conversation causes no demonstrable social harm.
Furthermore, common experience indicates that nearly everyone entertains some
criminal intent during his lifetime. A criminal-justice system that punishes only those
who allow such thoughts to rule their conduct is both more fair and more efficient than
one that punishes individuals who are either careless or foolish enough to speak of
intentions on which they may never act. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 13, at
605; see G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 2, 33 (2d ed. 1961).
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rea and render ancillary the actus reus to realize
the predictive
17
and preventive purposes of the criminal law.
The three main formulations of inchoate liability are attempt,
conspiracy, and solicitation. The treatment of these concepts as
substantive offenses, distinct from the completed offenses that
are their objects, is of comparatively late origin. Each of the
three had its beginning in the authority of common-law courts
to create offenses.18 Despite the independent origins and development of the three offenses, conspiracy and solicitation can be
viewed as early stages of an attempt to commit a completed
offense. 19 Further, specific substantive crimes such as assault
and burglary have inchoate aspects and can therefore be viewed
20
as crimes in the nature of attempt.
A. Attempt
Although the law of attempt has roots in the early English
law, 21 its formulation as a general substantive offense is a rela17 In inchoate offenses, the proscribed conduct is ancillary to the mens rea, in the
sense that it only serves to determine the likelihood that the actor would have done
everything necessary to realize his criminal intent. It is not ancillary, however, in the
sense that most jurisdictions punish conduct that fails to culminate in a particular crime
less severely than successful conduct, even though the intent informing both is identical.
Emphasis on actual harm in determining the degree of penal sanction is a vestige of the
criminal law's early role as an instrument of official retribution. Actual damage or injury
was once a prerequisite to the existence of a crime. The doctrines of attempt, conspiracy,
and solicitation have developed based on the theory that conduct that is proximate to
an ultimate harm is itself a harm, albeit a lesser one. J. HALL, supra note 10, at 584;
Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 1498-1501; see G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL
LAW 404-06 (1983) (stating that comparative leniency for attempt reflects a crude
retaliation theory, in which the degree of punishment is a function of the amount of
damage done rather than the intent of the actor).
"IFor a discussion of the historical origin of attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation, see
infra notes 21-22 (attempt), 99 (conspiracy), 126 (solicitation) and accompanying text.
'9 See Robbins, Solicitation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1502, 1505
(S. Kadish et al. eds. 1983) (conceptualizing conspiracy and solicitation as steps in the
direction of crime on a continuum of preparatory acts, rather than as distinct crimes).
20 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 11, at 497.
21 Although the early English law only punished conduct that resulted in actual harm,
in rare instances several fourteenth-century courts convicted individuals of certain
heinous felonies even though they had only unsuccessfully attempted to commit those
felonies. These solitary convictions rested on the doctrine of voluntas reputabiturpro
facto-the intention is to be taken for the deed. It is apparent from the reports, however,
that these courts did not penalize intent alone. Rather, the defendant must have manifested his intent by some deed tending toward the execution of the completed felony.
J. HALL, supra note 10, at 560-65; W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 11, at 495-96;
Sayre, CriminalAttempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 822-27 (1928).
The sixteenth-century Court of the Star Chamber, instituted partly to correct the
defects of the common-law courts, entertained cases involving conduct now categorized
as attempt as part of a trend of dealing with antisocial conduct theretofore unrecognized

10
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tively recent development. 22 Generally, the elements of attempt

are: (1) the intent to commit the completed crime; (2) the performance of some step, usually a substantial one, toward its

commission; and (3) the failure to consummate the substantive
crime. 23 Many American jurisdictions now make specific provisions for the punishment of attempts to commit certain offen-

ses,2 4 and almost all cover the rest of the field with a general
attempt statute. 25 With few exceptions, these general statutes
cover attempts to commit any felony or misdemeanor.2 6
as criminal because of its lack of direct harm. J. HALL, supra note 10 at 563-67. In a

prosecution, in 1615, Francis Bacon, the Attorney General, urged the Star Chamber to
adopt a doctrine of criminal attempt. Bacon successfully argued that the court should
punish as a high misdemeanor any combination or practice tending to a capital offense
or felony, "though it took no effect." Id. at 568. Due to political abuses, the Star
Chamber was abolished in 1640. Sayre, supra, at 828.
"2See J. HALL, supra note 10, at 571-73; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at
495-96; Sayre, supra note 21, at 836. The modern doctrine of attempt has its origin in
the case of Rex v. Scofield, Cald. Mag. Rep. 397 (1784). In Scofield, the court indicted
the defendant on a charge of placing a lighted candle and combustible material on
another's house with intent to set fire to it, even though the house did not burn. Id. at
400. Such conduct clearly would constitute an attempt to commit arson in modern law.
Prior to Scofield, however, the courts imposed attempt liability only for two categories
of offenses: attempted treason and attempts to subvert justice, such as subornation of
perjury and attempted bribery of the King's officials. Sayre, supra note 21, at 834-35.
The court in Scofield established the premises that a criminal intent may make criminal
an act that was otherwise innocent in itself, and, conversely, that the completion of an
act, criminal in itself, was not necessary to constitute a crime. Scofield, Cald. Mag.
Rep. at 400.
Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (1801), extended the decision in Scofield. In
Higgins, the authorities indicted the defendant for soliciting a servant to steal his
master's goods. There was no allegation or proof that the servant acted on the solicitation. The court ruled that it could indict a person for any act or attempt that tended
"to the prejudice of the community." Id. at 275; see Robbins, supra note 19, at 1503.
23 See People v. Miller, 2 Cal. 2d 527, 530, 42 P.2d 308, 309 (1935); State v. Bereman,
177 Kan. 141, 142, 276 P.2d 364, 365 (1954); State v. Patrick, 545 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1976).
24 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 347 (attempt to murder by administering poison),
218 (attempted train wrecking), 455 (attempted arson) (West 1988); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 707.11 (attempt to commit murder), 713.2 (attempted burglary) (West 1979 & Cum.
Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 10 (attempt to burn building or property), 290
(attempt to manufacture, distribute or possess controlled substance) (1982); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 509 (attempted arson), 2307 (attempted murder), 3434 (attempted sabotage) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-7 (attempt to kill or injure by
poisoning), 61-3-4 (attempted arson) (1984).
21FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04(1) (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.92 (West 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 110.00 to -.10 (McKinney 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.28.020 (Cum. Supp.
1987). See generally Robbins, supra note 11, at 419-42 (discussing attempt statutes in
the context of the defense of impossibility).
26 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-51 (West 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-103 (1981);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 564.011 (1986); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1978); VT. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 9 (1974); cf. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1 (1984) (felonies only); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-501 (1982) (felonies only).

1989]

Double Inchoate Crimes

11

Among modern American jurisdictions, some statutes provide
that failure is an element of the offense. 7 Further, the rule of
merger operates only to the extent that a defendant cannot be

convicted of both a completed offense and an attempt to commit

it.28 All jurisdictions treat attempt as a lesser included offense
of the completed crime.2 9 Moreover, many jurisdictions have
held that a defendant may be convicted of the attempt if the
state proves the completed crime,30 and several states so provide
31

by statute.

The distinction in attempt law between attempt and prepara-

tion reflects the notion that the act on which liability is based
must sufficiently manifest criminal intent. 32 The standards de-

27See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 274, § 6 (Law. Co-op. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.92 (West 1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.330 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3028-1 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-8 (1984).
18See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-2 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-5
(Smith-Hurd 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 41 (West 1983); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-4-302 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.72 (West 1982).
2 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-l-9(a)(2) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-9
(Smith-Hurd 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 152(3-A) (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 556.046 (Vernon 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.74 (Page 1987).
30 See, e.g., Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d 618, 619 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 545 (1932); State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54 (1828); Greenwood v. United States,
225 A.2d 878, 880 (D.C. 1967); Commonwealth v. Creadon, 162 Mass. 466, 467, 38 N.E.
1119, 1119 (1894); State v. Braathen, 77 N.D. 309, 316, 43 N.W.2d 202, 207 (1950).
31 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-110 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101(1) (1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-103(5) (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.485(1) (1985); TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(c) (Vernon 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
Commentary to the Texas provision suggests its rationale:
Subsection [(b)] expressly eliminates a defense that is raised, though rarely
successfully, in attempt cases ....
Subsection [(b)] conflicts with Subsection
(a), however, which makes failure to complete the offense an element that the
state must prove. There is no problem if the actor is convicted of attempt as
a lesser included offense in a prosecution for the completed offense ....
but
in a prosecution for attempt alone, the conflict will pose problems in some
cases.
Id. § 15.01(c) commentary at 516 (Vernon 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1988). In other words,
this provision ensures that, in a case difficult to prove, the state can at least bring an
indictment for attempt without concern that the defendant can clear himself by proving
that he completed the object offense. Contra Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-1-9 (1972) (prohibiting conviction for attempt or assault with intent to commit crime if object offense was
consummated).
32See Skilton, The Requisite Act in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. PiTT. L. REV. 308
(1937). The author argued that
"Sufficient" is, of course, a weasel-word; but generalizations can hardly be
more definite than that. Another way to put it is to say that this additional
factor, which, combined with intent, makes the defendant guilty of attempt
must be substantial, and not merely trivial, in character ....
No more definite
rule of law can be suggested, in determining the requisite magnitude of this

additional factor, than to say that the defendant's conduct must pass that point
where most men, holding such an intention as the defendant holds, would think
better of their conduct and desist
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veloped by courts and criminal-law experts to determine the
sufficiency of an act for attempt liability reflect the developing
rationales that are unique to anticipatory crimes.3 3 The principal
purpose behind punishing an attempt, unlike that of a completed
crime, is not deterrence. 34 The threat posed by the sanction for
an attempt is unlikely to deter a person willing to risk the penalty
for the object crime.35 Instead, the primary function of the crime
of attempt is to provide a basis for law-enforcement officers to
intervene before an individual can commit a completed offense. 36 A secondary function is to punish those who have carried out their criminal scheme but have failed to effect the
harmful result due to the intervention of external
physical cir37
cumstances, including on-the-spot prevention.
Id. at 309-10; see also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 504-09 (discussing
distinction between "preparation" and "attempt").
Courts occasionally cloud the distinction between preparation and attempt by holding
that preparatory acts satisfy attempt's actus reus requirement under certain circumstances. Id. at 431-32; see Bell v. State, 118 Ga. App. 291, 293, 163 S.E.2d 323, 325
(1968) (because the act was dangerous to people and property, proof that the actor
brought dynamite to certain premises was sufficient to establish the crime of attempt to
destroy those premises by dynamite).
33For a particularly cogent survey of the judicial tests that are used to distinguish
preparation from attempt, see generally P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL
LAW 131-37 (1986) [hereinafter Low].
M MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 commentary at 293-94 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
The commentary states:
Since these offenses always presuppose a purpose to commit another crime,
it is doubtful that the threat of punishment for their commission can significantly
add to the deterrent efficacy of the sanction-which the actor by hypothesis
ignores-that is threatened for the crime that is his objective. There may be
cases where this does occur, as when the actor thinks the chance of apprehension low if he should succeed but high if he should fail in his attempt, or when
reflection is promoted at an early stage that otherwise would be postponed
until too late, which may be true in some conspiracies. These are, however,
special situations. General deterrence is at most a minor function to be served
in fashioning provisions of the penal law addressed to these inchoate crimes;
that burden is discharged upon the whole by the law dealing with the substantive offenses.
Id.
3- Cf. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 499 (reasoning that the crime of
attempt may provide an effective deterrent in those cases in which the actor believes
that his chance of apprehension is low if he succeeds, but high if his attempt miscarries
in some way).
36 Ullman, The Reason for Punishing Attempted Crimes, 51 JURID. REV. 353, 363
(1939); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 498-99. For a discussion of the
various rationales behind attempt liability, see, e.g., Meehan, supra note 12 (emphasizing the importance of attempt liability in predicting and preventing social danger).
For a discussion of balancing the danger to society with individual freedom in the
context of a criminal law policy that aims at distinguishing dangerous offenders, see M.
MOORE, S. ESTRICH, D. MCGILLIS & W. SPELMAN, DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: THE
ELUSIVE TARGET OF JUSTICE (1984) [hereinafter DANGEROUS OFFENDERS].
37 W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTIT, supra note 11, at 499.
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The first case to distinguish attempt and preparation, Regina
v. Eagleton,8 introduced a "last proximate act" standard for

determining the actus reus of attempt.3 9 Under this approach,
an actor is not liable for attempt unless he has done all that he
intends to do to accomplish the target crime. 40 For example, a
would-be murderer commits the last proximate act when he
shoots at his intended victim.

41 Courts

since Eagleton uniformly

have rejected the last-proximate-act standard in favor of standards that give police a margin of safety by allowing them to

intervene after an actor's criminal intent becomes sufficiently
42
apparent.
The two basic standards developed since Eagleton reflect
different rationales behind criminalizing attempt. The first, a
"proximity" standard, focuses on the dangerousness of the actor's conduct and emphasizes what steps remain for him to take
to complete the object crime. 43 The second, and more recent
18169 Eng. Rep. 826 (Crim. App. 1855).
19Id. at 836.
40Low, supra note 33, at 132.
41 Id.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 321 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).

43 Id. at 321-26 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). The drafters of the Model Penal Code

criticized this approach on the ground that it does not give law-enforcement authorities
legal basis to intervene "until the actor ha[s] the power, or at least the apparent power,
to complete the crime forthwith." Id. at 322. They argued that the vagueness of the
standard provides little guidance in answering the question of how close is close enough
for preventive arrest. Id.
The tests that have been developed under the proximity standard are premised on
the notion that the primary purpose of the criminal law is to punish dangerous conduct.
Low, supra note 33, at 133. Courts employing proximity tests have suggested that
punishment of the actor is only justified if preparatory conduct comes dangerously close
to accomplishing the harmful result that is proscribed by the completed offense. Id. at
133-34.
The courts have developed three tests reflecting the proximity rationale: (1) the
"physical proximity" test; (2) the "indispensable element" test; and (3) the "dangerous
proximity" test. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 321-24 (Proposed Official

Draft 1985); Low, supra note 33, at 132-33. The physical-proximity test requires that
the actor come "very near to the accomplishment of the crime." People v. Rizzo, 246
N.Y. 334, 338, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (1927); see State v. Dumas, 118 Minn. 77, 84, 136
N.W. 311, 314 (1912) (noting that the test requires "something more than mere preparation, remote from the time and place of the intended crime"). The test measures
proximity in terms of necessary steps not taken, time, and geographical distance. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 321-22 (Proposed Official Draft 1985); Low, supra
note 33, at 132.
The indispensable-element test requires that the actor acquire control over every
element that is indispensable to his criminal objective. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01

commentary at 323-24 (Proposed Official Draft 1985); Low, supra note 33, at 133. The
rationale behind this test is that, until the defendant has gained control of those aspects
of his criminal scheme that the court identifies as indispensable, he remains insufficiently
proximate to success. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 11, at 505. In cases in which
the actor has failed to gain control of an indispensable element, the courts using this
test have refused to find that he has committed an attempt. See, e.g., People v. Oradorff,
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development, an "equivocality" standard, focuses on the dan-

gerousness of the actor himself and emphasizes what the actor
has already done in imputing criminal intent to his actions."

261 Cal. App. 2d 212, 216, 67 Cal. Rptr. 824, 826 (1968) (defendant was not guilty of
attempted theft by means of bunco scheme because the intended victim did not withdraw
money from the bank); In re Scherman, 40 Kan. 533, 541-42, 20 P. 277, 282-83 (1889)
(defendant was not guilty of attempting to defraud insurance company because the
named beneficiary neither filed a false claim nor agreed to do so). Courts have employed
this test most frequently in those cases that required that the defendant induce someone
else to take certain action. Low, supra note 33, at 133.
Some courts, however, have applied this test to cases in which the defendant could
not undertake the object offense until he obtained some item. See, e.g., United States
v. Stephens, 12 F. 52, 56 (D. Or. 1882) (noting that an actor who intended to smuggle
whiskey was not guilty of attempt because he failed to acquire whiskey); State v. Fielder,
210 Mo. 188, 201-02, 109 S.W. 580, 583 (1908) (actor who intended to vote illegally was
not guilty of attempt because he failed to obtain a ballot).
The dangerous-proximity test, espoused by Justice Holmes, requires that analysis of
an actor's nearness to completion of the offense be tempered by the gravity of the harm
threatened, the degree of apprehension aroused, and the probability that the conduct
would result in the intended offense. For Justice Holmes' exposition of this approach,
see Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (1897); O.W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 68-69 (1881). Such an approach would allow courts to interpret the
requirements of attempt more broadly in some offenses than in others. Although this
approach has the benefit ofallowing authorities to intervene earlier in schemes to commit
serious offenses, its reliance on judicial discretion invites widely divergent results in
drawing the line between attempt and preparation not only among different offenses,
but also among cases regarding attempts to commit the same offense. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.01 commentary at 322-23 (Proposed Official Draft 1985); Low, supra note
33, at 133-34.
A variant of the proximity standard is the "probable desistance" approach. Although
it is oriented largely toward the dangerousness of the actor's conduct, this approach
gives slightly more emphasis to the dangerousness of the actor himself. Under this test,
an actor's conduct constitutes an attempt if, in the ordinary and natural course of
events, without intervention from an outside source, it will result in the crime intended.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 324 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). Thus,

this test requires a judgment in each case that the actor had broken through a psychological barrier past which it was unlikely that he would turn back in his efforts to commit
the crime. Because there is no empirical basis for predicting the probability of desistance
at various stages of different criminal endeavors, however, most courts ostensibly using
this approach actually adopt a physical-proximity approach. Id. at 324-25; W. LAFAVE
& A. Scorr, supra note 11, at 507.
44The equivocality standard is premised on the notion that the primary purpose of
attempt law is to give law-enforcement officials a legal basis for subjecting dangerous
individuals to rehabilitative measures and restraints that adequately protect the public.
Unlike the proximity standard, the equivocality standard focuses on what the actor
already has done, instead of on what remains to be done. The equivocality test requires
that the actor's criminal intent be evident on the face of his conduct. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.01 commentary at 326-29 (Proposed Official Draft 1985); Low, supra note
33, at 134.
Consequently, the equivocality standard emphasizes the actor's intent as imputed
from his actions, rather than from the proximity of his actions to the actus reus of the
target crime. This approach is based on the assumption that there is a strong relationship
between the actor's state of mind and the external appearance of his acts:
While the actor's behavior is externally equivocal the criminal purpose in his
mind is likely to be unfixed-a subjective equivocality. But once the actor must
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The Model Penal Code has incorporated the equivocality standard in its definition of an attempt as "an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to
culminate in commission of the crime. '45 The Code goes on to
define certain preparatory acts as substantial steps that may be
"strongly corroborative of an actor's criminal purpose. ' 46 Because it does not consider proximity to the actus reus of the

object crime, the Model Penal Code's approach effectively
draws the line between attempt and preparation further back in

the continuum of preparatory acts leading to culmination of the
object offense.4 7 The Code's subjective approach also comes
desist or perform acts that he realizes would incriminate him if all external
facts were known, then in all probability a firmer state of mind exists.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 329 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
41MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (emphasis added).
The drafters of the Model Penal Code looked more favorably on the rationale behind
the equivocality approach-i.e., that the essential purpose of the criminal law is to
restrain dangerous persons rather than to deter dangerous or potentially dangerous
conduct. Id. § 5.01 commentary at 331. Nevertheless, the drafters rejected the "res ipsa
loquitur" or "unequivocality" test devised by Justice Salmond of New Zealand. As he
stated the test in Rex v. Barker, [1924] N.Z.L.R. 865 (N.Z. Ct. App.):
An act done with intent to commit a crime is not a criminal attempt unless it
is of such a nature as to be in itself sufficient evidence of the criminal intent
with which it is done. A criminal attempt is an act which shows criminal intent
on the face of it. The case must be one in which res ipsa loquitur.
Id. at 874 (Salmond, J.). For another early expression of support for the res ipsa loquitur
test, see, e.g., J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 388-89 (G. Williams 10th ed. 1947). Under
this test, the actus reus serves as the only proof of the intent and can have no purpose
other than the commission of the specific object crime. Id.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code criticized this test on the ground that it did not
consider other evidence of purpose, such as the actor's confession or another's testimony about the actor's representations of intent. Because few instances of conduct are
so unequivocal as to manifest purpose, the drafters reasoned that such a rigid standard
might exclude from liability externally equivocal acts guided by an unequivocal purpose
that prosecutors could corroborate using other means. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01
commentary at 328-31 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1985). The Model Penal
Code proposes three alternative subsections under which attempt liability can be imposed. Id. § 5.01(1). Subsection (a) covers cases in which the defendant mistakenly
believes that he has satisfied the actus reus of the substantive offense. Subsection (b)
punishes a defendant who believes that he has done everything necessary to cause the
prohibited result. Subsection (c) imposes liability on a defendant who believes that he
has taken a substantial step toward committing the object crime. Id.
If the defendant believes that he has completed the offense (subsection (a)), or has
done everything necessary to cause the prohibited result (subsection (b)), then he
necessarily has taken a substantial step toward committing the object crime. Thus, the
substantial-step requirement includes the other cases. On the proper relationship among
the three subsections, see Robbins, supra note 11, at 422-30.
47The drafters criticized proximity tests as vague and one-dimensional, emphasizing
physical and temporal proximity with insufficient regard to the dangerousness of the
actor's personality, as demonstrated only partially by the dangerousness of his actions.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 321-24 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). The
drafters noted several cases in which criminal purpose was clear, but in which the
defendant's actions were classified as preparatory only. Id. at 328.
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closer to punishing evil intent alone, but seeks to mitigate this
criticism by defining substantial step-the actus reus-in terms
of acts that constitute necessary elements of specific offenses.48
The acts from which the Code allows factfinders to infer wrongful intent and a resolute purpose to realize that intent, however,
49
include acts not necessarily unlawful in themselves.
B. Crimes in the Nature of Attempt

Prosecution for the substantive crime of attempt is just one
means by which the criminal law can reach conduct that merely
tends toward the commission of a completed offense. Several
other substantive crimes also have major inchoate elements.
These include assault and burglary, which originally dealt with
the most common forms of attempt prior to recognition of attempt as a discrete substantive offense,50 and the category of
offenses prohibiting possession of materials that the actor would
51
be likely to use to commit a crime.
1. Assault
At common law, a criminal assault was defined as an attempt,
combined with present ability, to commit a battery.52 Any crim48With the "substantial step" approach, the drafters introduced elements of the objective theory of criminality. One commentator argued, however, that the list of examples given in section 5.01(2) is so loosely drawn that it gives little guidance concerning
when the authorities can intervene. Such examples as "lying in wait" and "reconnoitering" seem too equivocal to allow criminal liability to attach to them in all cases.
Furthermore, the advent of the "stop and frisk" decisions beginning in the late 1960's
arguably rendered unnecessary the imposition of criminal liability so that police could
take action to prevent crimes. Misner, The New Attempt Laws: Unsuspected Threat to
the FourthAmendment, 33 STAN. L. REv. 201 (1981).
49Examples of acts from which a factfinder can infer intent and impose liability even
though the acts are not unlawful in themselves include lying in wait, enticement, and
reconnoitering. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(2)(a)-(c) (Proposed Official Draft
1985).
-o W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 11, at 497.
51 Id.
32 See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463, 465 (1885) (presenting and aiming loaded
gun was not assault because the defendant lacked present ability); Mullen v. State, 45
Ala. 43, 46 (1871) (defendant guilty of assault with intent to murder when he pointed a
gun that he believed to be loaded at another and pulled the trigger three times); People
v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 668-70, 30 P. 800, 801 (1892) (defendant who fired a pistol
through the roof, believing that a policeman was on the roof spying on him, was guilty
of assault with intent to murder because assault was defined as "unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another");
State v. Sears, 86 Mo. 169, 174 (1885) (if one points at another a gun that he believes
is loaded, he is guilty of assault); State v. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 305-07, 20 P. 625, 627-
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inal assault was a misdemeanor. 53 Because the law of assault
crystallized before the law of attempt, the element of present
ability requires an act with closer proximity to the completed
act-the causing of bodily injury contemplated by battery-than
does an attempt. 54 Nevertheless, many courts 55 and
commentators 56 have contended that, because assault is itself
28 (1889) (pointing an unloaded gun at another is not assault if assault is defined as
attempted battery, coupled with present ability) (superseded by statute, as stated in
State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354 (1984)); Smith v. State, 32 Tex. 593, 593
(1870) (defendant was not guilty of assault because he did not have the ability to commit
battery even though he manifested his intention to do so by threatening gestures and
accompanying words).
As evinced by the decisions above, actual present ability or the defendant's belief
that he possessed present ability was required. In most jurisdictions, however, apparent
present ability is sufficient. See, e.g., Wells v. State, 108 Ark. 312, 314-15, 157 S.W.
389, 390 (1913) (defendant who advanced with a knife toward a fleeing party was guilty
of assault because assault required apparent rather than actual ability); Macon v. State,
295 So. 2d 742, 745 (Miss. 1974) (if the defendant resists arrest with an unloaded gun,
he is guilty of assault with a deadly weapon because he effectively can resist arrest or

may cause the sheriff to shoot him, regardless of whether the gun is loaded); State v.
Machmuller, 196 Neb. 734, 738-39, 246 N.W.2d 69, 72 (1976) (a person who points an
unloaded weapon at another is guilty of assault if the person aimed at does not know
whether the gun is loaded but has no reason to believe that it is unloaded); State v.
Curtis, 14 Wash. App. 735, 736, 544 P.2d 768, 769 (1976) (one may commit seconddegree assault with an apparently loaded gun that is in fact unloaded because it is
apparent rather than actual present ability which gives effect to attempt); State v.

Thompson, 13 Wash. App. 1, 3, 533 P.2d 395, 397 (1975) (apparent power is the only
prerequisite of a statute punishing assault with a weapon likely to produce bodily harm).
"

MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 commentary at 174-80 (Proposed Official Draft 1980).

At common law, assault was but an attempt to commit a battery. Battery was a misdemeanor that punished any unlawful application of force to another willfully or in
anger. There was no common-law offense of aggravated battery. Attacks resulting in
injuries short of mayhem-intentional disfigurement of a disabling character-were
treated as ordinary batteries. Thus, all assaults were misdemeanors at common law.
The penalty at common law for a misdemeanor, however, was theoretically unlimited.
Thus, the common law punished assaults and attempts with relative severity even though
they were classified as misdemeanors. G.WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 606-07.
'4 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 23 N.C. 125, 127 (1840) (an actor does not commit an
assault until he begins to execute violence); Fox v. State, 34 Ohio St. 377, 380 (1878)
(assault is an act done toward the commission of a battery only if the next act would
appear to complete the battery); State v. Mortensen, 95 Utah 541, 550-51, 83 P.2d 261,
265-66 (1938) (Hansen, J., dissenting) (to prove an attempted rape, the prosecution may
prove an overt act that falls short of assault).
-' E.g., In re M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 521-22, 510 P.2d 33, 35-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91-92
(1973); People v. Gordon, 178 Colo. 406, 407, 498 P.2d 341, 342 (1972); Green v. State,
82 Ga. App. 402, 405, 61 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1950); People v. Maxwell, 36 Mich. App.
127, 128, 193 N.W.2d 176, 177 (1971); State v. Currence, 14 N.C. App. 263, 265, 188
S.E.2d 10, 12 (1972).
6 E.g., I W. BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME § 135, at 176-77 (1946) ("Thus embracery is
an attempt to bribe a juror, an assault an attempt to commit battery, and there can be
no attempt to commit these offenses."); W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, CRIMES 246 (7th
ed. 1967) ("There can be no such offense as an 'attempt to attempt' a crime. Since a
simple assault is nothing more than an attempt to commit a battery, and aggravated
assaults are nothing more than attempts to commit murder, rape, or robbery, an attempt
to commit an assault, whether simple or aggravated, is not a crime."); 2 J. STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 227 (1883) ("It is singular, but it is
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an attempt to commit a battery, the crime of attempted assault

cannot exist.
Currently, a few American jurisdictions define assault as an
attempt to commit a battery or to produce bodily harm,5 7 while

several more add to this definition the requirement that the actor
have a present ability to commit the battery.18 A majority of
states have weakened the inchoate aspect of assault by defining
it in the alternative as an unlawful act that places another in
reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.5 9 This adjunctive definition not only broadens the concept of criminal
assault to include aspects of assault's definition in tort, but also

treats assault as a substantive offense with a different mental
element than battery-an intent to put another in apprehension

of a battery, rather than an intent to commit a battery. 60 In
addition, an increasing number of states, following the Model
Penal Code, have entirely eliminated the inchoate aspect of
assault by redefining assault to constitute the completed offense
61
of battery.
also true, that there are a large number of crimes which it is impossible to attempt to
commit ....
[A] man could hardly attempt to commit perjury, or riot, or libel, or to
offer bad money, or to commit an assault, for an attempt to strike is an actual assault.");
I F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72, at 154 (R. Anderson ed. 1957)
("As an assault is an attempt to commit a battery, there can be no attempt to commit
an assault.").
-" See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 27 N.C. App. 576, 577, 219 S.E.2d 566, 568 (1975)
(defining assault as an "intentional offer or attempt by force or violence to do injury to
the person of another"); State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 788 (R.I. 1980) (assault is an
"unlawful attempt or offer, with force or violence, to do a corporal hurt to another,
whether from malice or wantonness") (quoting State v. Baker, 20 R.I. 275, 277, 38 A.
653, 654 (1897), overruled on othergrounds, State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 124 (R.I.
1983)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.224 (West 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-3-1(A) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 641 (West 1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-102(1)(a) (1978); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9(b) (1984).
-1 See People v. Gardner, 402 Mich. 460, 479, 265 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1978) (defining simple
assault as either an attempt to.commit a battery or an unlawful act that places another
in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery); CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West
1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-901(a) (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3408 (1981) ("apparent
ability" requires an "immediate apprehension of bodily harm"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-18-1(1) (1988); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-501(a) (1988).
59See People v. Gardner, 402 Mich. 460, 479, 265 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1978) (defining assault
as an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of an immediate
battery); State v. Thompson, 27 N.C. App. 576, 577, 219 S.E.2d 566, 567 (1975) (assault
is a "show of violence causing a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm"); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 602 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.011 (West 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.224 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.15 (McKinney 1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1023(a)(3) (1974).
60For discussion of the incorporation of the tort concept of assault into the criminal
law, see generally R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 13, at 161-63; Perkins, An
Analysis of Assault and Attempts to Assault, 47 MINN. L. REv. 71, 74-76 (1962).
6! For a listing of states that have adopted this approach and a discussion of the
Model Penal Code provision from which it derives, see infra note 538.

1989]

Double Inchoate Crimes

All of the states retaining the traditional definitions of assault
have expanded the concept statutorily by codifying so-called

"aggravated assaults" as distinct felony offenses. 62 The aggravating circumstance that justifies the more serious punishment
usually includes a grievous intent in the mind of the assailant,

such as in assault with intent to kill, or suggests a dangerous
means of perpetration, such as in assault with a deadly

weapon. 63 Some states have also enacted general aggravatedassault statutes that penalize an assault to commit any felony
not otherwise provided for by statute. 64 Consequently, an assault
with intent to commit a particular crime is the same as an
attempt to commit that crime, except that the former requires
a greater degree of proximity. 65
2. Burglary
At common law, burglary was defined as the breaking and
entering into the dwelling house of another at night with the
intent to commit a felony therein. 66 The common law classified
burglary, with arson, as a crime against habitation rather than
as a crime against property.67 The distinction reflected the
greater likelihood of violence incident to burglary, and justified
62 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 220 (West 1988) (with intent to commit rape, mayhem, sodomy, or oral copulation); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-21(a)(1) (1984 & Cum. Supp.
1987) (with intent to murder, rape, or rob); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, §§ 15 (with
intent to murder or maim), 18 (with intent to rob, being armed), 18A (with intent to
commit felony during burglary), 20 (with intent to rob, not being armed) (Law. Co-op.
1980 & Cum. Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-102 (with intent to commit felony),
39-2-103 (with intent to murder), -104 (with intent to rob) (1982); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-51
(1982) (shooting, stabbing, etc., with intent to maim, kill, etc.).
6 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 244 (with caustic chemical), 245 (with deadly
weapon) (West 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265 § 15B(b) (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Cum.
Supp. 1987) (using dangerous weapon); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.82 (West 1968)
(with dangerous weapon); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-2(a) (1978) (with deadly weapon);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-34.2 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (with deadly weapon on police officer,
fireman, or emergency medical-services personnel); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 645
(West 1983) (with dangerous weapon).
'4 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1204 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1987) (includes
assaults on law-enforcement officers and teachers); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 12-2(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3410 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-2
(1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-18-1.1 (1988).
'4R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 13, at 172.
6Id.
at 246; cf. Comment, Breaking as an Element in Burglary, 23 YALE L.J. 451,
466 (1914) (noting early statutes that eliminated the distinction between dwellings and
other structures and conveyances).
67 R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 13, at 246; Note, Statutory Burglaty-The
Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 411 (1951).
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treating the offense as a felony. 6 Likewise, the importance the
common-law courts accorded the security of the home and the

increased chance of violence to the dwelling's inhabitants, as
well as the undeveloped state of attempt law, justified imposing
69
liability on an actor before he completed the intended felony.

Burglary at common law was but a form of attempt, in which

the required elements merely constituted a step taken toward
the commission of some other offense. 0 Statutory revision of
the elements of burglary, however, has resulted in an offense

even more similar to attempt. 7' Burglary is no longer limited to
dwellings, but in most jurisdictions embraces any structure,

including uninhabited buildings, tents, boats, cars, and even
motorcycles. 72 Most jurisdictions have abolished the require-

ments of breaking 73 and of committing the offense under cover
6s

W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 800; Note, Rationale of the Law of

Burglary, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 1009, 1022-23 (1951); Note, supra note 67, at 411.
I W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 11, at 800; Note, supra note 91, at 1020.
70 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 commentary at 62-63 (Proposed Official Draft 1980).
The Code's commentators contended that burglary developed due to the common law's
strict proximity requirement for attempt, rather than as a substitute for the as yet
undeveloped attempt law. Id.
71 See Note, supra note 67, at 433-40 (noting effacement of the distinction between
elements of attempt and burglary and decrying fact that they are inconsistently
punished).
72 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.310 (1983) (any building for second-degree burglary); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-103 (West 1985) (buildings); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 31B-33 (1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.20, -.25 (McKinney 1987); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(a) (Purdon 1983) (limited to occupied structures).
Most state statutes, however, treat burglary of a dwelling or inhabited building as a
higher degree of the offense. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02(3) (West 1976 &
Supp. 1988) (upgrading burglary if "there is a human being in the structure or conveyance
at the time the offender entered or remained in the structure or conveyance"); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 708-810(1)(c) (1985) (enhancing sentence for offender who "recklessly
disregards a risk that a building is the dwelling of another, and the building is such a
dwelling"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:60 (West 1986) (includes any structure or conveyance in which a person is present if the defendant is armed with a dangerous weapon
or commits a battery while committing the burglary); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.160(l)(3)
(Vernon 1979) (if "[tihere is present in the structure another person who is not a
participant in the crime"); S.C. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16-11-310 to -311 (Law. Co-op.
1985 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
7 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1506 to -1508 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1987);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:62 (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.160-.170 (Vernon
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-2 (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (Purdon
1983). Contra IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 29-34 (1983); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-17-19 to -33 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 28-507
(1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-8-1 to -5.1 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 39-3-401 to -406(1982).
Several states, although not requiring a breaking, make breaking and entering an
element of a more serious degree of burglary. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 14-18
(Law. Co-op. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110 to -.111
(West 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1431, 1435 (West 1983); VA. CODE ANN.

§ 18.2-89, -90 (1988); W.
daytime).

VA. CODE

§ 61-3-11(a) (1984) (breaking and entering during
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of the night. 74 Also, most jurisdictions have diluted the specificintent requirement by expanding the scope of the object offense
to include all crimes, rather than only felonies. 75 The modern
law of burglary thus aims to protect not only persons in their
76
dwellings, but also people and property within any structure.
Burglary is distinguished from attempt in that it is not subject
to the rule of merger. 77 An actor who makes an unprivileged

entry into a structure and commits a crime therein is criminally
liable for both the completed offense and the burglary. 78 Thus,
71 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-101, -103 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 11, §§ 824-826 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1431, 1435, 1438 (West 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-301 (1983).
Some state statutes, however, treat entry of a dwelling during the nighttime as an
aggravating factor. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-102 (West 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 826 (1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 29, 30(a) (1982); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1(11) (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 12.1-22-02(2)(a) (1976).
75 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-2 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.20.30 (McKinney 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1431 (West 1983) (applicable to
dwellings only); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 22-32-1, -3, -8 (1988); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-1 (1988) (theft and felonies
only); IOWA CODE ANN. § 713.1 (West 1979 & Cum. Supp. 1987) (felony, assault, or
theft); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 30, 32 (with intent to steal or commit felony), 33,
33A (with intent to steal) (1982); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.110, -.111 (West
1968 & Cum. Supp. 1987) (felony or larceny); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-401, -403, 404 (1982) (felony).
Further, several courts have held that an unlawful intrusion into the dwelling of
another is itself sufficient to support a jury's finding of intent to steal. E.g., People v.
Soto, 53 Cal. 415, 416 (1879); People v. Shepardson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 33, 36, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 809, 812 (1967); Ex parte Seyfried, 74 Idaho 467, 469-70, 264 P.2d 685, 687 (1953);
Garrett v. State, 350 P.2d 983, 985 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah
2d 363, 365, 359 P.2d 486, 487 (1961).
76Note, supra note 67, at 433. This shift in emphasis is manifested in most jurisdictions
by the division of the offense into varying degrees. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing different grades of burglary). Not only do elements of the
common-law offense (such as dwelling and nighttime) serve as aggravating conditions,
but other elements that reflect the offense's early rationale-protection of people-also
increase the severity of the offense. See, e.g., Reeves v. State. 245 Ala. 237, 240, 16
So. 2d 699, 702 (1943) (presence of person in dwelling brings a greater penalty); People
v, Stroff, 134 Cal. App. 670, 673-74, 26 P.2d 315, 316 (1933) (carrying a gun during a
burglary increases the penalty).
7 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 827 (1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 401(3) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.070 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-407 (1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.050 (1977). ContraN.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1(IV)
(1986) (providing that courts cannot convict a person for both burglary and the object
crime unless the latter is a class A felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (Purdon
1983) (requiring merger unless the object crime is a first- or second-degree felony); cf.
Maynes v. People, 169 Colo. 186, 192, 454 P.2d 797, 800 (1969) (concurrent rather than
consecutive sentences are appropriate, because burglary and larceny are parts of a
single transaction); People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45 (multiple
convictions with concurrent sentences are appropriate if indictments for burglary and
the object crime arise from a series of incidental or closely related acts) (superseded by
statute as stated in People v. DeSimone, 108 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 439 N.E.2d 1311 (1982)),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977).
78 See, e.g., Mead v. State, 489 P.2d 738, 740-43 (Alaska 1971) (upholding convictions
and consecutive sentences for burglary and larceny in building arising from same acts);
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the crime of burglary allows punishment for the offense com-

mitted and also for the attempt to commit it in a particular
manner-by making an unprivileged entry. 79 Compounded liability is imposed to punish both aspects of intent in burglary:

(1) the intent to make an unlawful entry; and (2) the added
mental element of intent to commit another offense within the

violated structure. 80

3. Constituent-Element Crimes
Many modern criminal codes include offenses defined in terms

of conduct in itself arguably harmless, but still penalized because it very likely constitutes a step towards the harm punished
by a completed offense. These crimes include the possessory
offenses-such as possession of burglars' tools,8 ' possession of

People v. White, 115 Cal. App. 2d 828, 829-30, 253 P.2d 108, 109 (1953) (upholding
convictions and consecutive sentences for burglary, robbery, and assault with a deadly
weapon arising from failed theft from store) (superseded by statute as stated in People
v. Burns, 157 Cal. App. 3d 185, 203 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1984)); Jenkins v. State, 240 A.2d
146, 148-49 (Del. 1968) (upholding convictions for burglary and felony murder arising
from same unauthorized entry), aff'd sub nom. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213
(1969).
79See State v. Benton, 161 Conn. 404,411, 288 A.2d 411,414 (1971) (crime of breaking
and entering is a distinct offense that is complete without actual larceny).
80See Mead v. State, 489 P.2d 738, 742 (Alaska 1971) (allowing merger "would ignore
the law's traditional view that breaking and entering is itself a serious offense"). But
see MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 commentary at 61-66 (Proposed Official Draft 1980);

Comment, Burglary: Punishment Without Justification, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 391. The
expanded, modem definition of burglary has become increasingly subject to criticism.
With the expansion of the concept of "dwelling" to include almost any structure and
the relaxation of the requirement of "night," the chance that the structure will be
inhabited during the unlawful entry is greatly reduced. Consequently, the greater possibility of danger over other trespasses that the earlier concept of burglary aimed to
deter is no longer a consideration in the offense's rationale.
Furthermore, by relaxing the specific-intent requirement to include almost any completed offense and imputing from the mere fact of entry the intent to commit a crime
therein, courts punish burglary far more severely than most of the offenses that the
defendant might commit within the structure. Combined with the possibility of punishment for both the burglary and the completed offense committed within the structurea practice allowed in almost all jurisdictions-modem burglary statutes create an unjustifiable disparity: a defendant who attempts to commit a crime within a structure can
be punished far more severely than if he completed the offense a few feet away. It is
difficult to see that a crime necessarily entails more harm when it is committed in a
building or a car, so as to justify the imposition of additional punishment. Note, supra
note 68, at 1024-25.
8" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-106 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 828 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 19-2 (Smith-Hurd 1979); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 164.235 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-408 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
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a forged instrument with intent to issue or use it,82 possession
of narcotics with intent to distribute them, 83 possession of an
instrument adapted for the use of narcotics by subcutaneous
injection, 84 possession of a weapon with intent to use it against

explosives with intent
another unlawfully, 85 and possession of
6
to use them in committing an offenseA
The rationale behind punishing these offenses is that it is
improbable that an individual would possess such materials unless he intended to use them to commit a specific crime.8 7 To a

large extent, the law imputes an intent to commit a completed
crime to the mere act of possession.8 8 For example, most stat"ISee, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 475 (bills and notes), 475a (checks), 476 (fictitious
instruments), 484i (credit cards) (West 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 55 (1987) (forged
7
physician's prescription); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.15 p (West 1968 & Cum.
Supp. 1988) (credit cards with intent to sell or circulate); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2913.31(a)(3) (Anderson 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-21-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (forged
automobile certificate of title, registration, or license plate).
For statutes that punish possession of forgery devices, see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 205.790 (1987) (means of forging credit cards); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-02 (1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1550.31 (West 1983) (means of forging credit cards); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-49-6 (1981) (same); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-171 (device for forging
written instruments), -196 (device for forging credit cards) (1988). For statutes that
punish possession of counterfeit items, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 472 (seals), 479
(gold or silver, coins) (West 1988); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 267, §§ 12 (bills), 17, 18
(coins), 27 (non-current bills) (Law. Co-op. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.251
(bank or municipal notes), -.254, -.260 (coins) (West 1968); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3808 (bank bill, note, check, or other instrument), -817 (coin) (1982). For statutes that
punish possession of counterfeiting devices, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 480 (West
1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 831.18 (device for counterfeiting bills), -. 19 (device for
counterfeiting coins) (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 267, § 20
(Law. Co-op. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-14 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-02
(1987).
"ISee, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.030-.070 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 4751-4757 (1983 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-48-4-6 (narcotic drugs), -11
(marijuana, hashish oil, or hashish) (Bums 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 220.03-.21 (controlled substances), 221.05-.30 (marijuana) (McKinney 1980 & Supp.
1988).
4 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-550 (1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-32.2 (1988);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-8.3 (Bums 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1111
(hypodermic apparatuses), 1111-A (other drug paraphernalia) (1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-10-103 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-441, -442 (1985).
81See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1987); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-202 (possession of machine gun), -206 (carrying concealed
weapon) (West 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 527.020 (carrying
concealed weapon), -. 040 (possession of handgun by convicted felon) (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-7-2 (carrying deadly weapon), -3 (carrying firearm
in liquor store), -8 (possession of switchblade), -16 (possession of firearm by felon)
(1988).
6 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1338 (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:54.2
(delayed-action incendiary device), :54.3 (bomb) (West 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.020
(1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-8-334 (destructive device), -335 (explosives) (1987); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6161 (Purdon 1983) (carrying explosives on conveyance).
17 See J. HALL, supra note 10, at 584-85.
18 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 342-43 (Proposed Official Draft
1985) (possession of incriminating materials is a "substantial step" toward commission
of the completed offense). The Code's drafters noted:
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utes penalizing possession of narcotics with intent to distribute

erect a legal presumption that the added mental element exists
if the defendant was holding a certain controlled substance or

9
more than a specified quantity of the controlled substance.8

Also, in some jurisdictions, the possession of a controlled fire-

arm such as a sawed-off shotgun or an automatic weapon raises
a presumption that the possessor intended to use it for an unlawful purpose.90
In addition to possessory crimes, some jurisdictions punish
conduct that constitutes only part of the conduct required by a
specific completed offense. 9' These substantive offenses are de92
fined in terms of using certain items for a particular purpose,
offering to perform an illegal act, 93 attracting an intended vic-

tim, 94 or being in a certain place for a bad purpose.9 5 This
[The existing authorities] showfl a tendency to make criminal the possession
of materials to be employed in the commission of a crime when such materials
[are] distinctively suited to criminal purposes. The incriminating character of
such distinctive materials would usually be apparent to the actor himself, and
his possession of them would generally manifest a major commitment to the

crime contemplated.
Id.
19See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4224(e)-(f) (1982).
90MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 342 n. 193 (Proposed Official Draft 1985);
see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12023 (West 1982 & Cum. Supp. 1988); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.41.030 (1988).

91Although classifying crimes as "constituent act" offenses or possession offenses is
useful analytically, the classifications may overlap. Offenses such as carrying a concealed weapon, for example, arguably fit within both classifications. See supra note 85
(listing statutes). In addition, some states use the two approaches to punish the same
type of behavior. Compare infra note 508 (listing statutes that forbid persons from
altering identification numbers on motor vehicles) with infra note 519 (listing statutes
that punish possession of certain types of property with altered identification numbers).
92 Some states punish the use of instruments or drugs to induce a miscarriage and not
simply individuals who actually induce an abortion. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-31a (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3 (1972); VA. CODE § 18.2-71 (1988);
ALA. CODE § 13A-12-50 to -58 (1982) (maintenance of electric bells, wire or signals,
or dumbwaiters for use in communicating with barricaded rooms in business establishment serves as prima facie evidence of gambling); IDAHO CODE § 18-914 (1987) (administering drugs with felonious intent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 986 (West 1983)
(installing communications facilities for gamblers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 12 (1974)
(use of anesthetics with intent to commit a crime); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-10 (1984)
(administering anesthetic to female save in presence of third person).
93See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3002 (Cum.Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1342 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 18-5613(I)(a) (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3512 (1981
& Cum.Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 853 (1983).
94 For statutes that punish enticement of a minor for sexual abuse, see, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-69 (1982) (attempt included); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-6 (SmithHurd Cum. Supp. 1988); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.145a (West 1968); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-1 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.12, 948.07 (West 1982 & Cum. Supp.
1988).
9-Most of the statutes of this type create offenses relating to prostitution. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(a)(1) (West 1982) (residing in or frequenting a house of
prostitution); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-204.1 (1986) (loitering for the purpose of engaging
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category of offenses shares with the Model Penal Code's definition of attempt the underlying purpose of punishing an actor
for those acts that he has already committed, rather than the
proximity of his acts to a completed offense. 96 As with the
Code's definition of attempt, 97 "these statutes reach conduct
that is merely preparatory" as measured by traditional proximity
standards and, therefore, "is not encompassed within most jurisdictions' general law of attempts." 98

C. Conspiracy
The modem concept of conspiracy as a separate substantive
crime originated in the seventeenth-century English courts. 99
The common law defined conspiracy as a combination of two
or more persons to perform an unlawful act or a lawful act by
unlawful means. 10 0 Like burglary, the mental element of conspiracy has a dual aspect: (1) an intent to agree to commit an
offense; and (2) the added mental element of an intent to commit
a specific target crime. 01' Also as with burglary, the common
law does not generally merge the conspiracy into the target

in prostitution). But cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 167.222 (1987) (prohibiting persons from

"frequenting a place where controlled substances are used").
96See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing Model Penal Code definition of attempt). An early example of the constituent-act approach is the Waltham
Black Act of 1722, 9 Geo. 1, ch. 22. The Act punished persons who went about armed
and disguised, or merely disguised. The original intent of the Act was to curb depredations by masked bandits, particularly in Waltham, Hampshire, where the followers
of Robin Hood committed their deeds with their faces blackened. The scope of the
Act's prohibition against acts of violence, however, allowed more widespread use. On
several occasions, it was used to punish undisguised individuals who shot at others. I
L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 49-56 (1948).
9'MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
91W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 11, at 497-98.
99See Starling's Case, 82 Eng. Rep. 1039 (1664); Poulterers' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813
(1611). For detailed accounts of the development of the law of conspiracy, see generally
Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. L.J. 328 (1947); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922).
100See Rex v. Jones, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (1832) (conspiracy indictment must
"charge a conspiracy either to do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means");
Rex v. Journeymen Taylors of Cambridge, 88 Eng. Rep. 9, 10 (1721) ("a conspiracy of
any kind is illegal, although the matter about which they conspired might have been
lawful for them, or any of them, to do, if they had not conspired to do it").
101W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 11, at 525, 535; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 13, at 697; A. Hamo, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy,89 U. PA. L. REv. 624,
631 (1941).
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offense if both are successfully completed.10 2 Rather, both the
common and statutory law of conspiracy allow the compounding
of penalties for conspiracy and its realized object offense. 13
Statutory revision of the offense produced a hierarchy of penalties comparable in relative magnitude to the object crimes. 14
Although some statutes require only the act of agreement, most
jurisdictions require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.10 5 The common law and many modern statutes require the
agreement of two or more parties to constitute the actus reus
of conspiracy. 06

'02 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 641, 643 (1946) (crime of tax fraud
did not merge with distinct crime of conspiring to commit tax fraud); Johl v. United
States, 370 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1966) (because it is possible to make a false statement
to immigration agency without conspiring, the crime of conspiring to marry for the sole
purpose of upgrading immigration status did not merge with the completed offense);
People v. Ormsby, 310 Mich. 291, 297, 17 N.W.2d 187, 189-90 (1945) (court can convict
defendant of conspiracy to violate gambling laws even if it does not find substantive
offense); People v. Cadle, 202 Misc. 415, 417-19, 114 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452-55 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1952) (crime of conspiracy to conduct a lottery constituted a distinct offense for
which indictment was proper, even though the prosecution had also charged the completed offense).
103 See, e.g., People v. Hoyt, 20 Cal. 2d 306, 316-17, 125 P.2d 29, 35 (1942) (conspiracy
to rob and robbery); People v. Escobedo, 138 Cal. App. 2d 490, 493, 292 P.2d 230, 232
(1956) (conspiracy to commit abortion and abortion); People v. Havel, 134 Cal. App.
2d 213, 217, 285 P.2d 317, 320 (1955) (conspiracy to escape and attempted escape);
People v. Fratianno, 132 Cal. App. 2d 610, 615, 282 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1955) (conspiracy
to extort and attempted extortion); People v. Campbell, 132 Cal. App. 2d 262, 267-68,
281 P.2d 912, 915-16 (1955) (conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary); People v.
Brown, 131 Cal. App. 2d 643, 645-50,281 P.2d 319, 322-24 (1955) (conspiracy to murder
and assault with intent to murder). Contra, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-2 (1988); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IDAHO CODE § 18-301 (1987); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 706.4 (West 1979); Mo. REV. STAT. § 564.016.7 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:1-8a(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.485(3) (1987); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 939.72(2) (West 1982); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.07(l)(b), 5.05(3) (Proposed
Official Draft 1985).
1o4See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-3-401,
-404 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 706.1, 706.3
(West 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 151 (1983).
10-See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-48 (West 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-105a

(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-8
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.31 (West

(1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.175(2) (West 1987);
1982 & Cum. Supp. 1987).

The Model Penal Code considers the seriousness of the target crime to determine
whether an overt act in furtherance of the agreement is required. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.03(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) ("No person may be convicted of conspiracy to
commit a crime, other than a felony of the first or second degree, unless an overt act
in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by
a person with whom he conspired.").
106See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a48 (West 1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-1701 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-1-1 (1972 & Cum.
Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-6 (1981).
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The Model Penal Code 0 7 and many jurisdictions, 108 however,

have adopted the notion of unilateralconspiracy. 0 9 This concept
limits the defense of impossibility to agree by holding liable any
party who believes he has consummated an agreement, even

though the other party is incapable of committing the crime,
immune to prosecution for it, or only pretending to go along
with the importuning party's scheme.110
Like burglary, the purpose behind the substantive offense of

conspiracy is twofold: (1) preventing a completed offense; and
(2) punishing a special danger."' While burglary focuses on the
violence incident to breach of the dwelling, 112 conspiracy focuses on the additional dangers inherent in group activity. 113 In
theory, once an individual reaches an agreement with one or
more persons to perform an unlawful act, it becomes more likely
that the individual will feel a greater commitment to carry out
his original intent, providing a heightened group danger. 114
107

MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.03, 5.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). Consistent with

the Code's emphasis on subjective criminality, its conspiracy provision is phrased in
terms of individualliability:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a
crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he agrees
with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage
in conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit
such crime ....
Id. § 5.03(l)(a). The unilateral-conspiracy doctrine is evident in the Code's provision
pertaining to the doctrine of impossibility as a defense to solicitation and conspiracy:
"[I]t is immaterial to the liability of a person who solicits or conspires with another to
commit a crime that the person whom he solicits or with whom he conspires is irresponsible or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commission of the
crime." Id. § 5.04(l)(b).
13 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-2-201(1), -205 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 511-513, 523(b) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-04 (1985); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.01 (Anderson 1987); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1974); see

also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1988) (interpreted by Illinois Supreme Court as embodying bilateral-conspiracy approach, People
v. Foster, 99 Ill. 2d 48, 457 N.E.2d 405 (1983)).
'09 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) commentary at 398-402 (Proposed Official Draft

1985).
I10

Id.

M Id. at 387.

112See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
"3

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 commentary at 386-91 (Proposed Official Draft

1985).
"4 See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) ("concerted action ...
decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of
criminality"); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920,
924 (1959) ("A conspirator who has committed himself to support his associates may
be less likely to violate this commitment than he would be to revise a purely private
decision.").
Furthermore, the act of involving others in a criminal scheme lessens the individual's
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As an inchoate crime, conspiracy allows law-enforcement officials to intervene at a stage far earlier than attempt does. 1 5 To

obtain an attempt conviction, the prosecutor must prove that
the actor performed an act beyond mere preparation or took a
substantial step toward committing a completed crime. To ob-

tain a conspiracy conviction, however, the prosecutor need only
prove that the conspirators agreed to undertake a criminal

ability to arrest its development if he decides to abandon it. In complex criminal schemes
that require the involvement of two or more actors, the division of labor made possible
by combined efforts increases the probability of success. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 11, at 531. This group-danger rationale provides an explanation, inter alia,
for compounding the sentences for conspiracy and its realized object, imposing vicarious
liability on co-conspirators for one conspirator's acts, and allowing a concomitant
exception to the hearsay rule for co-conspirators' statements. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.03 commentary at 389 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
The relaxation of procedural and substantive safeguards in conspiracy prosecutions
has made the offense a favorite weapon of prosecutors, but also has made it an object
ofjudicial and academic criticism. See generally Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 452-53 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that relaxation of procedural
safeguards in conspiracy trials infringes on defendants' rights); Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54 GEo. L.J. 133 (1965); Klein, Conspiracy-The
Prosecutor'sDarling, 24 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1957); Developments in the LawCriminal Conspiracy, supra.
Criticism arises from the dangers of prejudice to individual defendants inherent in the
prosecution of criminal organizations-the primary danger being that a defendant will
be tarred by the same brush used to mark the guilt of a codefendant. The past use of
conspiracy law against labor organizers and political protestors has also emphasized the
conflict of conspiracy law's reliance on the group-danger rationale with the freedoms of
speech and association guaranteed by the first amendment. See generally Nathanson,
Freedom of Association and the Quest for Internal Security: Conspiracy from Dennis
to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 153 (1970).
Indeed, critics of the Model Penal Code's unilateral-conspiracy approach rely on the
premises of the group-danger rationale. One commentator argued that
[t]he so-called unilateral approach does make some sense. As the supporters
say, the unsuccessful conspirator did try to conspire so his state of mind is
clearly a criminal one. True enough, but did he enter into a conspiracy? After
all, the conspiracy charge subjects a defendant to criminal liability at a stage
earlier than any other inchoate offense and may raise grave procedural problems at the time of trial. And, the reason for such results is that there is a
special, added danger, resulting from group planning. Yet, in the unilateral
situation there is no conspiracy, no added group danger, for the fact remains
that there was not an agreement between two persons. The defendant may
have wanted to agree, may have intended to agree, and may have even believed
he had agreed; but there was no agreement, no true planning by two or more
persons, no meeting of the minds between the parties.

P.

MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES §

2.04, at

2-11 to 2-12 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
-'"
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 commentary at 387-88 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).

1989]

Double Inchoate Crimes

scheme or, at most, that they took an overt step in pursuance
117
of the conspiracy. 1 6 Even an insignificant act may suffice.
D. Solicitation

Solicitation, or incitement," 8 is the act of trying to persuade
another to commit a crime that the solicitor desires and intends
to have committed. 1 9 The mens rea of solicitation is a specific
intent to have someone commit a completed crime. 120 As in
common-law conspiracy, disclosure of the criminal scheme to
another party constitutes a part of the actus reus of solicitation. '2' But, while the actus reus of a conspiracy is an agreement
116Id. at 387. Because most conspiracies are secret, the prosecution can rarely present
direct evidence of the agreement. Thus, prosecutors frequently must "rely on inferences
drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators." Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939); see also W. LAFAvE & A. Scott, supra
note 11, at 530, 531 (discussing element of agreement).
117MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) commentary at 454 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
For examples of acts sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy, see Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298, 333-34 (1957) (attending liwful meeting), overruled on
other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); United States v. Harris, 409
F.2d 77, 84 (4th Cir.) (delivering stolen goods), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 965 (1969); United
States v. Fellabaum, 408 F.2d 220, 223-24 (7th Cir.) (making phone call), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 858 (1969); Bary v. United States, 248 F.2d 201, 208 (10th Cir. 1957) (attending
lawful meeting); Kaplan v. United States, 7 F.2d 594, 595-96 (2d Cir.) (attending interview with lawyer), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925).
An act by a conspirator is sufficient to implicate all parties to the conspiracy. See,
e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556-57, 559 (1947); United States v.
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915); Bannon v. United States, 156 U.S. 464, 468 (1895).
The special-danger rationale modifies the standards defining attempt by treating the
act of engaging another in a criminal scheme as an act unequivocally manifesting the
actor's criminal intent:
The act of agreeing with another to commit a crime, like the act of soliciting,
is concrete and unambiguous; it does not present the infinite degrees and
variations possible in the general category of attempts. The danger that truly
equivocal behavior may be misinterpreted as preparation to commit a crime is
minimized; purpose must be relatively firm before the commitment involved
in agreement is assumed.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 commentary at 388 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). Con-

spiracy law's focus on the agreement as the harmful act, however, reflects a policy that
seeks to minimize the danger of attaching liability to equivocal acts that only appear to
further a substantive offense. Id.
118See generally Robbins, supra note 19, at 1502 (noting that among the terms used
with solicitation are: advising, attempting to persuade another, counseling, encouraging,
enticing, entreating, hiring, importuning, inciting, instigating, procuring, requesting,
stimulating, and urging).
"9 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 11, at 486; Robbins, supra note 19, at 1502.
120W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 11, at 489-90; see 18 U.S.C. § 373 (Supp. IV
1986).
,21MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 explanatory note at 365; id. commentary at 368-69
(Proposed Official Draft 1985).
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with another to commit a specific completed offense, 122 the actus

reus of a solicitation includes an attempt to persuade another to
commit a specific offense. 123 A necessary element of solicitation
is the solicitant's rejection of the solicitor's request. 24 Thus,
solicitation can be riewed as an attempt to conspire.'25
The view that the judicial system should punish one who
unsuccessfully solicits another by reason of the solicitation itself

'22See Rex v. Sterling, 83 Eng. Rep. 331 (1663) (all but one judge held that no overt
act was needed; the remaining judge held the unlawful gathering or combination to be
the act required); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912) ("at common
law it was not necessary to aver or prove an unlawful act").
123 See, e.g., People v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 311, 314, 288 P.2d 503, 505 (1955) (it is
immaterial that the actor neither consummated nor took any steps toward consummating
the object of solicitation, because the offense of solicitation is complete when the actor
solicits another to commit a crime); People v. Haley, 102 Cal. App. 2d 159, 164-65, 277
P.2d 48, 51 (1951) (person who solicits another to commit or to join in committing an
offense is guilty even though the offense solicited is never committed and the other
person rejects the importunity); State v. Hampton, 210 N.C. 283, 285, 186 S.E. 251,
252 (1936) (rejecting defendant's contention that interposition of a resisting will between
his bare solicitation and the proposed act afforded him the opportunity to withdraw the
solicitation, because solicitation was complete before the resisting will refused to assent
or cooperate).
The Model Penal Code's drafters explained the rationale behind punishing solicitation:
Purposeful solicitation presents dangers calling for preventive intervention and
is sufficiently indicative of a disposition towards criminal activity to call for
liability. Moreover, the fortuity that the person solicited does not -agree to
commit or attempt to commit the incited crime plainly should not relieve the
solicitor of liability, when otherwise he would be a conspirator or an
accomplice.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 commentary at 366 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). Thus,
to allow a solicitor to defend on the ground that the solicitant refused to commit the
object offense effectively would nullify the crime of solicitation. Illustrating this principle, one commentator explained that,
[i]f the solicitant agrees to commit the crime, both he and the solicitor are
liable for conspiracy; if the solicitant attempts to commit the crime, both are
liable for attempt; if the solicitant actually completes the crime, the solicitor
is liable, under principles of accomplice liability, for being either an accessory
before the fact or a principal in the crime that he solicited. Only when the
solicitant rejects the request is the solicitor liable for the crime of solicitation.
Robbins, supra note 19, at 1502.
124R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 13, at 649-52. If the party solicited acts on
the solicitor's suggestion and goes far enough to incur guilt for a more serious offense,
then the solicitor is also guilty of the more serious offense, rather than the solicitation.
See State v. Jones, 83 N.C. 605, 607 (1881) (woman who advised or procured rape was
guilty as principal). If the party solicited goes far enough to incur liability for attempt,
then the solicitor is also guilty of attempt. Id. at 606-07; Uhl v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.
706, 709-11 (1849). If the solicited party consummates the object crime, then both he
and the solicitor are guilty of the completed crime. People v. Harper, 25 Cal. 2d 862,
877, 156 P.2d 249, 257-58 (1945); State v. Primus, 226 N.C. 671,674-75, 40 S.E.2d 113,
115 (1946).
'25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 commentary at 365-66 (Proposed Official Draft 1985);
see also G. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 669; Scott, The Common Law Offence of
Incitement to Commit Crime, 4 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 289, 290 n.1 (1975).
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is a recent development in criminal jurisprudence. 126 Viewed
solely as an inchoate offense, solicitation appears to impose
criminal liability on an act that presents no significant social
danger, and approaches punishing evil intent alone. 127 Penalties
for solicitation allow the judiciary to punish conduct far back
on the continuum of acts leading to a completed crime--conduct
128

that constitutes "mere preparation" by attempt standards.

The rationale for the substantive offense of solicitation is that,
like conspiracy, it treats the special hazards posed by potential
concerted criminal activity. 129 As with conspiracy, the specialdanger rationale modifies the standards of attempt to place liability at a far earlier stage than in an attempt. 130 The act of
revealing the criminal scheme to another extends beyond mere

preparation because the act is so unequivocal as to make evident
the solicitor's criminal intent. 131

Solicitation developed as a common-law notion, 3 2 but Amer-

ican jurisdictions increasingly have defined the offense statuto126 Prior to the nineteenth century, the English common-law courts held indictable
two specific forms of solicitation: importuning another to commit either a forgery for
use in a trial or perjury, Rex v. Johnson, 89 Eng. Rep. 753, 753, 756, 2 Show. K.B. 1,
1, 3-4 (1679), and offering a bribe to a public official. Rex v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep.
308, 310-11, 4 Burr. 2494, 2499 (1769). Not until the case of Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng.
Rep. 269, 2 East 5 (1801), did the English courts recognize solicitation as a distinct
substantive offense. See Curran, Solicitation:A Substantive Crime, 17 MINN. L. REV.
499 (1933); Robbins, supra note 19, at 1502.
127 See I NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, WORKING PAPERS 370 (1970) ("[D]espite the earnestness of the solicitation, the actor is merely
engaging in talk which may never be taken seriously."). By placing an independent actor
between the potential crime and himself, the solicitor has both reduced the likelihood
of success in the ultimate criminal object and manifested an unwillingness to commit
the crime himself. See State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 1236, 6 S.W.2d 609, 615 (1928)
(White, J., concurring) (solicitor is not significant menace since he has manifested his
reluctance to commit the crime himself); People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 64-65, 148
N.E. 786, 790 (1925) (solicitor is not dangerous because he has placed the will of an
independent moral agent between him and the commission of the offense).
,18See Gervin v. State, 212 Tenn. 653, 658, 371 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1963) (solicitation
requires less proximity to success than does attempt).
,29MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 commentary at 365-66 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
The Code's drafters reasoned that
a solicitation is, if anything, more dangerous than a direct attempt, because it
may give rise to the special hazard of cooperation among criminals ....
Moreover, the solicitor, working his will through one or more agents, manifests
an approach to crime more intelligent and masterful than the efforts of his
hireling.
Id.
130See 1 J. TURNER, RUSSELL ON CRIME 201-02 (12th ed. 1964).
'3, MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 commentary at 366 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
132 See, e.g., Meyer v. State, 47 Md. App. 679, 686 n.5, 425 A.2d 664, 668 n.5
(solicitation is a common-law offense in Maryland, but it is unclear whether it is limited
to felonies), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 720, 235
S.E.2d 193, 199 (solicitation of another to commit a felony is an indictable offense under

32
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rily. 133 Unlike the common law, which generally and vaguely
described the object crimes that solicitation covered as those

that breached the public peace, current state statutes define the
offense's coverage to restrict judicial discretion. 134 Most states
impose penalties for soliciting the commission of any crime, 35

but some states and the federal government apply solicitation

only to felonies.1 36 Others specifically enumerate the particular
object felonies subject to solicitation charges. 137
The Model Penal Code's solicitation provisions138 broaden the
scope of solicitation statutes to reach more behavior, in three

common law in North Carolina), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977); see also United

States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 474 n.12 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting North Carolina's
recognition of solicitation of felony as a common-law offense).
133 Thirty-three states and the United States currently catalogue solicitation
as a
general substantive crime. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 373 (Supp. IV 1986); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 653f (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 501-503 (1987); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-4-7 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Cum. Supp.
1988).
Some statutes punish the attempt to solicit. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-510(2) (1985);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 373 (Supp. IV 1986) (punishing one who solicits another to commit
a felony in violation of federal statutes that have as an element the use or attempted or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another).
'34 For discussion of the common-law scope of solicitation, see W. LAFAvE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 11, at 486; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 13, at 649-54. For
examples of the scope of solicitation in American jurisdictions, see infra notes 135-137
and accompanying text.
In both England and the United States, solicitation of another to commit a felony or
a misdemeanor that would breach the peace, obstruct justice, or otherwise disturb the
public welfare was a misdemeanor at common law. See, e.g., State v. Avery, 7 Conn.
266, 270-71 (1828); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545, 549 (1883); State v. Hampton, 210 N.C. 283, 284-85, 186 S.E. 251, 252 (1936); State v. Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99,
101, 50 A.2d 152, 153-54 (1946); Regina v. Gregory, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 459, 461-62
(1867). In the United States, there is no reported decision that holds that solicitation of
any misdemeanor is a common-law offense. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11,
at 487.
,3- See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.110 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-3-301 (1987);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1988); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 506.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:2

(1986).
136

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-301 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-7 (1988);

IOWA CODE ANN. § 705.1 (West 1979) (also aggravated misdemeanors); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:28 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 153 (1983) (only crimes
with maximum penalties exceeding five years); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-29 (1988).
137 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 653f, 6531, 1203.046 (West 1988); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.157(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.500 (Michie
1986 & Cum. Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1988). The
federal statute is a good example. It provides:
Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a
felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another in violation of the
laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of
that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade
such other person to engage in such conduct, [shall be guilty of a crime].
18 U.S.C. § 373 (Supp. IV 1986).
138

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).

1989]

Double Inchoate Crimes

33

ways. First, the Code imposes liability for the solicitation of
any crime. 39 Second, the Code incorporates the double inchoate
offense of attempt to solicit by making the solicitor's failure to
communicate the criminal scheme immaterial as long as he acted
on his intent to effect such communication. 140 Third, the Code
defines the actus reus of solicitation as acting "with the purpose
of promoting or facilitating" the commission of a crime.' 4' This
language incorporates the crime of facilitation into the solicitation provision. 42 Facilitation, viewed as both a lower level of
complicity and as an inchoate crime, punishes the individual
who knowingly provides assistance to another who intends to
43
commit a crime.1
The Code's solicitation provisions appear to have influenced
some states to penalize solicitation as harshly or almost as
harshly as the completed object crime.'" The common-law
courts traditionally treated solicitation as a less serious offense
than the object crime or an attempt to commit it. 145 Most states
with solicitation statutes continue this pattern by providing penalties either less stringent than those for attempt or one grade
lower than the range of sanctions for the object crime.146 Several
states, however, following the Model Penal Code, have enacted
'39

Id. § 5.02(l).

140Id.

§ 5.02(2). For one example of such a situation, see Regina v. Banks, 12 Cox
Crim. Cas. 393 (Wor. Sp. Assizes 1873), in which the defendant was convicted of
attempted solicitation where he had mailed an inciting letter to a prospective solicitee
but the letter was never received. A modem-day analog might be leaving a soliciting
message on the prospective solicitee's telephone-answering machine but the tape is
intercepted, or the solicitee never hears it, or the machine malfunctions and the recording is never made.
Another possible double inchoate construction with regard to solicitation is soliciting
a solicitation. See State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 (1928) (A solicited B to
solicit C to commit a killing; court suggested that defendants would be guilty of solicitation); see also Regina v. Bodin and Bodin, [1979] Crim. L.R. 176 (dismissing incitement prosecution in similar situation).
'4, MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1985). Thus, the Code
establishes liability for a solicitant's conduct under a complicity approach as well as
under an inchoate-crime approach. See also id. § 2.06(3)(a) (parallel language in Code's
complicity provision).
,42Id. § 5.02(l). The Code also uses this language in its conspiracy provision. Id.

§ 5.03(1).

For further discussion of facilitation, see infra note 578 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing state statutory penalties
for solicitation).
145See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing cases that held that soliciting
a felony was only a common-law misdemeanor).
146See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04 (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1988); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 705-512 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 8-1, 8-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972 &
Cum. Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.28.030 (1988).
243
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penalties for solicitation that correspond to the most serious
147
offense solicited.

II.

THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR DOUBLE INCHOATE CRIMES

In the last century, the balance in substantive criminal law
has tilted toward subjective criminality. t48 The movement to
,47 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (penalty for

solicitation equals that for crime solicited, except for capital crimes and first-degree
felonies); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.92(2) (West 1968) (penalty for inciting, in-

ducing, or exhorting another to commit a felony or misdemeanor likely to endanger life
same as if offense committed); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-101(2) (1987) (maximum
penalty for solicitation not to exceed that for the offense solicited); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 629:2(IV) (1986) (sentence for solicitation equals that for crime solicited, except
for murder); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (Purdon 1983) (penalty for solicitation
same as for offense solicited, except for murder or first-degree felonies, though mitigation is possible if completion of object offense is unlikely); Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-304
(1988) (solicitation punished in same manner as offense solicited, except if punishable
by death). But see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-9 (1981) (penalty for solicitation limited to

maximum of 10 years). Pennsylvania allows for mitigation if completion of the object
offense is unlikely. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905(b) (Purdon 1983).
The Model Penal Code departs from this pattern of corresponding sanctions only in
its treatment of solicitation of a first-degree felony, which solicitation it treats as a
second-degree felony. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1985).

The Code, however, does allow some judicial discretion in reducing the degree of the
offense. Id. § 5.05(2).
'4 G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 115-22, 166-74 (1978).

Professor

Fletcher contends that much of contemporary American criminal law reflects a tension
between two contrasting theories of liability-the manifest and the subjective. The
pattern of manifest criminality requires that the commission of a crime be objectively
discernible at the time that it occurs. Thus, in the objective analysis, the criminal law
punishes those acts that the community deems dangerous, and looks to the actor's
intent only to determine if he understands the likely result of and the circumstances
surrounding his act. The prohibited act is the focus of the law, and the intent informing
the act is a subsidiary issue. The law functions by means of behavioral standards
preannounced by statute or decisional law, and interpreted and applied in particular
cases.
By contrast, the theory of subjective criminality focuses on the individual's intention
to violate a legally protected interest. As applied to inchoate offenses, the subjective
theory establishes no preannounced standards for acts that violate the law of attempts.
Although the subjective theory does not dispense with the requirement of an act toward
execution of the completed offense, acts not incriminating in themselves are sufficient
to satisfy the requirement. The primary function of the act is to demonstrate the
firmness, rather than the content, of the actor's intent. Intent is proven not only by the
act, but also by evidence such as confessions, admissions against interest, and testimony
concerning the actor's prior and subsequent conduct.
Under the objective theory, only those acts toward the commission of a crime that
are so unequivocal as to arouse apprehension among witnesses-i.e., acts usually in
close proximity to consummation of the crime-invoke liability. The subjective approach, however, allows imposition of punishment for acts that are more remote from
completion. Although Professor Fletcher criticizes the objective approach's heavy reliance on community standards of behavior to determine the dangerousness, and thus
the punishability, of certain acts, he is more critical of the subjective approach's focus
on dangerous persons rather than on dangerous acts.
Admitting that the confinement of dangerous persons is a valid goal of the criminal-
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define inchoate liability in subjective terms reflects the more
general movement toward legislatively defining criminal law and
the quest for earlier points of intervention. 49 The trend toward
subjectively defining attempts and other inchoate offenses per-

mits earlier intervention and thus enhances the preventive work
of the police. 50 Proponents of the subjective approach, including
the drafters of the Model Penal Code, stress that the great value

of their approach is the emphasis on identifying and convicting
dangerous persons, rather than on preventing dangerous acts.'51

Against the backdrop of a theory of inchoate liability that
focuses on an actor's criminal intent, some courts have expanded the range of acts that incur liability and thus permit
intervention, and have authorized indictments and convictions
for double inchoate offenses. The inchoate acts of attempt,
conspiracy, and solicitation are relational in nature, as they exist
52
in relation to object offenses, most usually completed crimes.1
Modern criminal codes, however, rarely address the question
53
of whether one inchoate crime can be the object of another.1
justice system, Professor Fletcher nonetheless argues that the function of the criminal
law is to give notice of objective standards of behavior. The elevation of the systemic
goal of confinement that has accompanied the rise of the subjective approach blurs the
distinction between judicial and administrative means of isolating dangerous people
from society. The subjective theory, as embodied in the Model Penal Code's reliance
on confessions and other undefined instances of conduct to establish attempt liability,
provides insufficient guidance in determining when an actor should be held criminally
liable.
For criticism of the Model Penal Code's substantial-step test, see supra notes 48-49.
On objective and subjective views of inchoate liability, see generally Robbins, supra
note 11, at 397-419.
149See G. FLETCHER, supra note 148, at 115-22, 166-74.
"0 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 329-31 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
I
Id. at 298. The Code's drafters stated:
The literature and the decisions dealing with the definition of a criminal attempt
reflect ambivalence as to how far the governing criterion should focus on the
dangerousness of the actor's conduct, measured by objective standards, and
how far it should focus on the dangerousness of the actor, as a person manifesting a firm disposition to commit a crime. Both criteria may lead, of course,
to the same disposition of a concrete case. When they do not, the proper focus
of attention is the actor's disposition.
Id. See generally Robbins, supra note 11, passim.
512See J. HALL, supra note 10, at 575 ("it seems preferable.., to designate criminal
attempts, solicitations and conspiracies as 'relational' crimes which are defined by
reference to the intended 'ultimate' crimes").
"I Contra ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 154(1) (1983) ("It shall not be a crime to
conspire to commit, or to attempt, or solicit, any crime set forth in this chapter [concerning inchoate crimes]."); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.05 (Vernon 1974) ("Attempt
or conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, a preparatory offense defined in this chapter
is not an offense."); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27 (West 1986). The Practice
Commentary accompanying Louisiana's general attempt provision asserts that, "if the
definition of another crime includes the attempt to do something, this section cannot be
employed, for then a defendant would be charged with an attempt to attempt to do an
illegal act." Id. commentary at 138.
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This statutory void in defining inchoate-crime concepts has
allowed courts to "pyramid" inchoate crimes to fill the gaps left
in penal codes. Such gaps may include, for example, the omission of solicitation as a statutory offense or the lack of a unilateral-conspiracy provision. A statute also may create lacunae if
it narrowly defines a crime with a substantive inchoate element
such as burglary and the various forms of assault.
In creating double inchoate crimes, the courts exercise an
authority, analogous to that of earlier courts that created common-law crimes, 154 to extend liability to actors whose criminal
intent the courts consider sufficiently dangerous or heinous to
warrant judicial intervention. Although the pyramiding of the
three traditional inchoate offenses could theoretically result in
nine double inchoate offenses, only three categories have been
the subject of extensive criminal litigation: (1) attempt to attempt; (2) attempt to conspire; and (3) conspiracy to attempt.
Each of these three formulations will be discussed in turn.

A. Attempt to Attempt
The inchoate crime of attempt exists only in relation to the
substantive crime attempted. 155 When the object of an attempt
is a substantive offense that does not itself contain an attempt
provision, a court will apply its jurisdiction's general attempt
provision to impose liability for the defendant's acts. 156 Defendants have not successfully challenged this procedure when trial
courts have applied it to "completed" offenses, such as murder.
Some defendants, however, have successfully raised the issue
of whether the law can punish an attempt to commit an offense
"1

See Note, Common Law Crimes in the United States, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 1332,

1336-37 (1947) (arguing that the advantages of codifying the entire field of criminal law
outweigh the advantages of retaining the common-law system of misdemeanors as a
substratum to statutory coverage); cf. Arnold, CriminalAttempts-The Rise and Fall
of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 74-76 (1930) (the common-law offense of attempt
allowed courts to fill gaps left in a criminal code without distorting the language of the
completed offense involved).
155 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (conceptualizing inchoate offenses as
"relational" crimes); supra notes 15 and accompanying text (discussing specific intent
required to prove attempt).
1-6 See W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, supra note 11, at 497 (with few exceptions, general
attempt statutes in American jurisdictions cover attempts to commit any felony or
misdemeanor); see also supra note 25 (listing general attempt statutes).
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with substantial inchoate elements, such as assault. 157 Courts

are involved in a fundamental debate: whether an attempt to
attempt can exist.
Viewed as an abstract principle, the construction of attempt
to attempt presents the possibility of regression ad infinitum,158
with the concomitant distortion of the attempt concept's protections against punishment for equivocal behavior. 159 An indictment for the attempt to attempt a substantive crime would

ask a court to punish the defendant for acts that would not
qualify under the jurisdiction's definition of attempt.1 60 No
American court, however, has faced the issue raised by such an
16
indictment. '
Instead, the courts have considered challenges to indictments
for and convictions of attempts to commit substantive crimes
that contain major inchoate elements. Some, such as assault and
burglary, are defined as attempts to commit other, more serious,
offenses. Others, such as possession of proscribed materials,
are defined in terms of acts indicating that the possessor is likely
to commit more serious offenses. Crimes such as subornation
of perjury punish the act whether or not the actor achieves his
desired result. 62 Although "incomplete" in some sense, all of
these crimes are complete in that they involve discernible harms
that the law seeks to prevent. 163
"1 See, e.g., In re M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 521-22, 510 P.2d 33, 35-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89,
92 (1973) (legislature did not contemplate the crime of attempted assault, whether simple
or aggravated); Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 118, 485 P.2d 886, 888 (1971) (offense
of attempted assault with a deadly weapon did not exist); Wilson v. State, 53 Ga. 205,
206 (1874) (courts cannot punish "attempt to make an assault").
"I See Wilson v. State, 53 Ga. 205, 206 (1874) (considering the concept of attempt to
attempt "is like conceiving of the beginning of eternity or the starting place of infinity").
119See People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 105, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 931-32 (1978)
(Titone, J., dissenting) (warning that the concept of attempt to attempt "would render
illegal acts which, in themselves, are insufficient even to constitute an anticipatory
crime"), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394 N.E.2d 288, 420 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1979).

160See
161But

E.

MEEHAN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPT

201 (1984).

cf. infra notes 259-269 and accompanying text (discussing reversal of Florida
trial court that gave attempt instructions for crimes that already included attempt
provisions).
162 See infra notes 250-258 and accompanying text (discussing offenses of this type,
such as uttering a forged instrument, embracery (influencing or attempting to influence
a juror), bribery, solicitation of a bribe, and extortion).
16 J. HALL, supra note 10, at 586. Hall, who contended that attempts represent a
harm distinct from the ultimate crimes at which they aim, stated:
On the premise that criminal attempts are not harms, it would seem necessary
to hold likewise regarding many other crimes: e.g., the possession of burglars'
tools, counterfeit dies or money, solicitation, the conspiracies, burglary, reckless driving, bribery, subornation, and other offenses which "tend toward" the

commission of various ultimate crimes. Indeed, since there is nothing in nature
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Thus, by including such crimes within the statutory definition
of attempt, a court can punish an individual for actions that are

not in themselves substantive offenses. t64 Absent manifested
legislative intent either to limit explicitly those substantive of-

fenses that an individual can attempt or to prohibit judicial use
of double inchoate offenses, the judiciary must make the policy
decision of whether to punish preparatory acts done toward the
1 65
commission of a crime.

The debate over the validity of the "attempt to attempt" construction has developed almost exclusively at the state level.
66
Until recently, no case in federal court had raised the issue.

Most state courts continue to reject the attempt-to-attempt construction because it is either a logical absurdity 67 or contrary
to legislative intent. t68 Many courts, however, have begun to
look beyond the debate engendered by the semantical abstraction of attempting to attempt and have imposed liability for acts

tending toward the commission of crimes with substantial inchoate elements.

1. Attempt to Assault

The question of whether courts can punish an attempt to
attempt has arisen primarily in the context of prosecutions for
which distinguishes the presently designated "ultimate" crimes as actually
ultimate, it is possible to arrange the entire catalogue of crimes in a series in
which only a very few crimes would be "ultimate" harms and the rest would
merely tend toward the commission of those harms.
Id.

164 Arnold,

supra note 154, at 76.
165See infra notes 369-398 and accompanying text (discussing cases that decline to
recognize double inchoate crimes despite the absence of an explicit legislative
prohibition).
,66Although the United States Code does not contain a general attempt statute, it
does include several attempt provisions related to specific substantive crimes. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. §§ 546 (smuggling goods into foreign countries), 594 (intimidation of voters),
1113 (homicide within federal maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 1657 (corrupting a
seaman to confederate with pirates), 1751 (assassinating or kidnapping President or
presidential staff person) (1982).
Indeed, there is no comprehensive statutory definition of attempt in federal law.
United States v. Heng Awkak Roman, 356 F. Supp. 434, 437 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 484
F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974). But see infra notes 183-192
and accompanying text (discussing Army Court of Military Review's application of
general attempt statute in Military Code of Justice).
67 See infra notes 313-368 and accompanying text.
168 See infra notes 369-398 and accompanying text.
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attempted assault. 169 Although no jurisdiction recognizes the
crime of attempted simple assault, 170 an increasing number of
state courts have convicted defendants of attempted aggravated
assaults. 171
The rationales for punishing attempted assault vary with the
definitions of assault that the states employ. The types of assault
statutes include those that define the offense as: (1) an attempt
to injure another violently (or, more simply, an attempt to commit a battery); (2) an attempt, coupled with present ability, to
injure another violently; and (3) an unlawful threat by word or
deed to do violence to another, coupled with an apparent present
ability, that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent violence in that other person. Almost every American jurisdiction
today combines category (3) with either category (1) or (2), or
with a redefined assault offense that, like the Model Penal Code,
merges traditional battery and assault. 172 The following discussion, therefore, applies only to those states that do not redefine
assault as battery.
169See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 53 Ga. 205, 206 (1874); People v. Patskan, 29 Mich.
App. 354, 357, 185 N.W.2d 398, 400-01 (1971) (attempted assault is not a crime because
assault itself is an attempt), rev'd on other grounds, 387 Mich. 701, 199 N.W.2d 458
(1972); State v. Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 585-86, 346 P.2d 115, 120 (1959) (crime of attempted
assault exists because assault is not merely an attempted battery but also is a distinct
harm) (superseded by statute as stated in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354
(1984)).
170Contra Annotation, Attempt to Commit Assault as a Criminal Offense, 79
A.L.R.2D 597 (Supp. 1988) (suggesting that Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v.
Barnett, 253 Pa. Super. 39, 384 A.2d 965 (1978), held valid the offense of attempted
simple assault). This commentator misanalyzed the Barnett decision. The court in
Barnett merely upheld a conviction for simple assault by arguing that, because the
defendant actually inflicted bodily injury on one victim and physically menaced another,
hie had "at least attempted a simple assault" on both. 253 Pa. Super. at 44, 384 A.2d at
968 (emphasis added).
'71See, e.g., Miller v. State, 37 Ala. App. 470, 472-73, 70 So. 2d 811, 813 (1954)
(attempt to assault by shooting .22-caliber rifle); State v. Merseal, 167 Mont. 412, 416,
538 P.2d 1366, 1368 (1975) (attempted assault with a deadly weapon); State v. Skillings,
98 N.H. 203, 210, 97 A.2d 202, 207 (1953) (attempted aggravated assault by means of
harmful drugs); People v. O'Connell, 67 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 109, 113-14, 14 N.Y.S. 485, 486
(1891) (attempted assault with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill); State v. Wilson,
218 Or. 575, 585-92, 346 P.2d 115, 120-23 (1959) (attempted assault with a dangerous
weapon) (superseded by statute, as stated in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 678 P.2d
1354 (1984)).
Several state courts, however, have explicitly rejected the offense of attempted assault. See, e.g., In re M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 521-22, 510 P.2d 33, 35-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89,
91-92 (1973); Green v. State, 82 Ga. App. 402, 405, 61 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1950); People
v. Maxwell, 36 Mich. App. 127, 128, 193 N.W.2d 176, 177 (1971); State v. Currence, 14
N.C. App. 263, 265, 188 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1972); State v. Hewett, 158 N.C. 627, 629, 74
S.E. 356, 357 (1912); White v. State, 22 Tex. 608, 608 (1858); Brown v. State, 7 Tex.
App. 569, 569 (1880).
'7 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing different states' approaches to defining assault).
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a. Assault as attempted battery. The first category-assault
as attempted battery-poses the most obvious conceptual problems for courts seeking to attach attempt liability to assault.
Given this definition, a charge of attempted assault can be characterized as an attempt to attempt to commit a battery. Nevertheless, since 1891, some courts have recognized the crime of
attempted assault by reasoning that an effort to commit a battery
that goes beyond preparation, but which lacks the proximity to
completion to constitute an assault, is punishable as an attempt
to commit an assault.
A New York intermediate appellate court first stated this
principle in People v. O'Connell. 73 In O'Connell, the defendant
attacked and wounded his victim with an ax. 174 Charged with
assault in the first and second degrees, 175 the defendant pled
guilty to attempted assault in the first degree, which the statute
defined as assault with a deadly weapon with an intent to kill
the person assaulted. 76 Subsequently, the defendant challenged
his conviction on the ground that no such crime as attempted
77
assault existed.
Rather than uphold O'Connell's conviction by arguing that he
was estopped by his guilty plea from later challenging his conviction on a technical point of law, as the concurring judge
suggested, the majority in O'Connell sought to establish the
existence of the crime of attempted assault. The court framed
its analysis in terms of spatial and temporal proximity, ruling
that the crime of assault imposes liability only if the actor struck
at a victim within reaching distance. The court concluded that
an actor who approached his victim with a weapon that he
intended to use, but who was intercepted before reaching the
victim or failed to come within reaching distance because the
victim fled after becoming aware of the imminent attack, was
guilty of an attempted assault with a deadly weapon. 178
The O'Connell court's reasoning provided the basis for subsequent convictions by other state courts-not only for assaults

173 67
174Id.
175Id.
76

N.Y. Sup. Ct. 109, 14 N.Y.S. 485 (1891).

at 110, 112-13, 14 N.Y.S. at 485, 487.
at 110, 14 N.Y.S. at 487 (Lawrence, J., concurring).

Id. at 110, 113, 14 N.Y.S. at 485, 487.
"'Id.
-8 Id. at 110-15, 14 N.Y.S. at 486-88.
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41

with deadly weapons, 179 but also for other forms of aggravated
assault. 18 0
b. Assault as attempt, coupled with present ability, to injure
another violently. Extensions of attempt liability to the second
category of assault-assault as an attempt, coupled with present
ability, to injure another violently-provides a lesser conceptual
difficulty. Courts have found attempts to assault in those cases
in which the defendant attempted to commit a battery, but
lacked present ability. 181 Although liability may not attach under
the present-ability requirement unless the actor is sufficiently
proximate to his intended victim, as in the hypothetical raised
in O'Connell,182 the concept of present ability is still broader
than that of proximity.
Both the breadth of the concept of present ability and the
courts' increasing reliance on subjective intent to expand attempt liability are illustrated in United States v. Locke, 183 a 1983
179 See

Miller v. State, 37 Ala. App. 470, 472-73, 70 So. 2d 811, 813 (1954) (defendant

fired .22-caliber rifle at policeman hidden in bushes 75 yards away); State v. Wilson,
213 Or. 575, 580-92, 346 P.2d 115, 118-23 (1959) (intended victim had barricaded herself
in a room, thus thwarting husband who had shotgun) (superseded by statute, as stated
in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354 (1984)); State v. Music, 40 Wash. App.
423, 432, 698 P.2d 1087, 1092-93 (1985) (holding that attempted assault is implausible
when assault is defined as attempted battery, but not when assault is defined as placing
another in fear of imminent harm). Compare State v. Zackery, 31 Ohio App. 3d 264,
265, 511 N.E.2d 135, 137 (1987) (affirming conviction of attempted-battery type of assault
where defendant merely brandished a knife) with McGee v. United States, 533 A.2d
1268, 1269-70 (D.C. 1987) (reversing conviction of attempted-battery type of assault
where defendant brandished a gun).
110See McQuirter v. State, 36 Ala. App. 707, 709, 63 So. 2d 388, 389-90 (1953) (in
attempted assault with intent to rape, defendant came no closer than two or three feet
from intended victim); Morris v. State, 32 Ala. App. 278, 280, 25 So. 2d 54, 55 (1946)
(in attempted assault with intent to rape, defendant chased prosecutrix but never got
closer than five feet); Burton v. State, 8 Ala. App. 295, 299, 62 So. 394, 395-96 (1913)
(in attempted assault with intent to rape, defendant chased intended victim for 100
yards, but never got close enough to touch her); see also Young v. State, 353 S.E.2d
82, 83 (Ga. App. 1987) (attempted aggravated assault with intent to rape); State v.
Weinberger, 671 P.2d 567, 569, 578 (Or. App. 1983) (recognizing attempted aggravated
assault as proper predicate felony for crime of felony murder, but finding insufficient
evidence to establish attempted aggravated assault).
I State v. Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 590, 346 P.2d 115, 122 (1959) (superseded by statute,
as stated in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354 (1984)). The court in Wilson
grounded its upholding of a conviction for attempted assault with a deadly weapon on
the defendant's clearly expressed intent to shoot his wife, coupled with his lack of
access to her in a locked office. Id. at 578-79, 588-90, 346 P.2d at 117, 121-22. Thus,
Wilson demonstrates the idea of proximity as a component of present ability.
182 See text accompanying supra note 178 (discussing proximity as it relates to presentability requirement).
183 16 M.J. 763 (A.C.M.R. 1983).

HarvardJournal on Legislation

[Vol. 26:1

case from the United States Army Court of Military Review.
The defendant, during a struggle with military police, attempted
to remove a loaded revolver from an officer's holster.184 As the
defendant attempted to seize the weapon, he exclaimed, "If I
get that gun I will kill you all"-or words to that effect." 5
Relying heavily on this verbal expression of intent combined
with the attempt to seize the gun, the court applied the general
attempt statute of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 86 to its
aggravated assault statute, 87 and upheld the defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated assault. 88
The court recognized that the defendant lacked present ability
because he had never even obtained the weapon necessary to
commit the charged assault with a deadly weapon.189 Nevertheless, the court held that the charge of attempted assault was
valid because the defendant's act toward a battery against the
officers went beyond preparation. 90 The decision gave greater
emphasis to the serious consequences of the defendant's expressed intent than to the proximity of his acts to the completed
crime.
Some courts will attach attempt liability to this second category of assault, therefore, in those cases in which the defendant's acts were insufficiently proximate to a completed
battery. 9 1
c. Assault as intentionalfrightening. The third categoryassault as intentional frightening-poses the fewest conceptual
problems for courts seeking to attach attempt liability to assault.
This form of assault punishes intentional frightening rather than
an attempt to injure a victim physically; it clearly establishes an

' Id. at 764.
185Id.

186 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1982). Subsection (a) of the statute provides: "An act, done with
specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter, amounting to more than mere
preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to
commit that offense." Id. § 880(a).
117 Id. § 928.
's United States v. Locke, 16 M.J. 763, 765-66 (A.C.M.R. 1983).
189Id. at 765.

190Id.

191 See State v. Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 590, 346 P.2d 115, 122 (1959) (defendant was
guilty of attempted aggravated assault on his wife even though he did not have the
present ability to injure her because she was barricaded in a room) (superseded by
statute, as stated in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354 (1984)).
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independent substantive offense and not an inchoate offense
with a specified object.192

Most jurisdictions punish this form of assault by statute. 193 In
addition, courts in jurisdictions that do not explicitly punish
intentional frightening have interpreted statutes defining assault
as an "attempt or offer" to injure another physically to include
the tort concept of intentional menacing. 194 Those courts, however, have attached attempt liability only to those assaults that
threaten serious bodily harm.195

The addition of intentional frightening expands the range of
acts defined as assault by eliminating the strict proximity and
present-ability requirements of the older categories. 196 The re-

quirement of apprehension by the victim, however, creates a
new problem, which the courts have sought to mitigate by the
use of attempt liability. If the victim is unaware of the imminent
attack upon him, then no liability for assault attaches-even if
the attacker nearly succeeds in committing the completed
battery.
In State v. White, 197 for example, the defendant threw a large

glass jug at a police officer, striking him in the back of the head
and neck. The officer was unaware of the attack prior to absorbing the blow, and therefore was not placed in apprehension
of imminent violence by the defendant. 98 Although Florida's
assault statute did not define the elements of the offense, 199 the

court defined the prohibited act as the creation of "the victim's
well-founded fear that violence is imminent. ' 200 Consequently,
the court used the state's general attempt statute to extend
192See United States v. Locke, 16 M.J. 763, 765 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (justifying convic-

tion for attempted assault with a deadly weapon on intentional-frightening theory).

193See supra note 59 (listing statutes).
191
United States v. Locke, 16 M.J. 763, 765 (A.C.M.R. 1983); see State v. Wilson,

218 Or. 575, 582-84, 346 P.2d 115, 119-20 (1959) (treating assault as intentional frightening despite case law that defined assault as attempted battery) (superseded by statute,

as stated in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 695 P.2d 1354 (1984)). But see R. PERKINS &
R. BOYCE, supra note 13, at 163; Perkins, An Analysis of Assault and Attempts to

Assault, 47 MINN. L. REV.71, 75-76 (1962) (criticizing this approach because the term
"to offer," as originally used, meant no more than "to attempt").
191
See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
19 See supra notes 183-190 and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Locke, 16 M.J. 763 (A.C.M.R. 1983), in which the court used intentional-frightening

theory to attach liability to a crime that would go unpunished under the common-law
definition of assault).
197
324 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1975).
19 Id. at 631.
199FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.02 (West 1973), now codifiedat FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.011

(West1976).
200State v. White, 324 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 1975).
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liability to the defendant's actions.20 ' Implicit in the ruling was
the assumption that the court would have found the defendant
guilty of attempted assault even if his weapon had missed its
2 02
mark.
The expanding law of attempted assault signals a trend by
courts and legislatures to treat assault as a separate substantive
crime, rather than as an attempted battery, to avoid the conceptual difficulties of double inchoate constructions. As several
commentators have suggested, this approach is valid because
aggravated assaults were unknown at common law.203 Thus, it
is unnecessary to define these forms of assault in relation to the
common-law notion of assault as attempted battery.
2. Attempted Sexual Assault of Minors
Courts have found it easier to attach derivative attempt liability to statutes proscribing sexual assault or enticement of
minors. 204 The statutes involved in these cases have treated
sexual enticement of minors as a completed substantive offense,205 and have avoided the language of attempt found in
201

Id.

202
See id. (dictum) (general attempt statute applies to persons who unsuccessfully

attempt to injure violently persons who are unaware of the attack). The court stated:
The State argues for a definition of assault which does not include victim
awareness, on the ground that "bushwackers" and "backstabbers" would escape punishment if they were unsuccessful in their attempt to inflict injury.
The Legislature did not intend to allow such acts to go unpunished, however.
The general "attempt" statute will reach those situations.
Id.
203 See supra note 62 (providing citations). But cf. J. HALL, supra note 10, at 573
(contending that development of the "consummated" crime of aggravated assault in the
period immediately prior to cases recognizing attempt as a substantive offense retarded
development of the doctrine of criminal intent).
204See Donovan v. State, 47 Ala. App. 18, 20, 249 So. 2d 635, 636 (1971) (upholding
conviction for attempt to entice a child under 16 years of age to enter a place to commit
sodomy); People v. Martinez, 42 Colo. App. 257, 257, 592 P.2d 1358, 1359 (1979) (crime
of attempt to commit sexual assault on a child existed because, unlike an ordinary
assault statute, the statute at issue defined sexual assault on a child as a substantive
offense rather than as an attempted battery); Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 513,
147 N.W.2d 646, 650 (1967) (legislature's placement of the crime of attempt to entice or
persuade a child under 18 years of age into a place with intent to commit a crime against
sexual morality among substantive rather than inchoate crimes evinced its intent that
the general attempt statute apply to such a crime). Compare People v. Martinez, 42
Colo. App. 257, 257, 592 P.2d 1358, 1359 (1979) (allowing the offense of attempted
sexual assault on a child) with People v. Gordon, 178 Colo. 406, 407-08, 498 P.2d 341,
342 (1972) (the crime of attempted assault did not exist where assault was defined as an
unlawful attempt to commit violent injury) and Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 115-18,
485 P.2d 886, 887-89 (1971) (same).
203Donovan v. State, 47 Ala. App. 18, 20, 249 So. 2d 635, 636-37 (1974) (citing
Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 512-13, 147 N.W.2d 646, 650 (1967)).
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many ordinary assault statutes. 20 6 It is likely, however, that the
repulsion that such crimes arouse gives a court a sense that
there is greater leeway to punish an actor based on revealed
intent even if the acts have not progressed so far as to meet the
207
requirements of the substantive offense.
In Huebner v. State,208 for example, the defendant challenged
his conviction for "attempt to entice a child under the age of 18
years into an automobile for immoral purposes.

' 20 9

The defen-

dant contended that the law against enticement was itself an
attempt statute, and that to combine this statute with the state's
general attempt statute was to charge the defendant with an
attempt to attempt a crime against sexual morality. 210 Although
the enticement statute defined the crime's mens rea as an intent
to commit a "crime against sexual morality," it did not define
the actus reus in terms of sexual activity. 211 Instead, it defined
sexual assault of a minor in terms of a component part of the
ultimate harm. The actus reus was the persuading or enticing of
any child under 18 "into any vehicle, building, room or secluded
212
place."
The defendant, a male, had invited a seventeen-year-old boy
into his car for a ride. 21 3 When the boy declined the offer, the
defendant "in unmistakable layman's language asked [the boy]
to commit sodomy" and offered him money and drink in con206See

People v. Martinez, 42 Colo. App. 257, 257, 592 P.2d 1358, 1359 (1979) (the

crime of attempt to commit sexual assault on a child exists because, unlike an ordinary

assault statute, the statute at issue defined sexual assault on a child as a substantive
offense, rather than as attempted battery).
207 Both the Alabama and Wisconsin sexual-assault statutes at issue reflect the objective theory of liability. See Donovan v. State, 47 Ala. App. 18, 20, 249 So. 2d 635, 63536 (1971) (quoting Act No. 387, 1967 Ala. Acts (now codified at ALA. CODE § 13A-6-69
(1982)); Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 512 n.1, 147 N.W.2d 646, 650 n.1 (1967)
(quoting Wis. STAT. § 944.12, amended by § 948.07 (Supp. 1988)). In both statutes,
enticing or persuading a minor to enter a secluded place suffices to meet the act
requirement. The defendant need not tell his intended victim the purpose of the assignation. The imposition of liability on acts earlier in the preparatory continuum than
those that are prohibited by the enticement statutes, however, requires the court to
focus more narrowly on the actor's intent. For a discussion of the objective and
subjective theories of liability, see supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
202 33 Wis. 2d 505, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967).
209Id. at 512, 147 N.W.2d at 649-50. This issue was only one of six raised on appeal.
Id.
210Id. at 513, 147 N.W.2d at 650.
211 Id. But see People v. Martinez, 42 Colo. App. 257, 258, 592 P.2d 1358, 1359 (1979)
(quoting CoLo. REv.STAT. § 18-3-405 (1979), which requires "sexual contact" between
a child under 15 years of age and a defendant at least four years his or her senior).
212 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.12, amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.07 (Supp. 1988).
213 Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 513, 147 N.W.2d 646, 649 (1967).
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sideration. 214 The victim fled and notified the police. 2 15 Because
the victim had not entered the defendant's car, the defendant
21 6
did not meet the act requirement of the enticement statute.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, upheld the application
of the state's general attempt statute to the enticement statute
21 7
and affirmed the defendant's conviction.
21 8
Noting that Wisconsin had abolished common-law crimes,
the court focused on the legislative intent behind the applicable
statutes. The court concluded that the legislature evidenced its
intent by including the enticement statute among those offenses
21 9
denoted as "completed" rather than "inchoate" offenses.
Moreover, the court contended that the gravamen of the enticement statute was the successful persuasion of a child into one
of the listed enclosures. 220 Thus, the victim's entry into a secluded place completed the crime of enticement if the defendant
had the intent to engage in sexual activity therein. 22' The court
reasoned that "the attempt of this crime is completed when the
defendant with the necessary intent tries to persuade or entice
222
the child to get into the vehicle or secluded place.
Underlying the court's discussion of legislative intent, however, was its concern with protecting society from persons who
commit dangerous sex crimes and providing treatment for the
dangerous sex offender. The existence of the state's "sex deviate
law, '223 affording specialized treatment to sex offenders, attests
214

Id.

215Id.
216See id., 147 N.W.2d at 650 (gravamen of the substantive offense is in succeeding
in getting a minor to enter a vehicle, building, or other secluded place); see also Donovan
v. State, 47 Ala. App. 18, 20, 249 So. 2d 635, 636 (1974) (jurisdiction defined sexual
assault of a minor as enticing or persuading a minor to enter a secluded place to propose
the act of sodomy; the court held that the defendant did not commit a substantive
offense because the intended victim resisted the defendant's importunings to enter the

defendant's car).
217 Huebner, 33 Wis. 2d at 513, 519, 147 N.W.2d at 649, 653-54.
218 Id. at 514, 147 N.W.2d at 650.
219 Id.
220Id. at 513, 147 N.W.2d at 650 (emphasis added).
221Id.
2n Id. at

513-14, 147 N.W.2d at 650 (emphasis added). The court ruled in dicta that
no constitutional prohibition forbade the legislature from creating a crime of an attempt
to attempt a substantive offense. Id. Nevertheless, the court held that the enticement
statute was not an attempt statute. Id.; cf. People v. Martinez, 42 Colo. App. 257, 258,
592 P.2d 1358, 1359 (1979) (noting that, where assault is defined in terms of "attempt,"
attempted assault is "an attempt to attempt to act," a construction that is too indefinite
for a specific-intent crime).
23 See Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 521, 147 N.W.2d 646, 654 (1967). For a
discussion of the provisions of Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Act, also known as the "sex
deviate law," see generally Note, Criminal Law-Wisconsin Sexual Deviate Act, 1954
Wis. L. REV. 324.
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to the grave concerns that sexual crimes arouse. Furthermore,
the statute may have made it simpler for the court to focus on
the defendant's criminal intent in order to commit him to ad2 24
ministrative, rather than penal, processes.
Although other courts that have affirmed the validity of attempted sexual assault against minors have not discussed administrative treatment of the offender, the cases suggest that the
seriousness with which society views the substantive crime of
sexual assault of minors induces courts to focus on the intent
that the defendant displayed rather than on the limitation of the
doctrine that every criminal should have fair warning of what
the law prohibits.
3. Attempted Burglary
Although the courts remain divided over the existence of the
offense of attempt to assault, 225 no court has ever reversed a
conviction of attempted burglary on the ground that such a
conviction punishes an attempt to attempt. Every jurisdiction
continues to define burglary as an act-usually an unauthorized
entry-with intent to commit some other crime. 226 Nevertheless,
the courts have treated burglary as a separate substantive crime
rather than as an anticipatory offense.
In DeGidio v. State, 27 for example, the defendant contended,
among other things, that, because the applicable statute defined
burglary in terms of doing an act with the intent to commit some
other crime, the offense was a specific form of attempt. 228 Relying on the comments to the Model Penal Code's section on
attempt, the court responded that courts traditionally have
2,4 See Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 521, 147 N.W.2d 646, 654 (1967)
(discussing
operation of Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Act). After convicting the defendant of attempted
sexual assault, the trial court, within the discretion accorded to it by the Wisconsin Sex
Crimes Act, had ordered the defendant to undergo presentencing tests by the State
Department of Public Welfare, to determine if, as a sex offender, he was a continuing
danger to society. Id. The state agency, exercising its authority under the Act, determined that the defendant was a dangerous offender and committed him to its "sex
deviate facility," instead of sending him back to the court for criminal sentencing. Id.
at 522-24, 147 N.W.2d at 655. For a discussion of the confusion of administrative and
penal procedures that is inherent in the subjective theory of liability, see G. FLETCHER,
supra note 148, at 170-74.
"2 For a survey of cases addressing the issue of whether the crime of attempted
assault exists, see supra note 171.
26 For a discussion of current burglary statutes, see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
227 289 N.W.2d 135 (Minn. 1980).
Id. at 136.
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treated burglary as a separate substantive offense to which attempt liability attaches. 229 The Code's drafters noted other "sub-

stantive offenses" that contain more pronounced inchoate elements than burglary, but to which courts nevertheless have
applied attempt liability. 230 Moreover, the commentary suggests
that questions of attempt liability are better decided on the basis
of a policy decision regarding where to draw the line in punishing

over whether
preliminary acts rather than an abstract argument
231

an individual can attempt to attempt a crime.
The DeGidio court noted that the state legislature treated
burglary as a separate substantive offense instead of as an in-

choate crime, and did not explicitly limit the offenses to which
the general attempt statute could apply. 232 Consequently, the
court invoked the doctrine of implied legislative intent to hold
that the legislature intended the general attempt statute to apply
to the crime of burglary. 233 Other decisions upholding convictions for attempted burglary have not discussed the double in234
choate issue.
4. Attempted Possession of Proscribed Materials
The primary function of attempt law is to allow authorities to
235
intervene and convict before the consummation of a crime.
Society's need to protect itself, however, is offset by the need
9

22 Id. at 136-37.
230 MODEL

PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 75 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). The
court quoted the following passage from the comments to the Model Penal Code:
[Tihere has been no difficulty in sustaining charges of attempted burglary. Nor
has there been difficulty generally in finding attempt liablity where the "substantive offense" is even more clearly an attempt: possessing burglar's tools
with intent to commit burglary; conveying tools into prison with intent to
facilitate an escape; offering a bribe; exploding a substance with intent to cause
personal injury; employing a drug or instrument with intent to procure a
miscarriage; procuring a noxious drug with intent to supply it to another for
use in committing abortion. In each case attempt liability has been sustained.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see DeGidio v. State, 289 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Minn. 1980).
2'3MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 363-64 (Proposed Official Draft 1985);
DeGidio v. State, 289 N.W.2d 135, 136-37 (Minn. 1980).
232
289 N.W.2d at 137.
23 3
Id.

234See, e.g., State v. Echols, 742 S.W.2d 220, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming
conviction of attempted first-degree burglary and addressing only intent to commit
specific crime once in building and presence of another person in building); cf. Popwell
v. State, No. 6 Div. 624 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ala
file) (reversing conviction of attempted second-degree burglary because mere looking
in window was insufficient act to establish intent, but not discussing burglary as itself
a crime in the nature of attempt).
235See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing principle).
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to protect individuals from prosecution for equivocal acts-i.e.,
acts as likely informed by a lawful intent as by an unlawful one.
An alternative to the use of attempt law to facilitate intervention is to break crimes down into constituent acts and separately
prohibit those acts. Crimes that proscribe possession of materials presumably used to commit completed crimes exemplify
this approach. 23 6 The rationale for these crimes is the positivist
contention that experience has shown that an individual would
not possess such materials unless he intended to use them as
tools or means of a specific crime. Because the possessor of
certain materials is likely to use them for illegal ends, intervention is justified at least to force their possessor to explain why
he has them. This rationale is not far removed from the objective
theory of criminality, which requires that an act unequivocally
2 37
manifest its criminality.
The most heavily legislated proscription of this kind is the
possession of burglary tools. 238 The DeGidio decision makes it
clear that attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools
are separate substantive offenses.2 3 9 Indeed, the decision and
the Model Penal Code commentary on which it relied suggest
that attempt liability can attach even to the possession of burglary tools.2 40 The single state supreme court to address this
contention has rejected it following its brief espousal by an
241
intermediate appellate court.
Generally, courts have not addressed this issue with regard
to other possessory offenses-e.g., possession of explosives,
unlawful weapons, or forged instruments. Some courts, how136See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text (discussing constituent-element
approach).
217See G. FLETCHER, supra note 148, at 204-05. See generally Robbins, supra note

11, at 398-419 (discussing differences between the objective and subjective approaches
to criminality, in the context of the impossibility defense to attempt crimes).
238For a listing of state statutes prohibiting possession of burglary tools, see supra
note 81.
739DeGidio v. State, 289 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Minn. 1980).
240See supra notes 229-231 and accompanying text (discussing Model Penal Code
comments, approvingly quoted in DeGidio, that advocated attaching attempt liability to

the crime of possession of burglary tools).
241Thomas v. State, 362 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1978), rev'g 351 So. 2d 77, (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977). The Florida Supreme Court stated:

Although it may be possible for a person to be convicted of an attempt to
possess items which are contraband per se, burglary tools are not contraband

per se, and it is only the actual possession of burglary tools along with a
criminal intent or usage that constitutes a punishable offense. Possession of
otherwise "innocent" items, coupled with a use or intended use of such tools
in a burglary, is unlawful.
362 So. 2d at 1350; accord Vogel v. State, 365 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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ever, have held that the crime of attempted possession of narcotics does exist. 242 But narcotics possession is distinguishable
from other possessory offenses in that many drugs have no
lawful uses at all, and the remainder have only medicinal pur-

poses. In addition, narcotics addicts are likely to commit other
crimes to support their habits.
5. Crimes in Which the Attempt Is Subsumed Within the

Definition of the Completed Crime
Within this category of crimes possessing substantial inchoate

elements exist three subcategories: (1) statutory offenses defined as constituent acts within completed crimes; (2) long-rec-

ognized offenses in which attainment of the criminal intent is
unimportant to liability; and (3) statutory provisions that punish
the attempt as well as the completed offense.
The primary examples of the first subcategory of offenses are
abortion statutes phrased in terms of supplying or administering

any substance or instrument to a woman with the intent to
produce a miscarriage. 243 In a California decision, People v.

Berger,244 the court upheld a conviction for an attempt to commit
an offense thus defined. 245 Police had arrested one of the defen-

dants while she was sterilizing the instruments for an abortion,
but before she had begun the surgical procedure on the investigating agent ostensibly seeking the abortion.
The court found no indication that the state legislature intended to exclude the offense of abortion, despite its inchoate
nature as defined, from the scope of the state's general attempt
statute. 246 Instead, the court focused on the issue of whether
242See, e.g., Silvestri v. State, 332 So. 2d 351, 354-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (attempted
possession of cocaine), aff'd, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1976); Nichols v. State, 248 So. 2d
199, 199-200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (attempted possession of marijuana).
243 For a listing of such statutes, see supra note 92.
244 131 Cal. App. 2d 127, 280 P.2d 136 (1955).
245But see Commonwealth v. Willard, 179 Pa. Super. 368, 369-70, 116 A.2d 751, 752
(1955) (reversing conviction for attempt to administer instruments or drugs with intent
to induce a miscarriage, even though the defendant had prepared the instruments).
246People v. Berger, 131 Cal. App. 2d 127, 129, 280 P.2d 136, 137 (1955). The court
also noted that other state courts had recognized the crime of attempt to commit abortion
as defined by California statute. Id. at 129-31,280 P.2d at 137-39; see People v. Gallardo,
41 Cal. 2d 57, 66, 257 P.2d 29, 35 (1953) (arranging for abortions and accepting money
for those operations is not sufficient to establish an attempt to commit abortion); People
v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 718, 256 P.2d 317, 321-22 (1953) (arranging abortions in
Mexico and transporting patients to Mexico for that purpose are merely acts of preparation); People v. Reed, 128 Cal. App. 2d 499, 502, 275 P.2d 633, 635 (1954) (rinsing
speculum in cold water after boiling it was a sufficient act toward commission of the
offense, even though the patient was still fully clothed).
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the acts of the defendants were sufficient to establish an at-

tempt. 247 Reasoning that the acts of sterilizing the instruments
and instructing the patient to disrobe belonged to a small class

of cases in which the acts of preparation unambiguously indicated the defendant's intent, 248 the court ruled that these acts
also satisfied the requirement of a direct movement toward the
commission of the substantive offense-the application of the
instruments used to induce a miscarriage.249
The second subcategory of constituent-act offenses includes
such crimes as bribery, perjury, subornation of perjury, embra-

cery, extortion, making a false report of a crime, and uttering a
forged instrument. These are crimes in which the courts traditionally have treated the attempt to commit the crime the same
as the realized crime itself. For example, most bribery statutes
punish a party who offers a bribe to a public official regardless
of whether he is successful in soliciting a public officer to do
his bidding.250 Courts have generally held that attempt liability
241 People v. Berger, 131 Cal. App. 2d 127, 130-31, 280 P.2d 136, 138-39 (1955). The
court in Commonwealth v. Willard, 179 Pa. Super. 368, 116 A.2d 751 (1955), also focused
on the question of whether the defendant's acts went beyond mere preparation. Although
the defendant had begun to approach the patient with the prepared instruments when
she was apprehended, the court in Willard held that these acts merely constituted
preparation. Id. at 372, 116 A.2d at 753. The Pennsylvania court's categorization of its
abortion statute as one prohibiting the attempt to commit an abortion, however, determined this result. Id. at 374, 116 A.2d at 754. Contra State v. Goddard, 74 Wash. 2d
848, 851-52, 447 P.2d 180, 182-83 (1969) (preparing abortifacient and examining the
police agent were sufficient overt acts to sustain a conviction for attempt to administer
drugs or instruments to produce a miscarriage).
248People v. Berger, 131 Cal. App. 2d 127, 130-31, 280 P.2d 136, 138-39 (1955). The
court in Willard, however, ruled that, although Willard's actions manifested an unequivocal intent, she was not guilty of attempting to procure an abortion because her acts
did not move directly toward consummation of the offense. Commonwealth v. Willard,
179 Pa. Super. 368, 372-73, 116 A.2d 751, 753 (1955). Note that, although the court in
Berger used the language of both objective and subjective theories of criminality, it
conceded that there are few attempts in which the act speaks for itself, thus emphasizing
the subjective approach.
249People v. Berger, 131 Cal. App. 2d 127, 132, 280 P.2d 136, 139 (1955). The court
viewed its holding as an extension of that in People v. Reed, 128 Cal. App. 2d 499, 275
P.2d 633 (1954), in which the defendant had picked up the already-sterilized instrument.
See also Greenwood v. United States, 225 A.2d 878 (D.C. 1967). In Greenwood, the
court upheld a conviction for attempted unauthorized use of a motor vehicle despite
the defendant's claim that such an offense was, in effect, an attempt to attempt to
commit larceny. Id. at 279-80. The court, however, viewed the unauthorized-use statute
not as a lesser included offense of car theft, but rather as a separate substantive offense.
Id. at 880. Consequently, the unauthorized-use statute can be viewed as prohibiting a
component act of car theft-the unauthorized taking of another's car-but not requiring
the more serious offense's specific intent-the intent to deprive the owner of his property
permanently or for an unreasonable amount of time.
250See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1229 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding conviction under federal bribery statute, even though the defendant did not attain object of
bribe because the offeree was undercover agent), cert. denied,417 U.S. 950 (1974). See
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does not attach to these crimes because they are proved as fully
by evidence of attempt to commit them as by evidence that they

were accomplished.2

1

This proposition, however, is an over-generalization as it ap-

plies to those crimes in which the communication of a solicita-

52
tion or a threat is an essential element. In State v. Hansford,

for example, a Washington court upheld a conviction for attempted extortion. 253 Based on a tip, the defendant had been
apprehended while breaking into his intended victim's home
with gloves and a sawed-off shotgun.2 5 4 The court imposed attempt liability on the defendant, reasoning that a note in his
pocket instructing a family member to pay $350,000 to ensure
the family's safety established the defendant's intent and the
burglary established the requisite overt act for attempt liability.25 5 The court observed, however, that the defendant was not
guilty of the substantive crime of extortion, because he never

communicated his threat to his victim.256 Liability for the substantive offense would nevertheless have attached if the defendant had communicated his threat but received no money.257
Similarly, attempt liability also could attach to bribery or subornation of perjury under the same theory as an attempt to
258
solicit.

generally R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 13, at 534-35 (the common law punished
soliciting or offering a bribe even if the importuned party promptly rejected the offer).
For judicial treatment of attempted perjury, compare Adams v. Murphy, 394 So. 2d
411,415 (Fla. 1981) (crime of perjury is fully proven by "attempt" to commit the crime),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982) with id. (Alderman, J., dissenting) (attempted perjury
is possible where there is an intent to commit perjury and there is an overt act of falsely
testifying, but the crime is not completed because an essential element, such as materiality, is lacking). Cf. E. MEEHAN, supra note 160, at 199-200 (noting that various
Commonwealth courts have attached attempt liability to the crimes of extortion, perverting justice, and suboming perjury).
51 See Pagano v. State, 387 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1980) (corruption by threat against
a public servant); Achin v. State, 387 So. 2d 375, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(extortion), aff'd, 436 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1982); King v. State, 317 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (uttering of a forged instrument), aff'd, 339 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1976);
Silvestri v. State, 332 So. 2d 351, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla.
1976). For a discussion of the problem that Florida courts have considered in dealing
with attempt liability, see infra notes 259-269 and accompanying text.
252 22 Wash. App. 725, 591 P.2d 482 (1979).
53 Id. at 729, 591 P.2d at 484.
24

Id.

-'256 Id. at 727, 729, 591 P.2d at 483-84.
/d.

See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.56.110-.120 (1977) (extortion).
z' For a discussion of the double inchoate offense of attempt to solicit, see supra
note 140.
157
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The third subcategory of offenses that include the attempt
within the definition of the completed crime is exemplified in
Florida's penal code. Florida's legislature effectively has
merged the completed offense and the attempt in its statutes
prohibiting theft, 259 dealing in stolen goods, 260 escape from a
penal institution, 261 and resisting arrest with violence. 262 Although the practice of directly linking the attempt to the completed crime appears to answer the question of whether attempt
liability applies, this practice has created a serious, unexpected
problem in the Florida courts.
Florida's rules of criminal procedure require trial judges to
grant a defendant's proper request for a jury instruction on
attempt if the indictment contains an offense of attempt to commit the substantive crime charged and there is evidence to support such attempt. 263 Indeed, failure to do so is reversible error.264 If, however, the substantive offense contains the attempt,
then conviction for an attempt to commit the substantive offense
constitutes conviction of a nonexistent offense. 265 Seeking to
comply with the state's procedural rules, several trial judges
159Sykes v. State, 397 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 434 So. 2d

325, 327 (Fla. 1983); Bell v. State, 382 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
McIntyre v. State, 380 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Miles v. State, 374
So. 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.014(1) (West
1976 & Cum. Supp. 1988) ("a person is guilty of theft if he knowingly obtains or uses,
or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another") (emphasis added).
260 Ervin v. State, 410 So. 2d 510, 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 435 So. 2d
815 (Fla. 1983); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.019 (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1988) ("[a]ny
person who traffics in, or endeavors to traffic in, [stolen] property") (emphasis added).
26! Keel v. State, 438 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 443 So.
2d 979 (Fla. 1983); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.40 (West 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1988)

("[any person confined [by state penal authorities] who escapes or attempts to escape
from such confinement") (emphasis added).
262 McAbee v. State, 391 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 843.01 (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1988) ("[w]hoever knowingly and willfully
resists, obstructs, or opposes any ... municipal police officer.., in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering ... or doing violence to the person of such officer")
(emphasis added).
261FLA. R. CRIm. P. 3.510.
21 Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 383-84 (Fla. 1968) (superseded by statute, as
stated in Henry v. State, 445 So. 2d 707, 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)); Holloway v.
State, 362 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 953 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
265See Pagano v. State, 387 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1980) (reversing conviction for
attempted corruption of a public servant by threat); Vogel v. State, 365 So. 2d 1079,
1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (reversing conviction for attempted possession of burglary tools); Silvestri v. State, 332 So. 2d 351, 353-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (reversing
conviction for attempted making of a false report of a crime), aff'd, 340 So. 2d 928
(Fla. 1976); King v. State, 317 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (reversing
conviction for attempted uttering of a forged instrument), aff'd, 339 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1976).
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have instructed juries on attempt when the applicable statute
already included the attempt. 266 Under the principle of "jury
pardon," appellate courts reversed these convictions and discharged the defendants, rather than remand for retrial. 67

The Florida Supreme Court partially corrected this situation
with its 1983 decision in State v. Sykes.2 68 The holding in Sykes

allows appellate courts to remand a case for retrial rather than
discharge a defendant who was convicted in a trial in which the
judge improperly instructed the jury on the nonexistent crime
as a lesser included offense.2 69 But the decision failed to clarify
when an attempt instruction is appropriate. The Florida legis-

lature's efforts to resolve the controversy concerning double
inchoate liability by defining attempt liability more precisely has
paradoxically raised the very issues that it sought to resolve.

B. Attempt to Conspire

Unlike the attempt-to-attempt construction, the attempt-toconspire construction has raised little argument. Only a few
courts have had to deal with indictments for attempted conspir266See Ervin v. State, 410 So. 2d 510, 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd in part,
435 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1983); Sykes v. State, 397 So. 2d 991, 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
aff'd, 434 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1983); McAbee v.State, 391 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
267See Ervin v. State, 410 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd il part,
435 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1983); Sykes v. State, 397 So. 2d 991, 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981), aff'd, 434 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1983); McAbee v. State, 391 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Vogel v. State, 365 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Silvestri v. State, 332 So. 2d 351, 353-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 340 So. 2d 928
(Fla. 1976).
In Sykes, the intermediate appellate court explained and criticized the jury-pardon
rule, although it ultimately followed it:
The defendant can receive a "jury pardon" if the jury decides to convict of a
"lesser included offense," even though the offense may or may not not [sic]
have been in fact committed. Paradoxically, under the "merged attempt" rule,
a defendant must be set free by the appellate courts if he is convicted of an
attempt to commit the offense, even though the offense of "criminal attempt"
was in fact committed by the defendant, and the attempt is by law the offense.
... In cases dealing with the failure to give a jury instruction on "attempt,"
where the attempt is merged with the crime itself, the appellate courts ...
have avoided reversal by employing the "no crime" rationale. When faced with
a jury conviction of a similar "attempt" offense, it appears that the courts
(probably for the sake of consistency) felt obliged to follow the same "no
crime" approach, which of course mandated the discharge of the defendant.
397 So. 2d at 994 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
268434 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1983).
269Id. at 328. For a case that followed the holding in Sykes, see State v. Ervin, 435
So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1983).
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acy.270 The only federal appellate court to address such a conviction dismissed the concept.2 7' Most of the state appellate

courts that have considered the existence of attempted conspir272
acy have rejected it.
Nevertheless, the crime of attempted conspiracy may be useful in two situations. First, it would allow courts to find a lesser
included offense of conspiracy where the required elements of
270See United States v. Murrell, 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Usapp file), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546,
549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting attempt-to-conspire construction because no
overt act was proven and the behavior already was covered by the conspiracy statute),
overruledon othergrounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
State v. Sexton, 232 Kan. 539, 540, 542-44, 657 P.2d 43, 44, 46-47 (1983) (rejecting
attempted-conspiracy construction because cannot convict for crimes that state does
not define); People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 94-100, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925-28
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (noting that unilateral approach to conspiracy makes attempt-toconspire construction unnecessary), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394 N.E.2d 288, 420
N.Y.S.2d 218 (1979); People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 17, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1019 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978) (same).
27 United States v. Murrell, 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980) (unpublished opinion; citation
refers to table; full opinion appears in LEXIS, Genfed library, Usapp file), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1084 (1981). In Murrell, the defendant was convicted for violating the Hobbs
Act's provision against conspiracies to extort, contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The
defendant sought to have his conviction overturned on the basis of a faulty jury instruction. The district court had instructed the jury that the government must show that
"defendant Murrell had conspired or attempted to conspire to induce his victim to part
with money" (emphasis added). Agreeing with the defendant, the circuit panel stated:
"There is no such thing as 'attempt to conspire.' Conspiracy requires an agreement and
one cannot be guilty of conspiracy if one only 'attempts to agree."' Nevertheless, it
held the district court's error to be harmless and upheld the conviction for conspiracy.
See also United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980) (dictum)
(rejecting attempt-to-conspire construction). In reversing a conviction for a conspiracy
to attempt, the Meacham court denigrated the attempted-conspiracy construction:
It would be even more inane to commit the other crime the government would
have us recognize-attempt to conspire. A scenario leading to a prosecution
for that offense might read something like this: A suggests to B that they get
together to discuss the possibility of violating the criminal code and to select
the provisions they will violate. B agrees to meet and talk. While ascending
the staircase leading into the room in which they will meet, both slip and fall
down the stairs. A dies of his injuries. B, who survives, is prosecuted for an
attempt to conspire.
Id. But cf. Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1981) (mentioning
defendant's indictment for conspiracy and his plea of guilty to a charge of attempted
conspiracy to criminally possess a controlled substance).
272See Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 548-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (the
crime of attempted conspiracy does not exist because state case law defines attempt as
overt action and conspiracy requires criminal intent of at least two parties), overruled
on other grounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd,
437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983); State v. Sexton, 232 Kan. 539, 542, 657 P.2d 43, 46 (1983)
(rejecting attempted-conspiracy construction because courts cannot convict for crimes
that the state does not define); State v. Kihnel, 488 So. 2d 1238, 1239-41 (La. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that, under a bilateral-conspiracy statute, there can be no attempted
conspiracy); People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 97-100, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 926-28
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (noting that Model Penal Code's unilateral approach to conspiracy
makes attempt-to-conspire construction unnecessary), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394
N.E.2d 288, 420 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1979).
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that crime cannot be proved. Many states have not adopted the
Model Penal Code's unilateral approach to conspiracy, retaining
the traditional bilateral formulation.2 73 Thus, their statutes may
require the agreement of two or more parties to commit a substantive offense. Liability for conspiracy would not attach under
those statutes if an actor requested another's participation in a
conspiracy, but, for example, the other party only feigned
agreement.
Ironically, the only state court to adopt the attempted-conspiracy approach sits in a state that has adopted the Model
Penal Code's unilateral-conspiracy approach.2 74 In People v.
DiDominick,275 a New York court upheld a conviction for attempted conspiracy to commit murder.276 The defendant, a policeman on limited assignment who was restricted from carrying
a gun, offered to murder for hire two people named by a person
with whom he had conversed on several occasions. 277 Unbeknownst to the defendant, his "business" partner was actually
an undercover police officer.2 78 After the defendant had obtained
a pistol and informed the undercover agent that he was ready
2 79
to commit the two murders that day, the police arrested him.
The court cited the unilateral-conspiracy provision to demonstrate that it was unnecessary for both parties to have the required mental state for one to be guilty of conspiracy.2 0 Nevertheless, the court relied on the state's attempt statute to treat
the defendant's actions as a lesser included offense of
281
conspiracy.
Liability also may attach under the attempt-to-conspire construction in those situations in which one party requests another's participation in a conspiracy, but the second party refuses.
273For a discussion of the unilateral-conspiracy approach, see MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 5.03(1)(a), 5.04(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1985); supra notes 107-109 and accom-

panying text. For a listing of several states that have adopted that approach, see supra
note 108.
274Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.30 (McKinney 1987) (adopting unilateral ap-

proach to conspiracy) with People v. DiDominick, 94 Misc. 2d 392,393-94,406 N.Y.S.2d
420, 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (relying on general attempt statute to uphold a conspiracy

conviction in a case in which the defendant "conspired" with an undercover officer who
had only feigned agreement).
27-94 Misc. 2d 392, 406 N.Y.S.2d 420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
276Id. at 393, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
277Id.
78 Id.
79

z Id.

=w
Id. at

394-95, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 422.

281Id. at 393-94, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22. But cf. People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 17,
406 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (criticizing reasoning in DiDoninick).
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Attempts to conspire are partially covered in the solicitation
statutes of some states. 282 Those few remaining states that do
not have such a statute and do not recognize the common-law
offense of solicitation, however, would find the attempted-conspiracy construction useful. 283 But none of the appellate courts
in those states has approved the construction.
The second general use of the attempted-conspiracy construction occurs in plea bargaining. In People v. Toliver,284 for example, the defendant pled guilty to attempted conspiracy to sell
narcotics as part of a plea-bargaining arrangement arrived at
during the selection of jurors for his trial. 28 5 Subsequently, he
sought to withdraw his plea on the ground that he was not guilty
286
of conspiring to sell narcotics.
The court refused to accept the withdrawal, ruling that he had
voluntarily entered into the plea bargain with the full understanding that it was negotiated in compromise of pending
charges.287 The court stated:
[T]he practice of accepting pleas to lesser crimes is generally
intended as a compromise in situations where conviction is
uncertain of the crime charged. The judgment entered on the
plea in such situation may be based upon no objective state
of facts. It is often a hypothetical crime, and the procedureauthorized by statute-is justified for the reason that it is in
substitution for a charge of crime of a more serious nature
which has been charged but perhaps cannot be proved ....
[H]is plea may288relate to a hypothetical situation without
objective basis.
Moreover, by comparing the charge of attempted conspiracy to
that of attempted manslaughter, 289 the court implied that the
m For a listing of several state solicitation statutes, see supra note 133.
281But see State v. Sexton, 232 Kan. 539, 540, 542-44, 657 P.2d 43, 44, 46-47 (1983).

In Sexton, the court refused a conviction for attempted conspiracy because the state
legislature had not manifested any intent to punish such actions. The state legislature,
however, enacted a solicitation statute in 1982, after the acts in Sexton had been
committed. Id. at 543, 657 P.2d at 46-47. The court conceded that the defendant's
solicitation of an undercover policeman would have fallen within this statute's ambit.
Id. at 543-44, 657 P.2d at 47.
29 A.D.2d 210, 287 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. App. Div.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 892
(1968).
28 Id. at 211, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
26 Id. at 211-12, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
2V Id.
29 Id. at 212, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 737-38 (quoting People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d 511, 516,
166 N.E.2d 684, 686, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677 (1960)) (emphasis in original).
289Id., 287 N.Y.S.2d at 738 (citing People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 154, 225 N.E.2d
200, 202, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (1967)).
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attempted-conspiracy construction is also logically inconsistent.

Nevertheless,
purposes.

290

the court recognized it for plea-bargaining

C. Conspiracy to Attempt

Unlike the attempt-to-conspire and attempt-to-attempt constructions, almost the entire body of case law concerning conspiracy to attempt is at the federal, rather than the state, level. 29'
This situation results from the language of the federal criminal
code's general conspiracy statute:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof, in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
292
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Thus, if a separate federal statute expressly proscribes attempt,

it is an "offense against the United States," and therefore is an
293
appropriate object of the conspiracy statute.
29 Id.; cf. People v. LeBlanc, 120 Mich. App. 343, 327 N.W.2d 471 (1982) (holding
that guilty plea to nonexistent crime of attempted felonious assault was not error
requiring reversal). See also A. DERSHOWiTZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 115 (1982) (discussing
impossible-attempt case, settled by plea of guilty to attempted manslaughter); Robbins,
supra note 11, at 432-33 n.287 (discussing plea of guilty to nonexistent crime).
291The only state cases to discuss conspiracy to attempt are People v. Teitelbaum,
163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 329 P.2d 157 (holding conspiracy to attempt grand theft to be a
lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit grand theft), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 206
(1958), and People v. Travis, 171 Cal. App. 2d 842, 341 P.2d 851 (1959) (holding
conspiracy to attempt petty larceny to be a lesser included offense of conspiracy to
commit petty larceny).
m 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
2 See United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 710 (7th Cir.) (attempted bank robbery is
an appropriate object of a conspiracy charge, as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937 (1974).
At first glance, it appears that the language of the federal conspiracy statute, 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1982), also allows a conspiracy-to-solicit construction. Indeed, several
federal-court decisions have upheld or alluded to convictions for conspiracy to solicit
bribes by government officials or trustees of government-regulated pension funds, or
conspiracy to solicit perjury. See, e.g., United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1319
(lth Cir. 1982) (upholding convictions both for the substantive offense of soliciting a
person who was materially connected with ajudicial proceeding, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and
for conspiracy to solicit), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983); United States v. Hastings,
681 F.2d 706 (l1th Cir. 1982) (upholding a conviction for conspiracy to solicit a bribe
from a person who was materially connected with a judicial proceeding), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1203 (1983); United States v. Dorfman, 470 F.2d 246, 247 (2d Cir. 1972)
(upholding a conviction for conspiracy to commit a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1954, which
prohibits an offer to, acceptance of, or solicitation to influence the operation of an
employee-benefit plan by a person who is materially related to the plan), cert. denied,
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Although conspiracy statutes reach back further in the continuum of preparatory acts to impose liability than do attempt
411 U.S. 923 (1973); Wilson v. United States, 230 F.2d 521, 522 (4th Cir.) (upholding a
conviction for conspiracy to solicit a bribe by an officer or employee of the federal
government), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956); United States v. Hood, 200 F.2d 639,
640-43 (5th Cir.) (reversing the district court's dismissal of a charge alleging conspiracy
to violate a federal statute that proscribed soliciting or receiving money in consideration
of a promise, support, or use of influence to obtain for any person any federal appointive
office), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); see also Cline v. Brussett, 661 F.2d 108, 112
(9th Cir. 1981) (remanding to the district court a prisoner's two actions alleging that
state officials conspired to convict him of groundless charges and denied him right of
fair trial in his conviction of conspiring to solicit perjury); United States v. Sposato,
446 F.2d 779, 780 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding a conviction for perjury against a challenge
based on the defendant's inability to impeach chief witness against him, who was
subsequently charged with, but not convicted of, conspiracy to solicit a bribe); United
States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (declaring a mistrial in the
trial of two federal narcotics agents charged with conspiracy to solicit a bribe, where
the principal government witness had stated during testimony that he had taken a liedetector test).
United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069
(1979), exemplifies the class of offenses that use the conspiracy-to-solicit construction
and helps to illustrate why they are not double inchoate crimes. In Arroyo, Fernandez
had applied for a Small Business Administration (SBA) guaranteed loan through a local
model-cities program. Subsequently, Sanchez, a business counselor at the local agency,
told Fernandez that, although the bank had approved the loan, the SBA had not yet
guaranteed it. Sanchez instructed Fernandez to see Arroyo, a loan officer at the SBA,
for help in processing the loan. Id. at 651.
Fernandez met with Arroyo, who suggested that the application was pending before
him. Arroyo, however, had already recommended authorization of an SBA guarantee.
Id. at 654. Nevertheless, Fernandez, believing that Arroyo held the power of decision
over the loan, asked Arroyo how much Arroyo's approval would cost. Id. at 651.
Arroyo told Fernandez to talk to Sanchez. Sanchez informed Fernandez that he should
pay Arroyo $800.
The SBA, which unbeknownst to Fernandez had processed the loan, finally disbursed
it more than five months after his meetings with Sanchez and Arroyo. Shortly thereafter,
Sanchez and Arroyo contacted Fernandez to arrange for Arroyo to pick up the $800.
Fernandez informed the FBI, which staked out Fernandez' business and arrested Arroyo
when he came to collect the bribe. Id. at 651-52.
The district court convicted Arroyo of the substantive offense of corruptly soliciting
or receiving a bribe, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (1976), and convicted both
Arroyo and Sanchez of conspiracy to commit the substantive offense, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1976). Id. at 650. Both appealed on the ground that Arroyo had solicited
a gratuity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1976), rather than a bribe, because he had
approved the loan prior to the solicitation, and thus no longer had authority to influence
its disposition. Id. at 653. A divided appellate court rejected the defendants' contention
and upheld their convictions. Id.
Significantly, none of the defendants in these cases challenged his conspiracy conviction on the ground that it constituted an impermissible double inchoate offense. The
reason is that the crimes of soliciting a bribe and soliciting perjury are long-recognized
forms of the substantive offenses of bribery and subornation of perjury. See R. PERKINS
& R. BoYcE, supra note 13, at 524-26 (subornation of perjury), 534-35 (solicitation of
bribe). Historically, the treatment of solicitation as a general inchoate offense developed
from those crimes affecting the administration of government functions. See supra note
126 (discussing early English cases from which the substantive crime of solicitation
developed). None of the conspiracy charges brought in the cases above made a general
solicitation statute its object, nor could they have, as the federal criminal law has no
such statute. Accordingly, it is incorrect to view these conspiracies as double inchoate
crimes.
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statutes, 294 the federal courts' use of the conspiracy-to-attempt

construction has not resulted in an extension of liability to more
remote acts. Instead, the courts have applied it in instances in
which the conspiracy failed to realize an object offense for which
the statutory definition of the crime prohibited both the attempt
295
and the substantive crime.
The conspiracy-to-attempt formulation is used most frequently in conjunction with the federal statute prohibiting bank
robbery or the attempt to commit it.296 In United States v.
Dearmore,297 for example, an informant, knowing that the defendants had been planning to rob a bank, introduced them to
federal agents who pretended to be potential accomplices. The
agents assisted the defendants in organizing the crime and accompanied them to the bank on the morning of the planned
robbery. The agents arrested the defendants as they entered the
bank. 298 Relying on prior federal case law,299 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants'
contention that the general conspiracy statute did not apply to
an attempted bank robbery or any other attempt: "While we
think it a poor practice to indict for conspiracy to commit the
attempt instead of indicting for conspiracy to commit the substantive offense which is the real object of the perpetrators, we
cannot say that the former cannot constitute an indictable
offense."300
Courts also have applied the conspiracy law to statutes that
prohibit the attempt to violate the union members' "bill of
29'

For a discussion of conspiracy as an inchoate crime that imposes liability at an

earlier stage than does attempt, see supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.

29SSee United States v. Dearmore, 672 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1982) (conspiracy to
attempt bank robbery); United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1068 (2d Cir.) (conspiracy to attempt to export firearms without a license), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817
(1981); United States v. Williams, 624 F.2d 75, 75 (9th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy to attempt
to use violence to intimidate a union member from exercising his right to free speech
guaranteed by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("Landrum-Griffin"
Act)); United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir.) (conspiracy to attempt bank
robbery), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937 (1974); United States v. Baum, 435 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1970) (conspiracy to attempt to evade federal income taxes); United States v.
Chambers, 515 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (conspiracy to attempt to maliciously
destroy property by explosion).
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1982).
m 672 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1982).
m Id. at 739.
2 See United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 710 (7th Cir.) (rejecting the contention
that conspiracy to attempt to rob a bank is not a crime), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937
(1974); United States v. Chambers, 515 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (holding that
conspiracy can have as its object crime the attempt to maliciously destroy property).
30 672 F.2d at 740 (Kennedy, J.).
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rights," 30 to maliciously destroy property by explosion,30 2 and
to evade federal income taxes. 30 3 One court has applied the
conspiracy statute to a Treasury Department regulation that
expanded the scope of a substantive statute proscribing the

export of firearms without a license by making the attempt to
do so a violation. 304 Another court has upheld the application of

conspiracy to a statute prohibiting a0 5form of burglary-the
3
breaking and entering of a post office.
The only decision to reject a conspiracy to attempt implicitly
strengthened the principle that the inchoate "offense against the
United States" to which the conspiracy statute can apply must6
30
be a separate, specific statute. In United States v. Meacham,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
conspiracy-to-attempt convictions based on conspiracy and attempt provisions that were contained in the same statute. Because federal narcotics laws contain their own conspiracy provisions, the general conspiracy statute is inapposite. 3 7 Thus,
federal prosecutors sought to bring the conspiracy-to-attempt

charges based on the two narcotics statutes, both of which read:
30,See United States v. Williams, 624 F.2d 75, 75-77 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding
application of 18 U.S.C. § 371 to 29 U.S.C. § 530).
302See United States v. Chambers, 515 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (upholding
application of 18 U.S.C. § 371 to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
303See United States v. Baum, 435 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1970) (upholding
application of 18 U.S.C. § 371 to 26 U.S.C. § 7201), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971).
The meaning of "attempt" under the tax code, however, is different from that which
has traditionally been used in the criminal law. The elements of attempted tax evasion
are the same as those for tax evasion itself, combined only with the fact that the actor
was caught. The statute provides: "Any person who willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall ... be
guilty of a felony ....
26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982). For other cases upholding the validity
of conspiracy to attempt to evade taxes, see, e.g., Forman v. United States, 361 U.S.
416, 417-18 (1960), overruled on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978); United States v. Wenger, 455 F.2d 308, 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 920
(1972); Giardano v. United States, 257 F.2d 109, 111-12 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 944 (1958); Yoffe v. United States, 153 F.2d 570, 571, 576 (Ist Cir. 1946).
3o4 See United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1074-75 n.15 (2d Cir.) (upholding
application of 18 U.S.C. § 371 to 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.01, 127.03, implementing the mandate
of 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817 (1981). The Mowad court stated:
Although it is probable that the "conspiracy to attempt" charge against Mowad
was the result of careless indictment drafting and not innovative legal reasoning, the Government's charge contains all elements necessary to prosecute a
conspiracy: a provision making the act of conspiring a crime and a provision
making the object of the conspiracy a crime.
Id. at 1074.
30SSee Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106, 108 (8th Cir.) (upholding application
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 to 18 U.S.C. § 2115), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968).
3 626 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
307United States v. Mori, 444 F.2d 240, 244-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913
(1971).
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"Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense
defined in this subchapter is punishable .... "308 The court overturned the convictions not on the ground that a conspiracy to
attempt is a "conceptually bizarre crime,"30 9 but rather on its
reading of congressional intent that the statute be used only to
charge either an attempt or a conspiracy.310
Despite criticisms of the statutory construction, 31' federal law
clearly makes valid the double inchoate crime of a conspiracy
to attempt.
Ill. CRITICISM OF DOUBLE INCHOATE

CRIMES

Despite the use of double inchoate concepts by many federal
and state courts, the majority of jurisdictions have not adopted
this practice. Decisions of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries that criticize convictions for attempts to attempt as
"logical absurdities" remain influential, as evidenced by many
courts' citation of them, with and without further analysis.
The abstract and semantical nature of the logical-absurdity
argument, however, has come under criticism in recent years
by scholars and jurists. Consequently, some recent decisions
declining to recognize double inchoate offenses have referred
to the absence of express legislative intent to allow courts the
essentially common-law authority to create crimes by combining
statutory inchoate offenses. This argument implies a violation
of due process caused by lack of notice to the defendant. In
addition, several recent decisions and commentaries have criticized the use of double inchoate crimes as cumbersome and
unnecessary.
3-s 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) (distribution of marijuana) (emphasis added); id. § 963
(importation of marijuana) (emphasis added).
109626 F.2d at 509. The court observed that "it would be the height of absurdity to

conspire to commit an attempt, an inchoate offense, and simultaneously conspire to fail
at the effort." Id. at 509 n.7; see also supra note 271 (quoting court's comments on
attempt to conspire). The court continued:

The propriety of applying conspiracy statutes "through" attempt statutes is
not before us in this case. We note the possibilities such an application could
cause merely to highlight our belief that, had Congress intended that there be
prosecutions for conspiracies to attempt to violate the drug laws, it would have
so provided in terms less ambiguous ....

Congress is as much aware as we

are of the venerable maxim that penal statutes are to be strictly construed.
626 F.2d at 509 n.7.
310626 F.2d at 508-09.
31 See infra notes 422-428 and accompanying text (noting judicial criticism of the

conspiracy-to-attempt construction).
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In summary, the case law generally reflects a progression from
a conceptual approach, which concentrates on the use of abstract concepts and their analysis by pure logic, to a functional
approach, which emphasizes the purposes of the law. Although
the logical-absurdity approach appears to offer greater predictability and certainty, it may fail to achieve the social policies
that the legislatures intended to further through inchoate liability.3 12 Both the manifested-legislative-intent approach and the
evaluation of the necessity for specific double inchoate crimes
reflect a more functional, policy-based approach. The former,
however, emphasizes notions of separation of powers and individual freedom from criminal process, and thus still partakes
of a conceptual approach. The latter, along with those decisions
that accept double inchoate offenses, represents a truly functional approach.
A. The Logical Absurdity of Double Inchoate Crimes
1. The Origins of the Logical-Absurdity Approach
Perhaps the most influential decision to denigrate the concept
of double inchoate offenses is Wilson v. State,313 decided by the
Georgia Supreme Court in 1874. Wilson, which involved a conviction for "an attempt to make an assault,' 314 is the most often
cited and quoted decision regarding double inchoate crimes.
Despite criticism of the court's analysis in Wilson, 31 5 several
subsequent decisions have invalidated double inchoate convictions by condensing its sweeping rhetoric into the shorthand
'316
premise, "logical absurdity.
312Meehan,

supra note 12, at 218.
313
53 Ga. 205 (1874).
314
Id. at 206. The state had indicted Wilson for assault with intent to murder, but the

jury found Wilson guilty of what it believed to be a lesser included offense. Id.
311
Arnold, supra note 154, at 64-65; Perkins, supra note 194, at 81-87; see R. PEPKINS
& R. BoYcE, supra note 13, at 159-73 (noting modern courts' tendency to move away
from Wilson's logical-absurdity argument); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at
363-64 (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (suggesting that courts should decide whether
attempt liability attaches to particular behavior based on public policy, rather than on
semantic niceties).
316 See Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 115, 485 P.2d 886, 888-89 (1971) (invalidating
the charge of attempted assault with a deadly weapon); Hutchinson v. State, 315 So.
2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ("attempted conspiracy as an abstract concept
would be a logical absurdity"), overruled on othergrounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d
1072 (Fla. App. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983); Green v. State, 82 Ga. App.
402, 405, 61 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1950) (the offense of attempted assault with intent to rape
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In Wilson, the defendant had used a gun to threaten a person
who sought to enter the defendant's premises. The defendant,
however, made clear that he would shoot only if the other party
attempted to enter his house. (The court noted that the intended
victim appeared to have no right to enter the defendant's
house. 3 17 ) On this evidence, the defendant was convicted of
31 8
attempted assault with intent to murder.
The Georgia Supreme Court used the logical-absurdity argument when it reversed the conviction. 3 9 Noting that the state
code defined an assault as "an attempt to commit a violent injury
on the person of another, '320 the court stated:
As an assault is itself an attempt to commit a crime, an
attempt to make an assault can only be an attempt to attempt
to do it, or to state the matter more definitely, it is to do any
act towards doing an act towards the commission of the
offense. This is simply absurd. As soon as any act is done
towards committing a violent injury on the person of another,
the party doing the act is guilty of an assault, and he is not
guilty until he has done the act. Yet it is claimed that he
may be guilty of an attempt to make an assault, when, under
the law, he must do an act before the attempt is complete.
The refinement and metaphysical acumen that can see a
tangible idea in the words an attempt to attempt to act is too
great for practical use. It is like conceiving32of the beginning
of eternity or the starting place of infinity. 1
This analysis presents two bases for criticism of attempt to
attempt as a logical absurdity. First, the court suggested that
the attempt-to-attempt concept would give courts unlimited discretion to punish acts further removed from a completed offense
than an attempt statute does. 322 As the attempt statute did in
Wilson, general attempt statutes require an overt act done with
the intent to commit a completed crime. 323 The act must go
does not exist); People v. Banks, 51 Mich. App. 685, 690, 216 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1974)
(there is no such crime as attempted felonious assault); cf. People v. LeBlanc, 120
Mich. App. 343, 327 N.W.2d 471 (1982) (holding that, although attempted felonious
assault is a nonexistent crime, for policy reasons a defendant may still plead guilty to
such a crime).
31753 Ga. at 206. The court doubted, based on the conditional nature of Wilson's
threat and his right to protect his abode, whether the evidence was sufficient to establish
"even an assault." Id.
318Id.
319Id.
320Id.
321Id.

322
Id.
323
See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text (discussing actus reus of attempt).
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beyond mere preparation, but may fall short of consummation
of the completed offense. Consequently, the court in Wilson
viewed an attempted attempt as "the doing of an act towards
the doing of an act" toward completing an offense defining a
tangible harm. 324 The court indicated that allowing a conviction
for attempt to attempt would be impractical at best and might
lead to the judicial use of further regressions. 325 This practice
would impart criminal liability to acts so removed from the
ultimate offense as to qualify as mere preparation-that is, acts
326
to which a court cannot impute a fully formed intent.
Second, the court in Wilson suggested that individuals do not
attempt to attempt a crime, but instead attempt to commit a
completed offense. 327 Even if an inchoate crime can have as its
object another inchoate crime, the second inchoate crime must
have as its object some completed substantive offense meeting
a statutory test of liability. 328 In most states, failure to consummate the completed offense is an element of attempt. 329 Thus,
in those jurisdictions, attempt to attempt suggests within the
same construction both an attempt to commit some ultimate
330
offense and an attempt to fail at that same offense.
32453

Ga. at 206.

325Id.

316
This implication in the Wilson analysis is elaborated on in the dissent in People v.
Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 105, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 931-32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)
(Titone, J., dissenting), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394 N.E.2d 288,420 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1979),
which criticized an indictment that the state claimed set out a charge of attempted
conspiracy as a lesser included offense of conspiracy. The dissent argued as follows:
[C]onspiracy is an inchoate, or anticipatory, crime. It is "anticipatory in the
sense that there exists an 'object' or substantive crime yet to be committed."
Because of the very nature of conspiracy as an inchoate crime there cannot
be an attempt to commit it since you would then have an attempt on an attempt.
To establish a conspiracy proof is required that the plot or scheme is being
acted upon and not resting in the minds of the plotters. Conspiracy is a
completed crime only when the agreement is effectuated by an overt act toward
fruition of the substantive crime. Thus, even when the conspiracy is established, it is inchoate. To hold that acts which have not reached the minimal
level required for an inchoate crime are sufficient to warrant a conviction for
attempted conspiracy is untenable. It would render illegal acts which, in themselves, are insufficient even to constitute an anticipatory crime.
Id. (citing Sobel, The Anticipatory Offenses in New Penal Law, 32 BROOKLYN L. REV.
257 (1966)).
32753 Ga. at 206.

"8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 363 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
329See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (listing the elements of attempt).

330
A Colorado court developed this implication of Wilson's rationale further. See
Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 115, 485 P.2d 886, 888 (1971) ("Perhaps philosophers or
metaphysicians can intend to attempt to act, but ordinary people intend to act, not to
attempt to act."); cf. United States v. Dearmore, 672 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1982)
(dictum) ("We think it a poor practice to indict for conspiracy to commit the attempt
instead of indicting for conspiracy to commit the substantive offense which is the real
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Several other roughly contemporaneous decisions concerning
convictions for attempt to commit a crime that is itself in the
nature of attempt buttressed the rationale of Wilson.33 ' These
decisions, however, merely held without analysis that the crime
of an attempt to commit an assault did not exist 3 32 or that the
state could not indict a person for an attempt to commit a crime
333
that is itself in the nature of an attempt.
In State v. Hewett,334 for example, the North Carolina Su-

preme Court rejected a conviction for a felonious "attempt to
ravish and carnally know" the victim. 335 The court held that the
indictment made out a charge of assault with intent to rape. The

court treated this crime as a lesser included offense of rape,

336
holding that no such crime as attempt to commit rape existed.
The Hewett court then stated the general proposition that
''one cannot be indicted for an attempt to commit a crime where

the crime attempted is in its very nature an attempt, '337 citing
as authority the decision in People v. Thomas,338 a case that had
339
overturned a conviction for attempted subornation of perjury.
Several other cases involving attempt to commit embracery
340
stated the proposition in the same way.

As previously discussed, however, the nature of subornation
of perjury and embracery as forms of attempt are different from
that of assault. 341 In embracery and subornation, the attempt
establishes the crime; it is irrelevant whether the actor realizes
his intent-i.e., solicits another to do his bidding. In assault,
objective of the perpetrators.
...); United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 509 n.7
(5th Cir. 1980) ("[I]t would be the height of absurdity to conspire to commit an attempt,
an inchoate offense, and simultaneously conspire to fail at the effort.").
"I See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 63 Cal. 482, 482-83 (1883); State v. Davis, 112 Mo.
App. 346, 348, 87 S.W. 33, 33 (1905); State v. Sales, 2 Nev. 268, 270 (1866); State v.
Hewett, 158 N.C. 627, 629, 74 S.E. 356, 357 (1912); White v. State, 22 Tex. 608, 608
(1858); Brown v. State, 7 Tex. Crim. 569, 569 (1880); Wiseman v. Commonwealth, 143
Va. 631, 636, 130 S.E. 249, 251 (1925).
332See White v. State, 22 Tex. 608 (1858) (assault with intent to murder); Brown v.
State, 7 Tex. Crim. 569 (1880) (assault with intent to rape).
331 State v. Hewett, 158 N.C. 627, 629, 74 S.E. 356, 357 (1912).
-3 158 N.C. 627, 74 S.E. 356 (1912).
311Id. at 629, 74 S.E. at 357.
336

Id.

337 Id.

33 63 Cal. 482 (1883).
339 Id.
at 482-83.
340 State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 333-34, 133 S.W.2d 336, 341 (1939); State v. Davis,
112 Mo. App. 346, 348, 87 S.W. 33, 33 (1905); State v. Sales, 2 Nev. 268, 270 (1866);
Wiseman v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 631, 636, 130 S.E. 249, 251 (1925).
34' See supra notes 250-251 and accompanying text (discussing differing judicial treatment of subornation of perjury and embracery).
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however, guilt or innocence depends on how close the defendant
comes to realizing his intent. Accordingly, the extension of a
principle of some validity for embracery and subornation of
perjury to assault without further analysis merits closer
attention.
2. The Move Away from Logical Absurdity
The appeal of the logical-absurdity argument as the most valid
criticism of attempts to attempt diminished with the publication
of an article by Thurman Arnold in 1930.342 Arnold implicitly
criticized Wilson's broad generalization by attacking the overemphasis on abstract concepts in substantive inchoate crimes:
One way of treating cases arising under [criminal attempt]
statutes is to determine whether the policy of the statute can
be said to include the conduct of the defendant and whether
the penalty seems appropriate to the offense. If we do this
we can confine our attention to the particular prohibition
under discussion, and decide to what conduct we wish to
extend it. Another method is to forget the particular statute
which the defendant is alleged to have violated or the particular crime which he has almost consummated, and put
our emphasis on words in the statute such as "assault" and
"attempt." When we do this every other statute, no matter
how different in policy or penalty, and attempts at every
other crime no matter how dissimilar immediately become
relevant. We are thereupon forced 343
to create numerous fine
distinctions and abstract concepts.
Using the concept of attempt to assault, from which most of
the discussion of attempt to attempt has arisen, Arnold illustrated the validity of policy-based distinctions. He noted that,
although the courts had not punished attempts at ordinary assault, two courts had made attempts at aggravated assault punishable. 344 He believed that this distinction, based on the relative
seriousness of the completed offenses, made good common
sense, although it appeared incorrect when analyzed in terms
142Arnold,

supra note 154.

343Id. at 62.

34 Id. at 65 (citing Burton v. State, 8 Ala. App. 295, 62 So. 394 (1913) (attempted
assault with intent to commit rape), and State v. Herron, 12 Mont. 230, 29 P. 819 (1892)
(attempted assault with a deadly weapon)).
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of the applicable statutes' definitions. 345 Arnold concluded that

"the generalization that there can be no attempt at a crime in
the nature of attempt tells us nothing and tends merely to divert
3' 46
the court's mind from the real issue.
Arnold's criticisms of the logical-absurdity approach make a
valid point: By focusing on the definitions of attempt in modern
general attempt statutes, courts that fail to recognize attempts
to commit crimes in the nature of attempt have obscured the
Id. Professor Arnold stated:
The court is confronted with the alternative of either discharging the accused
or modifying the penalty to make it more nearly fit his conduct. An easy way
to accomplish this is by making attempts at aggravated assaults punishable,
and this is frequently done. It is academic to call such cases "wrong" because
assault is in the nature of an attempt and hence cannot be attempted, particularly when a common sense result is reached.
Id. (footnote omitted).
316 Id.; accord MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 363-64 (Proposed Official
Draft 1985). The Code's drafters reasoned that:
One of the questions frequently litigated is whether there can be an attempt
to attempt. As an abstract proposition of law the construction has been condemned by the majority of cases considering the issue, and it seems as a matter
of sound analysis that the construction is not necessary. An attempt to attempt
can always be considered a more remote attempt to commit the same substantive crime, provided, of course, that the conduct is sufficient to meet the basic
test of liability. Thus, if an assault is an attempt to commit a battery, an attempt
to assault can more properly be charged as itself an attempt to commit a battery
and its sufficiency determined on that basis. In any case, convictions have
been sustained for attempts to assault.
The situation is somewhat different when the attempt is not described as
such, but is defined as an act done with intent to commit some other crime.
Among the traditional offenses burglary is such an attempt-a breaking and
entering under certain circumstances with intent to commit a felony. But there
has been no difficulty in sustaining charges of attempted burglary. Nor has
there been difficulty generally in finding attempt liability when the "substantive
offense" is even more clearly an attempt: possessing burglar's tools with intent
to commit burglary; conveying tools into prison with intent to facilitate an
escape; offering a bribe; exploding a substance with intent to cause personal
injury; employing a drug or instrument with intent to procure a miscarriage;
procuring a noxious drug with intent to supply it to another for the use in
committing abortion. For each attempt liability has been sustained. It would
be possible to treat each of these acts as an attempt to commit the more remote
substantive crime, but this is unduly cumbersome; the existing approach seems
preferable. If a preliminary act is prominent enough to serve as the basis of
substantive liability, it should also provide a sufficient foundation for attempt
liability ....
Id. (citations omitted).
In addition, several courts have noted two short scholarly works on attempt to assault
as influential in eroding the unquestioning acceptance of the proposition that one cannot
attempt an offense in the nature of an attempt. See, e.g., In re M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 521,
510 P.2d 33, 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91 (1973) (citing Perkins, supra note 194); Hutchinson
v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Annotation, Attempt to
Commit Assault as Criminal Offense, 79 A.L.R.2D 597 (1961)), overruled on other
grounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d
1097 (Fla. 1983); People v. Banks, 51 Mich. App. 685, 689 n.6, 216 N.W.2d 461, 463
n.6 (1974) (citing the same Annotation as Hutchinson).
3
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necessary relationship between an attempt and an object
crime. 47 In Allen v. People,3 48 for example, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a conviction for attempt to commit an
assault with a deadly weapon, holding that the crime of attempted assault did not exist under the laws of Colorado. Two
police officers had stopped the defendant's car because it displayed an expired temporary permit. When one of the officers
approached the car and asked for his driver's license, the defendant pulled a gun out of his right rear pocket. Although the
defendant actually dropped the gun as he drew, his arm came
across as if he intended to point the gun at the officer. The
defendant tried to pick up the gun, but was dissuaded by the
349
officer, who had trained his gun on the defendant.
The court's analysis focused exclusively on the statutory definitions of attempt and assault, the latter of which it character350
ized as an attempt with present ability to commit a battery.
Ironically, the court noted the importance behind policy
considerations:
When a person is charged with an assault, it is clear that
"present ability" must be construed in the light of the particular situation. The policy behind criminal statutes is to
safeguard the public from harm from individuals. In construing the criminal assault statute, therefore, factors such as
the gravity of the potential harm and the uncertainty of the
result are
to be included in appraising the actor's "present
351
ability."

In the sentence that immediately followed, however, the court
concluded: "In view of our determination that the offense with
which the defendant was charged is non-existent in Colorado,
the judgment of the trial court must be reversed .... 352
47The approach of some courts validating attempts to assault, however, is also open
to criticism. One court has found the construction valid by simply declaring that assault
is a "separate substantive crime," even though assault was defined statutorily as attempted battery. State v. Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 581-90, 346 P.2d 115, 118-22 (1959)
(superseded by statute, as stated in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354 (1984)).
Other decisions have broadened traditional definitions of assault by reading into them
the requirement that the necessary act be one that instills a fear of imminent bodily
harm in the victim. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 16 M.J. 763, 765 (A.C.M.R.
1983); State v. White, 324 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 1975). This interpretation serves to
make assault a substantive offense, rather than an attempted battery.
343175 Colo. 113, 485 P.2d 886 (1971).
349
Id. at 115, 485 P.2d at 887.
350Id. at 116, 485 P.2d at 888.
35'
Id. at 117-18, 485 P.2d at 888 (citation omitted).
352Id. at 118, 485 P.2d at 888-89.
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3. Analysis of the Logical-Absurdity Approach

The idea of making a general attempt statute the object of
another general attempt statute is logically absurd. General attempt statutes, because of their broad applicability to various
types and degrees of crimes, must rely on such abstract concepts
as "proximity," "preparation," or "substantial step" as general
rules to define in specific instances the preparatory acts that
create culpability. 353 A continuing regression of "general attempt" to commit a "general attempt" to commit a crime would
circumvent the measures, however vaguely defined, with which
legislatures draw the line for attempt liability.
Crimes in the nature of attempt, however, are not merely
abstract attempts. Rather, they are substantive offenses combining elements of a completed offense with the attempt to
commit that specific offense. 354 Consequently, courts can evaluate the danger posed by preparatory acts and decide whether
the danger warrants punishment, albeit of a lesser severity than
that for the completed object offense. 355 The application of attempt liability to serious offenses such as burglary,3 5 6 aggravated

313Arnold, supra note 154, at 65-66.
3m See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text (discussing crimes in the nature

of attempt). Even assault, which stirs the greatest controversy as the object of an
attempt, is usually defined as an unlawful attempt coupled with the present ability to
commit a violent injury. Thus, assault seems to be an attempt plus another element.
Arnold, supra note 154, at 65. This reasoning is even stronger in cases of assault with
a deadly weapon and assault with intent to commit another crime. Accordingly, this
argument is used to justify the treatment of aggravated assault as a separate substantive
crime. Burton v. State, 8 Ala. App. 295, 298-99, 62 So. 394, 395-96 (1913); State v.
Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 585, 346 P.2d 115, 120 (1959) (superseded by statute, as stated in
State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354 (1984)); see also Perkins, supra note 194,
at 87 (because the crime of assault with a deadly weapon was unknown at common law,
"it [is] a separate substantive offense and not an uncommitted battery").
35-Arnold, supra note 154, at 75:
The law of criminal attempts ... [c]onsidered apart from any particular
crime ... simply means that courts are permitted to fill in the gaps which a
set of definitions inevitably leave when applied to human conduct. The power
to interpret statutes performs a similar function, but the rules of statutory
interpretation of criminal statutes are never considered as definitions of crimes.
The power to punish for criminal attempts gives the court power to extend a
criminal statute without distorting its language. It is necessary to our criminal
system. To treat this power as the definition of a substantive crime is either to
destroy it or hopelessly to confuse it.
Id.
316 See supra notes 225-234 and accompanying text (discussing attempted-burglary
constructions).
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assault, 357 and sexual assault of minors 358 indicates growing acceptance of a policy-based analysis.
Nevertheless, several recent decisions have characterized
double inchoate constructions as invalid without further
analysis 359 or as logical absurdities. 3 0 These courts have not
only rejected convictions for attempts to commit crimes in the
nature of attempt-most notably assaults-but also have re-

357See supra notes 169-224 and accompanying text (discussing the debate over the
attempt-to-assault construction).
3S See supra notes 192-224 and accompanying text (noting the modem courts' characterization of assault as a substantive offense, to justify attempt liability).
3S9See, e.g., People v. Duens, 64 Cal. App. 3d 310, 314, 134 Cal. Rptr. 341, 343 (1976)
(assault with intent to commit rape); People v. Gordon, 178 Colo. 406, 407-08, 498 P.2d
341, 342 (1972) (assault with a deadly weapon); People v. Banks, 51 Mich. App. 685,
689, 216 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1974) (felonious assault); People v. Maxwell, 36 Mich. App.
127, 128, 193 N.W.2d 176, 177 (1971) (assault with intent to commit armed robbery);
People v. Patskan, 29 Mich. App. 354, 357, 185 N.W.2d 398, 400-01 (1971) (assault with
intent to rob while armed), rev'd on other grounds, 387 Mich. 701, 199 N.W.2d 458
(1972); State v. Currence, 14 N.C. App. 263, 265, 188 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1972) (assault with
a deadly weapon); Commonwealth v. Willard, 179 Pa. Super. 368, 374-75, 116 A.2d
751, 754 (1955) (use of drugs or instruments with intent to induce an abortion); see also
People v. LeBlanc, 120 Mich. App. 343, 327 N.W.2d 471 (1983) (holding that felonious
assault was a nonexistent crime, but that a plea of guilty to such a crime was not
reversible error).
An analogous case is State v. Davis, 108 N.H. 158, 229 A.2d 842 (1967). In Davis,
the court upheld a conviction for attempted statutory rape against the defendant's
contention that such a charge is, in essence, an attempted assault with intent to rape.
Id. at 162, 229 A.2d at 845. The court, while conceding that there could be no crime of
an attempt to commit an attempt, rejected the argument, holding that attempted rape is
a lesser included offense of rape. Id. The court supported this proposition by citing
cases rejecting attempts to commit embracery and to induce prostitution. Id.
Offenses such as embracery and inducing prostitution punish the attempt as the
completed offense. Thus, the general proposition that there is no offense of attempt to
attempt a crime has greater validity for them than it does for attempt to assault. For
cases that reject the attempt-to-attempt construction for crimes that punish the attempt
as the completed offense, see Pagano v. State, 387 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1980) (corruption
of a public servant by threat); Silvestri v. State, 332 So. 2d 351, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.) (making a false report of a crime), aff'd, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1976); King v.
State, 317 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (uttering a forged instrument),
aff'd in relevantpart, 339 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1976).
Several courts, particularly those in Florida, have discussed this general proposition
in those cases in which the legislature has included the attempt with the completed
offense in a single statute punishing both with the same penalty. See, e.g., State v.
Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361, 1363-64 (La. 1978) (reversing a conviction for attempt to incite
a riot, because the offense was defined as "endeavor by any person to incite or procure
any other person to create or participate in a riot"); supra notes 263-266 (listing Florida
cases that discuss the principle).
360See In re M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 522, 510 P.2d 33, 36, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1973);
Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 117, 485 P.2d 886, 888 (1971); Hutchinson v. State, 315
So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruledon other grounds, Gentry v. State,
422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983); Milazzo
v. State, 359 So. 2d 923, 924-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("to hold that attempted sale
is a crime distinct from sale would result in an absurdity"), aff'd in relevant part, 377
So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979).
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jected convictions for attempt to conspire and criticized the use
of conspiracy to attempt.
In their functions as inchoate crimes, both conspiracy and
solicitation are offenses that punish acts further removed from
the completed offense than attempt does.3 61 Consequently,
courts can analyze constructions such as conspiracy to attempt
362
and solicitation to attempt as forms of attempt to attempt.
These constructions raise the most valid criticism inherent in
the logical-absurdity approach-defendants do not conspire or
solicit another to attempt to commit a crime; rather, they act
3 63
with the intention of committing the completed offense itself.
These constructions also raise the possibility of regression of
liability to merely preparatory acts. 364 As previously demonstrated, however, the federal courts consistently have recognized the crime of conspiracy to attempt.3 65 This construction
has raised no regression problem because the courts have applied it only to conspiracies to commit completed crimes that
366
have failed.
By contrast, it appears that double inchoate constructions
such as attempt to conspire or attempt to solicit raise less of a
logical-absurdity problem than does conspiracy to attempt. In
36

E.g., Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruled

on other grounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd,

437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983); accord People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 95, 411
N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394 N.E.2d 288, 420 N.Y.S.2d 218

(N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
1' United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1040 (1982); People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 105, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 931-32
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (Titone, J., dissenting), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394 N.E.2d 288,
420 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1979).
361See United States v. Dearmore, 672 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that it is
a poor practice to indict for conspiracy to attempt, because the real object of perpetrators
is to commit the substantive offense); Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 115, 485 P.2d 886,
888 (1971) ("Perhaps philosophers or metaphysicians can intend to attempt to act, but
ordinary people intend to act, not attempt to act.").
364People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 105, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 931-32 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978) (Titone, J., dissenting), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394 N.E.2d 288,420 N.Y.S.2d
218 (1979). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1985)

(allowing the application of the law of conspiracy to attempt and solicitation as object
crimes):
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a
crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he agrees
with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage
in conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit
such crime ....
Id. (emphasis added).
36 See supra notes 291-311 and accompanying text (listing cases discussing the
principle).
366 See supra note 295 (listing cases).
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such constructions, the additional harm of potential group activity toward an ultimate offense makes it difficult to analyze
conspiracy and solicitation as merely forms of attempt. 67 Neverconspire, several
theless, most courts have rejected attempt3 to
68
on the ground that it is a logical absurdity.

B. The Problems of Notice to Offenders and Manifested
Legislative Intent

1. The Role of Due Process in Inchoate Liability
The development of the due process concept of notice has
369
resulted in the increasing codification of the criminal law.
Notice requires not only that the legislature explicitly make an
act resulting in certain consequences a crime, but also that the
scope and penalty of the criminal statute be phrased in explicit
terms. 370 Most states have abolished the common law of
367 For discussion of the non-inchoate elements of conspiracy and solicitation, see
supra notes 115-117, 129-131 and accompanying text.
368See supra notes 270-272 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have rejected attempt-to-conspire constructions). For cases referring to the attempt-to-conspire
construction as a logical absurdity, see, e.g., United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503,
509 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); Hutchinson v. State, 315 So.
2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruled on other grounds, Gentry v. State, 422
So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983).
369 Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV.
671, 686 (1976); Note, Common Law Crimes in the United States, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
1332, 1337 (1947).
370See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (invalidating a
municipal vagrancy ordinance as "void for vagueness," because the ordinance failed to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the statute forbade his contemplated
behavior and encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions). For cases on
which the PapachristouCourt relied, see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 458 (1939); United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
For decisions adopting and refining the rule in Papachristouin the area of economic
regulation, see, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 498-500 (1982) (upholding local ordinance requiring licensing of the sale
of drug paraphernalia); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 28991 (1982) (validating licensing ordinance allowing the police chief to consider whether
coin-operated amusement establishments had any "connections with criminal elements"); West Virginia Mfrs. Ass'n v. West Virginia, 714 F.2d 308, 314 (4th Cir. 1983)
(upholding state OSHA's notice and posting requirements for manufacturers of toxic
substances against a void-for-vagueness challenge).
In addition, the courts have recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a
statute's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant
that his conduct is proscribed. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-96 (1979)
(invalidating "viability determination" provision of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control
Act); United States v. Curcio, 712 F.2d 1532, 1543-44 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding a federal
statute prohibiting the extortionate extension of credit, even though it did not use the
terms "knowingly" or "wilfully").
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crimes. 37 1 Consequently, judicial discretion to punish crimes is
circumscribed by legislative
intent to proscribe an act as mani372
fested by a statute.
But the comparatively recent separation of inchoate crimes
into substantive statutes requires judicial discretion in the ap373
plication of general principles to specific instances of conduct.
In particular, the crime of attempt has permitted courts to fill a
gap in a definition of criminal conduct by giving them the authority to extend a statute punishing a completed crime without
distorting the legislative intent expressed by the statute's
374
language.
The use of double inchoate concepts allows courts to exercise
an even more extensive common-law type of discretion to punish acts that are not covered by general inchoate statutes. The
doctrine of "no punishment without a statute" generally requires
an explicit legislative directive or manifested legislative intent
to punish conduct. 375 The doctrine of manifested legislative intent is a variation of the constitutional prohibition against legislative enactment of ex post facto laws. One can view judicial
"creation" of double inchoate crimes as judicial enactment of

For further discussion of the requirement of notice in the context of void-for-vagueness challenges, see generally Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189 (1985); Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal
Courts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1974); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); Annotation, Supreme Court's Views
Regarding Validity of CriminalDisorderly Conduct Statutes Under Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine, 75 L. ED. 2D 1049 (1985); cf. Robbins, supra note 11, at 392-94 (discussing
concept of pure legal impossibility).
371See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-4 (1988);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.015 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5 (1982); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 107(b) (Purdon 1983).
372Most states abolishing common-law crimes make no explicit provision for judicial
interpretation of common-law terms within penal statutes. But cf. KAN. STAT. ANN,
§ 21-3102(1) (1981). The statute provides:
No conduct constitutes a crime against the state of Kansas unless it is made
criminal in this code or in another statute of this state, but where a crime is
denounced by any statute of this state, but not defined, the definition of such
crime at common law shall be applied.
Id.
373W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 11, at 61-62. Many states rejecting common
law crimes, for example, establish inchoate crimes defining the offense or its elements
in common-law terms, necessitating resort to the common law for guidance. See supra
note 372 (discussing Kansas statute that directs courts to apply the common-law definition of crime in the absence of a statutory definition).
374
Arnold, supra note 154, at 65.
375Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 401, 415 (1958).
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criminal law to fit an act already committed. 376 Thus, a court's
use of a double inchoate offense raises a significant question of
due process.
The application of due process analysis to the criminal law
requires an assessment of the proper purposes of the criminal
law. 377 Today, a major purpose of the criminal law is the prevention of harmful conduct. This is particularly true for inchoate
offenses. 378 The judicial system seeks to prevent crime not only
through intervention, but also through the secondary purposes
379
of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.
Due process analysis also requires a determination of whether
the means chosen to implement such purposes are related to
the ends sought in a constitutionally permissible way. Under
due process means-ends analysis, a court must decide whether
a given set of facts justifies a finding of criminality and the
sanction in light of the proper purposes
imposition of a criminal
380
of the criminal law.
One can argue that the use of double inchoate crimes is inconsistent with the principles of retribution and deterrence.
Both concepts are based on the notion of culpability-that is,
that an individual has the choice of doing good or committing a
harmful act. 381 The element of choice, however, is effaced if the
individual cannot determine whether an intended act is criminal.
Although it is by no means certain that an actor would realize
the criminality of his act even with reference to a written statute,
the argument in favor of explicit notice is buttressed by the
nature of the criminal sanction.
Because the imposition of a criminal sanction results in an
individual's involuntary loss of liberty and in stigmatization,
substantial procedural protections are required to surround the
process by which criminality is determined in the individual
case. Thus, in the absence of a statute explicitly punishing a
defendant's conduct, a court must resolve in the defendant's
376See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that the doctrine
of common-law crimes has on judicial power to create and define crimes).

37 See, e.g., Angel, Substantive Due Processand the CriminalLaw, 9 Loy. U. Cm.

L.J. 61, 79-80 (1977).
378MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 commentary at 293-94 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).

379Angel, supra note 377, at 79-80. It would not be incorrect to add to this list public
education, although the term is somewhat more nebulous than the others. See Robbins,
Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REv. 918 (1981) (reviewing J. GORECKI, A THEORY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE

(1979)).

3'o Angel, supra note 377, at 79-80.
381Id.
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favor the issue of whether he knew or should have known of
382
the criminality of his actions.
2. The Manifested-Legislative-Intent Approach
Courts that have sanctioned double inchoate offenses necessarily have assumed that courts can construe a state's criminal
code so that one inchoate crime is the object of another inchoate
crime unless the legislature specifically manifests a contrary
intent. 383 This doctrine of manifested legislative intent is too
narrowly positivistic. Common-law jurisdictions have never
taken the rigid position that the criminal law is purely the command of the sovereign. Instead, courts have had greater or lesser
discretion in distinguishing criminal from noncriminal conduct.
Because the statutory language of inchoate offenses relies heavily on common-law concepts, inchoate liability is still an area in
384
which substantial judicial discretion is proper.
By contrast, several states explicitly preclude judicial discretion to create double inchoate offenses.3 85 In addition, several
state courts have exercised judicial restraint by citing a lack of
manifested legislative intent to allow judicial pyramiding of inchoate offenses. 386 The California Supreme Court, for example,
m Id. at 65, 79-81.
Only a few courts, however, have stated this proposition explicitly. See United
States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1074 (2d Cir.) (conspiracy to attempt), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 817 (1981); United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 710 (7th Cir.) (conspiracy to
attempt), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937 (1974). The assumption of legislative intent to allow
double inchoate offenses in these cases, however, derives from the unique language of
the federal conspiracy statute. See supra notes 293-310 and accompanying text (listing
cases that construe the federal conspiracy statute).
384Professor Hart stated that "most American legislatures have been content to make
use of familiar words and phrases of the common law, relying upon the courts to fill in
their meaning .... " Hart, supra note 375, at 415. Hart concluded that, as long as
courts continue to reflect the community's understanding of blameworthiness in their
elaboration of statutes, "judgments of conviction are not subject to the reproach of
being, even in spirit, ex post facto." Id.
' See supra note 153 (quoting statutes and commentary that reveal the principle);
see also State v. Stevens, 452 So. 2d 289, 291 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding trial
court's vacating of guilty plea to the nonexistent crime of attempted conspiracy to
distribute marijuana).
316 See In re M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 522, 510 P.2d 33, 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91 (1973)
(observing that the legislature did not recognize the crime of attempt to assault with a
deadly weapon); People v. Duens, 64 Cal. App. 3d 310, 314, 134 Cal. Rptr. 341, 343
(1976) (the crime of attempted assault with intent to rape does not exist, because there
is no enactment manifesting legislative intent to create the crime of attempt to commit
battery without present ability); Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 547-48 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting the attempt-to-conspire construction, despite a lack of express
limiting language in the attempt statute indicating the crimes to which it applies, because
the definition of attempt indicated that the legislature intended to limit liability to
38
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has held that attempted assault is not a crime in that state. In
In re M.,387 a minor had been charged with assaulting a police
officer with a deadly weapon after hurling an unidentified projectile that missed the officer. The juvenile court declined to
find the defendant guilty of the aggravated assault because he
had missed his target. Instead of finding the minor guilty of the
lesser included offense of simple assault, however, the court
388
convicted him of attempted aggravated assault.
The supreme court, after noting the division of opinion over
the validity of attempt to assault, conceded the effacement of
the logical-absurdity argument:
Whether or not the foregoing theories are entirely tenable,
it is apparent that the abstract concept of an attempted assault is not necessarily a logical absurdity. Yet to concede,
in an academic sense, the possibility that there can be an
attempted assault is not the equivalent of declaring it to be
a punishable offense under the laws of this state.3 89
Noting that the penal code had abolished common-law crimes,
the court acknowledged that the legislature statutorily defined
390
assault as an attempt to commit a battery with present ability.
The court also noted that no such crime as attempt to assault
was recognized at the time the legislature adopted its definition
of assault. 39 1 Accordingly, the court ruled that the legislature's
omission of attempt to assault from the penal code demonstrated
its intent not to punish such an offense, whether characterized
as an attempted assault or as an attempt to commit a battery
392
without present ability.
The same criticism applies to the lack-of-legislative-intent approach as to the logical-absurdity approach: By focusing on the
legislative definitions of general inchoate offenses, a court fails
physical acts carried beyond preparation toward the proximate accomplishment of the
complete crime), overruled on other grounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983); State v. Sexton, 232 Kan. 539,
543, 657 P.2d 43, 46 (1983) (the crime of attempt to conspire does not exist because the
state prohibits conviction for crimes that are not statutorily defined); People v. Banks,

51 Mich. App. 685, 688-90, 216 N.W.2d 461, 462-63 (1974) (because the general attempt
statute applies only "when no express provision is made by law for the punishment of
such attempt," it does not apply to felonious assault, which is an attempted battery).
3879 Cal. 3d 517, 510 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1973).
3 Id. at 519-20, 510 P.2d at 34, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
319Id. at 521, 510 P.2d at 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
390Id. at 521-22, 510 P.2d at 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 91; see supra notes 52-65, 169-180
and accompanying text (discussing definitions of assault and their applications).
39, 9 Cal. 3d at 521-22, 510 P.2d at 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
392Id. at 522, 510 P.2d at 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92.
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to engage in valuable policy analysis concerning how far back
courts should extend liability for attempts to commit specific
crimes. 393 The court's reliance in In re M. on a reworked version
of the logical-absurdity argument demonstrates the superficiality
394
of its analysis.
The lack-of-legislative-intent approach, however, raises two
valid policy criticisms of double inchoate offenses. First, because the common law creates double inchoate crimes, the caseby-case nature of their development will likely result in inconsistent and arbitrary results. 395 Decisions may vary within jurisdictions concerning how far back in the preparation/perpetration
396
continuum a court will impose liability for the same offense.
Second, a factfinder may improperly base its finding of guilt on
its subjective belief about an individual actor's dangerousness,
rather than on the seriousness of the defendant's intended crime
or his actions toward it. This inclusion of subjective elements
in the determination of liability makes it more difficult to establish settled rules of law.
These notions, combined with the infrequent use of double
inchoate crimes, also lessen the deterrent value of double in319See supra notes 342-358 and accompanying text (criticizing the logical-absurdity
approach).
394The court in In re M. commented:
[W]e foresee serious pragmatic difficulties if attempted assault were judicially
established as a punishable crime. Trial courts must instruct on lesser included
offenses if the evidence raises questions as to whether all the elements of the
charged crime are present .... If it were a crime trial courts would be required
to instruct on attempted assault in every prosecution for a crime involving any
type of assault, whether simple or aggravated, when the proof of one of the
elements of the underlying crime is unclear or contested. The injection of an
additional issue into such trials, with attendant likelihood of confusion of the
jury and unwarranted reversals, does not seem justified, particularly since the
lack of seriousness of a mere attempted assault has been evidenced by consistent legislative omission since 1850 to provide for any such crime. Juries should
not be required to engage in fruitless metaphysical speculation as to differing
degrees of proximity between an assault and a general attempt, nor as to the
logical possibility of attempting to commit any crime of assault, either simple
or aggravated, the basic nature of which is an attempt in itself.
9 Cal. 3d at 522, 510 P.2d at 36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 92 (citations omitted).
The California court thus hoped to demonstrate its aversion to double inchoate
concepts by illustrating the practical difficulties in their use. The jury example, however,
is somewhat disingenuous, in that the conceptual complexity faced by a jury would be
largely a function of the quality of the court's instructions to it.
395
Note, supra note 154, at 1337.
396In addition, because there are no express terms of punishment for these crimes,
there is little to guide a court in setting sentence other than its perception of a defendant's
dangerousness to society. One can argue that such a subjective criterion is more properly
a factor in determining punishment than it is in determining liability for an act. Nevertheless, this approach creates the potential for widely disparate sentencing for similar
offenses.
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choate concepts. It is unclear whether general inchoate crimes
provide any deterrent effect beyond that which is provided by
the object crime. The Model Penal Code's commentary suggests
that inchoate-crime statutes do little to deter crimes, because
most individuals base their calculations, if any, on whether to
commit a crime on the penalty for the successful, rather than
the failed, commission of that crime. 397 The manifested-legislative-intent approach, however, implies that notice is the essential basis of deterrence and assumes some deterrent value in
statutory inchoate crimes. 398 Consequently, the approach emphasizes the danger in degrading whatever quantum of additional deterrence general inchoate offenses provide.
The importance of the predictive and preventive policies behind inchoate liability, however, has received short shrift in the
manifested-legislative-intent approach. Requiring acts on the
part of the accused before inchoate liability will attach satisfies
the interests of individual liberty. 399 The statutory harm of these
acts not only justifies punishment for what the accused has
actually done, but also for what he intended to do had he not
40
been prevented.
C. The Cumbersome Nature of and Lack of Need for Double
Inchoate Crimes
Despite the partial validity of the constitutional and policybased arguments in the manifested-legislative-intent doctrine,
an expanding number of American courts have found that other
policy considerations outweigh those arguments. At the same
time, American jurisdictions increasingly have codified inchoate
offenses in a manner similar to that suggested by the Model
I" See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing rationales behind im-

posing attempt liability).
398The rationale behind the approach of nullum pene sine crimen is that, although

potential criminals are unlikely to peruse penal codes in deciding whether to commit a
crime, it is even less likely that they will look to court decisions establishing the common
law of a crime. Thus, it is assumed that the framing of a criminal offense in a statute is

a much more effective means of making the public aware of prohibited acts and their
penal consequences. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); see also
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 292-93 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
For two good, recent articles on the subject, see Allen, The Erosion of Legality in
American CriminalJustice:Some Latter-DayAdventures of the Nulla Poena Principle,
29 ARIZ. L. REV. 385 (1987); Jeffries, supra note 370.
399Meehan, supra note 12, at 218-20.
4w For discussion of legal or statutory harm, see supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
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Penal Code. 40' Consequently, substantive inchoate provisions

now cover more acts that tend toward commission of a completed crime. This trend is reflected by several recent decisions

holding that indictments for double inchoate offenses are
40 2
unnecessary.

1. Attempt to Conspire
Some of these cases have arisen in the context of indictments
for attempt to conspire. Prosecutors have charged attempted
conspiracies in two situations: (1) where the actus reus requires
the actual agreement of another party and the importuned party
has no intent to act on the agreement but pretends that he
does; 40 3 and (2) where the importuned party simply refuses to
4
join the conspiracy. 04
The first type of attempt-to-conspire construction usually
arises when a party discusses a proposed crime with an undercover police agent. 40 5 It also includes situations in which the
party seeks the aid of another private citizen who subsequently
becomes a police informant, 40 6 or in which a person is incapable
of carrying out the agreement due to some incapacity unbeknownst to the solicitor. 40 7

4" See supra notes 104-109 (listing attempt statutes); supra notes 107-109 (listing
conspiracy statutes); supra note 133 (listing solicitation statutes).
401 See Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (attemptedconspiracy construction is not necessary because solicitation statute reaches the same
behavior), overruled on other grounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983); People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 9-17,
406 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1014-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (the unilateral approach to conspiracy
makes the attempted-conspiracy construction unnecessary); cf. State v. Sexton, 232
Kan. 539, 543-44, 657 P.2d 43, 46-47 (1983) (although the defendant's actions would
have come within the solicitation statute that was enacted subsequently, no statute
prohibited his conduct at time he performed the acts at issue).
4o3See People v. DiDominick, 94 Misc. 2d 392, 393-94, 406 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978) (murder); supra note 273 and accompanying text (suggesting that the
attempt-to-conspire construction is more useful in states that have not adopted the
unilateral approach to conspiracy).
4 See supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing Kansas' rejection of indictment for attempted conspiracy).
I See DiDominick, 94 Misc. 2d 392, 393-94, 406 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) (involving an undercover police officer who hired the defendant to kill two people).
406 See Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (involving
a solicitee who reported to police the defendant's offer to pay to have someone killed),
overruled on other grounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983).
407 But see People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 342-43, 406 N.E.2d 783, 788, 428
N.Y.S.2d 927, 932 (1980) (holding that the unilateral theory of conspiracy allowed the
court to convict the defendant of conspiracy even though all of the other parties to the
illicit agreement were not criminally liable due to their minority or similar incapacity).

1989]

Double Inchoate Crimes

81

In the past, prosecutions for conspiracy in these circum408
stances were overturned due to the doctrine of impossibility.
The Model Penal Code's unilateral-conspiracy approach, however, removes impossibility as a defense in conspiracy prosecutions. 409 In People v. Lanni,410 for instance, a New York appellate court upheld a conspiracy conviction against such a
challenge. The defendant had approached another party to commit a crime (unspecified by the court), and the other had feigned
agreement and become a police informant. 41' The defendant, but
not the informer, committed overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy, as required by the statute. 412 The court held that

criminal liability for conspiracy attaches regardless of the culpability of the importuned party 413 because New York's conspir-

acy statute adopted the Model Penal Code's unilateral approach
to conspiracy. 414 In so holding, the court criticized the attemptto-conspire construction that other state courts had used to
415
uphold conspiracy indictments.
4 See, e.g., King v. State, 104 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 1957) (police officers who agreed
with an undercover agent that he pay them in return for protection of his phony
bookmaking operation were not guilty of conspiracy); Archbold v. State, 397 N.E.2d
1071, 1073 (Ind. 1979) (defendant was not guilty of conspiracy because the named coconspirator was an undercover officer acting within scope of his duties and feigning
participation in the criminal enterprise); People v. Atley, 392 Mich. 298, 303, 220 N.W.2d
465, 467 (1974) (feigned agreement of a police informant was not considered admissible
as proof of conspiracy); Delaney v. State, 164 Tenn. 432, 433-35, 51 S.W.2d 485, 48687 (1932) (because the co-conspirator in a murder scheme merely feigned agreement
and later informed police of the scheme, there was no conspiracy); see also Robbins,
supra note 11, at 411-12 n. 189 (discussing the relationship between conspiracy and the
impossibility defense).
4 See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text (discussing unilateral approach to
conspiracy and listing states that have adopted approach).
410 95 Misc. 2d 4, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
41 Id. at 5-6, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
412 Id.
413 Id. at 12-17, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 1016-19.
414 Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (quoted at
supra note 107) with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.30 (McKinney 1975); see also Robbins,
supra note 11, at 419-42 (discussing differences between the Model Penal Code and
New York approaches to impossible attempts).
For a discussion of the influence of the Model Penal Code on state conspiracy law,
see Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1122 (1975).
41595 Misc. 2d at 17, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 1019. The court noted that
[s]ince the advent of our present Penal Law, it would appear that habit, not
necessarily logic, has fashioned an unremitting dogma in its insistence that
change in our law has brought no change. It has bound down a functionally
appropriate approach, as it deals with individual dispositions to criminality, in
the iron grip of outdated precedents and, at times, ill-traced legal genealogies.
It has restrained our acceptance of the modem unilateral aspect of conspiracy
as directed and defined in [the new conspiracy statute], which provisions are
supportive of social interests and address individual criminal responsibility.
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Similarly, a court in Florida overturned a conviction for attempt to conspire because the court found that the legislature
did not intend to punish that offense, and that the state's law of
solicitation covered the indicted behavior. In Hutchinson v.
State,41 6 the defendant asked another to find someone to murder
a bothersome union business agent. The solicitant requested a
few days to think over the proposition, but never actually agreed
to it. Instead, he informed the police of the defendant's re-

id. The court particularly criticized the reasoning of another New York state court in
People v. DiDominick. Id. (citing People v. DiDominick, 94 Misc. 2d 392, 406 N.Y.S.2d
420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)). In DiDominick,the court held that the general attempt statute
applied to the crime of conspiracy. 94 Misc. 2d at 394, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 421. Therefore,
the court reasoned that a grand jury could indict the defendant for attempted conspiracy
even though the "co-conspirator" (an undercover police officer who did not intend to
execute the planned crime) was not criminally culpable. Id. The court in Lanni, however,
held that because New York had adopted the unilateral approach to conspiracy, a grand
jury could indict someone for conspiracy without regard to the criminal culpability of
the person with whom the actor intended to conspire. 95 Misc. 2d at 6, 406 N.Y.S.2d
at 1012.
Lanni thus imposed liability on the unsuccessful conspirator by construing the definition of conspiracy to include situations in which the importuned party does not intend
to act on the agreement. Id. at 12-17,406 N.Y.S.2d at 1016-19. The court in DiDominick,
however, avoided resolving the issue of whether the impossibility defense applied to
the crime of conspiracy by deciding that, even if a conspiracy does not exist unless
both actors have the necessary mens rea, a grand jury still could indict an unsuccessful
conspirator for attempted conspiracy. People v. DiDominick, 94 Misc. 2d 392, 394, 406
N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). Because the court in Lanni believed that the
reasoning in DiDominick "begs our question," it criticized the manner in which the
court in DiDominick resolved this issue. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d at 17, 406 N.Y.S.2d at
1019.
For examples of other courts that have followed the unilateral approach to conspiracy,
see, e.g., Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152, 154 (Del. 1975); State v. St. Christopher, 305
Minn. 226, 234, 232 N.W.2d 798, 803 (1975); People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 96100, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 926-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394
N.E.2d 288, 420 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1979); People v. Cardosanto, 84 Misc. 2d 275, 276-77,
375 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835-36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); cf. State v. Lavary, 152 N.J. Super.
413, 433-34, 377 A.2d 1255, 1261 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (premising its decision
on the unilateral approach, even though the conspiracy statute indicated a need for
bilateral agreement), rev'd, 163 N.J. Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1978). The lower court in Lavary relied on the decision in State v. Moretti, 52 N.J.
182, 244 A.2d 499, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968). In Moretti, the court affirmed a
conviction for conspiracy to commit unlawful abortion, even though the "patient" was
a police agent who was not pregnant. Id. at 185-86, 244 A.2d at 501. The court held
that it was no defense that the defendant's criminal goal was impossible to attain because
of circumstances unknown to him. Id. at 190, 244 A.2d at 502.
A subsequent New Jersey appellate decision criticized the lower court's holding in
Lavary. In State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super. 89, 385 A.2d 878 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978), the court stated that Moretti held only that, even though the object of a criminal
conspiracy is unattainable, this form of factual impossibility provides no defense to
those who have agreed to commit the crime. Id. at 99, 385 A.2d at 883. Thus, the court
argued, Moretti emphasized, rather than downplayed, the need for concerted intent. Id.
416 315 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruled on other grounds, Gentry v.
State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983).

1989]

Double Inchoate Crimes

quest. 417 Having noted that the state legislature had not mani-

fested an intent to punish attempted conspiracy, the court reasoned that the prosecutor should have indicted the defendant

418
for the common-law crime of solicitation.

The double inchoate crime of attempt to solicit is unnecessary
in those states that have adopted a solicitation provision similar
to that of the Model Penal Code. 4 19 Such statutes punish the
attempt to solicit to the same degree that they punish the completed solicitation. 420 Thus, a failure to communicate the request
for criminal activity to the intended solicitant is no bar to pros-

ecution for solicitation.421
2. Conspiracy to Attempt
In contrast to the diminishing need to use the attempted-

conspiracy construction, the crime of conspiracy to attempt is
not and has never been necessary. Because the crux of a conspiracy is the agreement to commit a crime, 42 2 liability for conspiracy attaches regardless of whether the actor completed the
423
object crime.

In People v. Travis,424 a California appellate court emphasized
these points in a challenge to a conviction for attempted theft.
The defendants had been indicted for conspiracy to commit
theft, but the court found them guilty of attempted theft instead.
The appellate court reversed the convictions, holding that atId. at 547-48.
Id. at 548-49. A Florida statute allows Florida's courts to apply the common law
of England where no statute covers the offense. FLA. STAT. § 775.01 (West 1973). The
court also noted that the new Florida solicitation statute that was not yet in effect would
have covered the defendant's behavior. 315 So. 2d at 549 (citing FLA. STAT. § 777.04);
see also State v. Sexton, 232 Kan. 539, 543-44, 657 P.2d 43, 46 (1983) (noting that the
solicitation statute that had been passed subsequent to the acts at issue would have
attached liability).
4,9 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1985). For an example of an
attempted-solicitation conviction, see Regina v. Banks, 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 393 (Wor.
Sp. Assizes 1873); see also State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 (1928).
420 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.02(1), 5.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1985); id. § 5.05
commentary at 487-88, 489-90.
421 This approach, like the concept of unilateral conspiracy, reflects the Model Penal
Code's emphasis on individual intent to complete the object crime rather than on the
enhanced danger of group activity. Thus, a court following this approach would view
the importuning of another to join in a criminal scheme merely as a "substantial step"
in an attempt to commit the object crime. Id. § 5.01(2)(g).
422 On agreement as the essence of the crime of conspiracy, see supra notes 100, 106
and accompanying text.
43 For discussion of the irrelevance of attaining the object offense in a conviction for
conspiracy, see supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
424 171 Cal. App. 2d 842, 341 P.2d 851 (1959).
417
418
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tempted theft is a lesser included offense of theft, but not of
425
conspiracy to commit theft.
In dicta, the court also suggested that there is no such crime
as conspiracy to attempt theft:
Conspiracy imports an agreement to commit a crime and it
seems doubtful, to say the least, that persons would agree
to merely attempt to commit a crime as distinguished from
agreeing to commit it. Moreover, if persons conspire to commit a particular crime, they would be guilty of the conspiracy
regardless of whether426the substantive crime was actually
consummated or not.
Although the federal courts continue to recognize the offense,427
one court has noted the unwieldy nature of the charge and
suggested that it is "a poor practice to indict for conspiracy to
commit the attempt instead of indicting for conspiracy to commit
the substantive offense which is the real objective of the
'
perpetrators. 428
The manner in which the courts have considered conspiracy
to attempt illustrates that it is unnecessary. Rather than as a
means to fill gaps in the criminal code by extending attempt
liability, the courts have employed the construction merely as a
means of categorizing the criminal action based on an after-thefact assessment of the defendant's success or failure in completing the object crime. 429 The success or failure of the object
crime, however, is irrelevant in determining conspiracy liability. 430 Instead, it should serve only to determine an actor's lia431
bility for the completed crime.

3. Policy-Based Analysis
Recent developments in the criminal law have demonstrated
the lack of necessity for double inchoate crimes such as con42S
Id. at 843-44, 341 P.2d at 852-53.
426Id.

at 846 n.1, 341 P.2d at 853-54 n.l (emphasis in original).

41 See supra notes 291-311 and accompanying text (discussing federal cases that

uphold the conspiracy-to-attempt construction).
428
United States v. Dearmore, 672 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the conspiracy-to-attempt indictment was valid. Id.
429For discussion of the limited nature of the conspiracy-to-attempt construction in
the federal law, see supra notes 294-295 and accompanying text.
430See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text (discussing actus reus of
conspiracy).
431
For discussion of the lack of merger in conspiracy, see supra notes 102-103 and
accompanying text.
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spiracy to attempt and, to a lesser degree, attempt to conspire.
Courts instead should analyze double inchoate crimes in terms
of their necessity for realizing the policies of the criminal law,
rather than in terms of logical absurdity or manifested legislative
intent. Although the modem trend in criminal law is toward
restricting the discretion of courts to punish individuals for actions that are not specifically covered by criminal codes, the
need remains for limited judicial discretion to extend liability
for unsuccessfully attempting to complete a crime through the
use of inchoate offenses.
The balancing tests of policy analysis provide no easy answers
regarding whether attempts to commit inchoate crimes are necessary. Courts have avoided significant consideration of this
issue by relying on logical-absurdity 4 2 and manifested-legislative-intent 433 analyses. The arguments that assault can be treated
as a substantive offense 43 4 or that present ability can be redefined
in light of the seriousness of the intended consequences 43 5 ignore
the unique development of assault law and its received legal
tradition-a collection of concepts that is not easily altered by
efforts to impose a uniform approach.
Courts that criticize the validity of double inchoate offenses
generally have framed the issue in terms of whether an inchoate
offense can have as its object another inchoate offense.436 This
conceptual approach has resulted in resort to the intellectually
412For analysis and criticism of the logical-absurdity approach, see supra notes 313368 and accompanying text.
433For analysis and criticism of the manifested-legislative-intent approach, see supra
notes 383-400 and accompanying text.
4-4 State v. Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 585-86, 346 P.2d 115, 120 (1959) (superseded by
statute, as stated in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354 (1984)).
43-Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 116, 485 P.2d 886, 888 (1971).
436See, e.g., id. at 116-17, 485 P.2d at 888 (stating that "as to [certain crimes] it is
true as argued by defendant that 'there can be no crime of an attempt to commit an
attempt"') (quoting State v. Davis, 108 N.H. 158, 162, 229 A.2d 842, 845 (1967)); Milazzo
v. State, 359 So. 2d 923, 924-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing conviction for
attempted sale of cocaine because the crime of "attempt to attempt to transfer for
consideration" does not exist), aff'd in relevantpart, 377 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979); State
v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (La. 1978) (holding that the attempt statute does not
apply to a crime that is itself an attempt because the resulting indictment would charge
the defendant with attempting to attempt to do illegal act); State v. Taylor, 345 Mo.
325, 334, 133 S.W.2d 336, 341 (1939) ("to convict defendant of attempting to attempt to
corrupt the alleged juror" would allow the state "to sort of 'pyramid' attempts") (emphasis in original); State v. Currence, 14 N.C. App. 263, 266, 188 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1972)
(reversing conviction for attempted aggravated assault because the effect of such a
verdict was to find the defendant guilty of attempt to attempt); Commonwealth v.
Willard, 179 Pa. Super. 368, 373, 116 A.2d 751, 754 (1955) (the attempt-to-attempt
construction impermissibly allows a prosecutor to indict for acts that are not sufficiently
proximate to the completed crime to hold the defendant criminally responsible).
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arid doctrines of logical absurdity and manifested legislative
intent. 437 Although sometimes logically awkward, double inchoate constructions have provided a flexible mechanism for
courts to use in filling the gaps left in necessarily general inchoate statutes. 4 8 Indeed, double inchoate constructions have
allowed courts to retain a consistent approach to inchoate culp-

ability. Courts have used these constructions rather than stretch
or distort the established definitions of single inchoate offenses
439
and their elements.
Despite efforts to codify all-encompassing substantive inchoate offenses, double inchoate concepts such as attempted

assault are of value to courts in their efforts to elaborate on and
rationalize inchoate statutes. This argument assumes a substan-

tial role for the judiciary in interpreting not only the specific

provisions of the criminal law, but also the policies behind it.440
This proposition is particularly valid for statutory inchoate
offenses that leave many issues of interpretation unresolved
because they are necessarily defined in general terms. Conse-

quently, the courts must "collaborate with the legislature in
437
See supra notes 313-400 and accompanying text (discussing approaches).
438For survey and analysis of useful double inchoate constructions, see supra notes
155-203 and accompanying text (attempt to commit crimes in the nature of attempt);
supra notes 270-290 and accompanying text (attempt to conspire in the absence of a
unilateral-conspiracy or solicitation statute).
419
A comparison of two cases with nearly identical facts illustrates this point. In
United States v. Locke, 16 M.J. 763 (A.C.M.R. 1983), the defendant, while fighting
with a military police officer, verbally threatened to kill him and unsuccessfully attempted to remove the officer's gun from his holster. Id. at 764. The court held that,
although the defendant lacked the present ability to commit a battery on the officer, he
nevertheless was guilty of an attempt to commit aggravated assault. Contrastingly, in
People v. Gordon, 178 Colo. 406, 498 P.2d 341 (1972), the court found, under almost
identical facts, that the defendant was guilty of assault and specifically ruled that he
had not committed only an attempted assault. Id. at 408, 498 P.2d at 342. Relying on
the earlier decision of Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 485 P.2d 886 (1971), the court
held that the crime of attempted assault did not exist in Colorado. The court cited Allen
for the proposition that courts must construe the concept of present ability in light of
"the gravity of the potential harm and the uncertainty of the result." Id. Accepting the
police officer's testimony that the defendant had gotten both of his hands on the gun,
the court ruled that the gun, though still in its holster, could have fired and hit the
officer in the leg. Id. Thus, the court found that the defendant was guilty of assault
because he possessed the present ability to commit a battery. Id.
4 Hart, supra note 375, at 429. Hart posited that
[c]ourts look both backward and forward in the application of law. They look
backward to the relevant general directions of the Constitution and the statutes,
as interpreted and applied in prior judicial decisions. They look backward to
the historical facts of the litigation. But when the facts raise issues with respect
to which the existing general directions are indeterminate, they are bound to
look forward to the ends which the law seeks to serve and to resolve the issues
as best they can in a way which will serve them.
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discerning and expressing the unifying principles and aims of
the criminal law,"' 44 1 particularly inchoate offenses.
As Professor Hart noted, few American courts have recognized, much less exercised, this obligation to shape their legislature's criminal code into a rational and coherent body of law.
If courts do not interpret the criminal code according to "principles and policies rationally related to the ultimate purposes of
the social order," it will become "a wasteland of arbitrary distinctions and meaningless detail." 442 Certainly, this criticism applies to those courts that have applied only logical-absurdity and
manifested-legislative-intent analyses to double inchoate
constructions.
In accepting the role for the judiciary suggested by Professor
Hart, it follows that a court faced with a question of double
inchoate liability first should ask whether the defendant's acts
are sufficiently dangerous to society to warrant judicial intervention and punishment. Only then should the court decide
whether a double inchoate construction is necessary because
taken alone, the jurisdiction's attempt, conspiracy, or solicita443
tion statutes do not already cover those acts.
With the advent of the legal-realist movement, the judiciary
has enjoyed more freedom to interpret legislation according to
its social purpose and policy. 4" Although constitutional doctrine
requires courts to interpret criminal laws more strictly than
other laws, the vagueness and abstraction of inchoate offenses
require a judicial balancing of policies.
In this context, the courts that have declined to adopt double
inchoate concepts in the absence of manifested legislative intent
have emphasized the conceptual argument of separation of powers over the policy argument regarding protection of individual
freedom. The decisions that have rejected or criticized double
inchoate crimes as unnecessary, however, have examined in
more depth the function of inchoate offenses.

44'Id. at 435-36.
412Id. at 435.
443See Arnold, supra

note 154, at 62; supra notes 353-358 and accompanying text
(applying this principle to attempt).
44 Meehan, supra note 12, at 218.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISION OF INCHOATE-CRIME
STATUTES TO MINIMIZE THE NEED FOR DOUBLE INCHOATE
OFFENSES

The proper criterion for determining the validity of a double
inchoate offense is whether it is necessary to fulfill the policies
underlying inchoate liability-the prevention of the socially
harmful acts that are proscribed by the substantive criminal
law. 445 The failure of courts that have relied on the logicalabsurdity and legislative-intent arguments is that they have neglected the threshold inquiry of whether the acts before them
warranted punishment. 446 Instead, they have begun with an analysis of whether their jurisdictions' substantive inchoate statutes
4
allowed punishment for these acts.

7

Some of the courts that have accepted the validity of double
inchoate crimes, however, have done so without adequate analysis of their necessity in light of extant attempt, conspiracy, and
solicitation statutes. Although there are areas in which double

inchoate crimes are a useful judicial tool, there are others in
448
which they are unnecessary.
A. PracticalLimitations on Statutory Revision
Wherever possible, legislatures should expand existing inchoate concepts rather than cause prosecutors to resort by de45 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale behind imposing
liability for inchoate crimes).
446 Cf. supra notes 376-379 and accompanying text (noting the due process considerations that are present when a judge "creates" double inchoate crimes).
"7 See In re M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 519-20, 510 P.2d 33, 34, 108 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 (1973)
(juvenile threw an object at a policeman but missed him and struck a patrol car); People
v. Duens, 64 Cal. App. 3d 310, 312, 134 Cal. Rptr. 341, 342-43 (1976) (defendant accosted
a woman he did not know, attempted to kiss her, and tore her dress as she tried to
escape); Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113, 115-18, 485 P.2d 886, 887 (1971) (defendant
dropped his gun after unsuccessfully trying to pull it on an officer who had stopped him
for a vehicular offense); Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (defendant offered an informant money to find someone to kill a union business
agent), overruled on other grounds, Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983); State v. Sexton, 232 Kan. 539, 539-40,
657 P.2d 43, 44 (1983) (defendant planned with undercover federal agents to murder his
wife for hire); People v. Banks, 51 Mich. App. 685, 689, 216 NAV.2d 461, 461-62 (1974)
(defendant pointed a shotgun at pursuing policemen, then dropped it and attempted to
hide).
48 For a discussion of the complete lack of need for the offense of conspiracy to
attempt, see supra notes 422-431 and accompanying text. For discussion of the need
for the crime of attempted conspiracy only in those jurisdictions that do not have
solicitation or unilateral-conspiracy statutes, see supra notes 402-419 and accompanying
text.
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fault to indictments for double inchoate offenses. Despite an

increasing judicial449 and scholarly 450 acceptance of double inchoate constructions, significant obstacles to their widespread
use remain. Most jurisdictions do not employ double inchoate
offenses either because they have not considered their use 451 or
because they have considered it and rejected the idea. 452 Fur-

thermore, the cumbersomeness of these constructions draws
attention, and thus makes double inchoate convictions more

readily subject to appellate challenge. 453 Consequently, courts
uncomfortable with the conceptual oddity of the double inchoate
constructions are likely to continue to reject them.
1. Conspiracy to Attempt (or Solicit)
The double inchoate crime of conspiracy to attempt is unnecessary. The essence of conspiracy is the communication of a
criminal scheme by one party to another to gain the other's
support. 454 The success or failure of the target crime is irrelevant
in determining conspiratorial liability. 455 Although the federal
courts have upheld convictions for conspiracy to attempt, 456 the
that at least
increasing criticism of this construction suggests
457
future.
the
in
it
reject
to
likely
some courts are
449 See supra notes 148-312 and accompanying text (discussing cases that adopt the
double inchoate construction).
450 See supra notes 342-346 and accompanying text (discussing commentary that
advocates a policy-based approach to determining whether to attach inchoate liability
to particular behavior).
41 In the following jurisdictions, neither the legislature nor the appellate courts have
addressed explicitly the validity of double inchoate crimes: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
452The following states reject double inchoate crimes: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.01 commentary at 363 n.294 (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (listing states that reject
attempt to attempt as an abstract proposition).
41S See supra notes 401-436 and accompanying text (noting judicial criticism of double
inchoate constructions).
454MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 commentary at 394, 398-402 (Proposed Official Draft
1985).
455See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text (listing cases and statutes that
state the principle).
456 For a survey of the federal-court decisions approving the use of conspiracy to
attempt, see supra notes 291-311 and accompanying text.
47 See supra note 311.
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As evidenced by the fact that only one state court has upheld
its use, states apparently have recognized the lack of need for
the conspiracy-to-attempt construction. 458 In most states, however, the language of the conspiracy statute leaves it unclear
whether a conspiracy can have an inchoate crime as its object. 459
These state legislatures should ensure that conspiracy cannot
have another inchoate offense as its object by adding the following commentary:
The legislature intends that the offense of conspiracy, defined above in [enumerated code section(s)], will apply only
to completed criminal offenses, and not to attempts or solicitations to perform such completed offenses.
This language would manifest legislative intent adequately without requiring the legislature to amend inchoate statutory provisions in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.
The general federal conspiracy statute, 4 0 making any "offense
against the United States" a proper object of conspiracy, has
allowed the needless use of conspiracy-to-attempt indictments
in the federal courts. 461 Because congressional intent is derived
from lengthy and complicated legislative history rather than
from relatively short commentaries by state legislative drafting
committees, clear expression of intent requires statutory revision. Thus, the conspiracy statute should be amended to exclude
attempts and solicitations as applicable object offenses. 62 The
amended statute might read:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any completed offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof, in any manner or for
458 People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 220, 329 P.2d 157, 180 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 206 (1959). The court reasoned
that "[a] conspiracy to commit grand theft is inherently one to attempt that crime. If
the conspirators are successful in accomplishing the object of the conspiracy, they have
committed grand theft. If they are not successful, they have committed the crime of
attempted grand theft." Id. Contra People v. Travis, 171 Cal. App. 2d 842, 846 n.1, 341
P.2d 851, 852-53 n.1 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (dictum) (suggesting the lack of need
for a charge of conspiracy to attempt to commit theft).
419 See supra note 104 (listing conspiracy statutes). Except for the conspiracy statutes
of Louisiana, Maine, and Texas, none of the statutes listed in footnote 104 expressly
indicates whether conspiracy can have an inchoate crime as its object.
4w For quotation and analysis of the general federal conspiracy statute, see supra
notes 292-293 and accompanying text.
46 See supra note 428 (discussing a federal case that criticizes a conspiracy-to-attempt
indictment due to a lack of need for it).
462
This proposed amendment does not address the desirability of punishing unilateral
conspiracy. For a model conspiracy statute that addresses both the double inchoate and
unilateral-conspiracy issues, see infra notes 572-579 and accompanying text.
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any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shal be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
This provision shall not apply to any attempt or solicitation to
commit any completed offense, except the attempt to evade taxes
[26 U.S.C. § 7201].463

2. Attempt to Conspire
The double inchoate offense of attempt to conspire is unnecessary in those jurisdictions that have adopted either a solicitation statute, a conspiracy statute that embodies the unilateral
theory of conspiracy, or both. Although only thirty-three states
punish solicitation as a statutory offense, 464 several others recognize it as a common-law crime. 465 Thus, solicitation-a form
of attempt to conspire is a well-established offense in American criminal law. Its statutory enactment in the remaining American jurisdictions would allow states to avoid problems like that
466
faced by Kansas in State v. Sexton.

In Sexton, local police had received a tip that the defendant
was seeking someone to kill his estranged wife. Armed with this
information, two undercover federal agents made contact with
the defendant. Over the course of several meetings between the
defendant and the agents, the defendant offered a price for the
murder and outlined a plan for its commission based on his
467
knowledge of his wife's whereabouts.
The prosecutor charged the defendant with attempt to conspire to commit the murder of his wife. The prosecutor did not
bring charges of either attempted murder or conspiracy to commit murder because of the state-law definitions of attempt and
conspiracy. The trial court dismissed the charge of attempted
conspiracy, holding that the defendant's actions-essentially a
468
solicitation-did not constitute a crime at state law.
Although the Kansas Supreme Court found these facts "morally reprehensible," it upheld the lower court's dismissal. 469 The
4 The amending language is italicized. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (general federal
conspiracy statute). For a discussion of the exception for tax cases, see supra note 303.

4 For a listing of states that have solicitation statutes, see supra note 133.
46 For a listing of states that punish solicitation as a common-law offense, see supra
note 132.
4" 232 Kan. 539, 657 P.2d 43 (1983).

46 Id. at 539-40, 657 P.2d at 44.
-6 Id. at 541, 657 P.2d at 44.
469Id. at 544, 657 P.2d at 47.
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court ruled that the crimes of conspiracy and attempt, categorized in the state's penal code as "anticipatory crimes," could
not "be stacked or added to another anticipatory crime in order
to arrive at a new crime." 470 The court declined to recognize
solicitation as a common-law offense because the penal code
had abolished common-law crimes. Ironically, the court relied
on the legislature's enactment of a solicitation statute subsequent to defendant's arrest to demonstrate legislative intent not
to punish solicitation at the time defendant sought to hire some471
one to murder his wife.
Fewer states have adopted unilateral-conspiracy statutes than
have adopted solicitation statutes. 472 This may reflect the fact
that unilateral conspiracy is a more recent development in Anglo-American jurisprudence than is solicitation. 473 The states
that have adopted the unilateral-conspiracy approach have done
so since the publication of the Model Penal Code's provisions
on inchoate offenses. 474 The rationale for this approach is sound,
because the communication of a criminal scheme to another is
a substantial manifestation of a firm intent to commit that
crime.

475

Adoption of a unilateral-conspiracy statute alone, however,
does not ensure that courts will permit a conspiracy charge in
cases in which the actor believes that he has formed a conspiracy, but the importuned party either cannot or does not intend
to complete the object crime. People v. Foster476 demonstrates

the need for firm indicia of legislative intent that a unilateral
theory apply. In Foster, a party approached by the defendant
to aid in a robbery feigned agreement and informed the police
of the impending crime. Despite the Illinois conspiracy statute

470Id. at 541, 657 P.2d at 45.
471Id.

47 For a listing of states that have enacted unilateral-conspiracy statutes, see supra
note 108.
473Anglo-American courts have recognized solicitation as a separate offense since the
early nineteenth century. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (tracing the history
of the common-law crime of solicitation). By contrast, the notion of unilateral conspiracy
first attracted wide notice with the publication of the Model Penal Code's tentative draft
on inchoate offenses. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
474For discussion of the influence of the Model Penal Code's conspiracy provision
on subsequently promulgated state provisions, see Burgman, Unilateral Conspiracy:
Three CriticalPerspectives, 29 DE PAUL L. REv. 75, 75-76 n.3 (1979).
475MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 commentary at 388 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
47699 111.2d 48, 457 N.E.2d 405 (1983).
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being patterned after the Model Penal Code provision, 477 an
appellate court reversed the conviction of conspiracy to commit
robbery, interpreting the state conspiracy statute to require an
two persons. The state suactual agreement between at least 478
preme court sustained the reversal.
47 Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972) ("[a] person
commits conspiracy when, with intent that an offense be committed, he agrees with
another to the commission of that offense") (emphasis added) with MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.03(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1985):
[a] person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a
crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(a) agreeswith such other person or persons that they or one or more of them
will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation
to commit such crime ....
Id. (emphasis added). The Illinois legislature also adopted a provision eliminating the
impossibility defense for conspiracy, which provision was similar to the Model Penal
Code provision. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972) with

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

In Foster,the Illinois Attorney General argued that the fact that the state statute's
language amended previous language that required "two or more persons" to "conspire
or agree together" evinced the legislature's intent to adopt.the unilateral-conspiracy
approach. 99 111. 2d at 51, 457 N.E.2d at 407. CompareILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 139
(1961) (requiring "two or more persons" to "conspire or agree together") with ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972) (imposing liability for conspiracy if only
"[a] person ... agrees" to commit a crime). He supported his position with the committee comments to the conspiracy statute that demonstrated the legislators' awareness
of the new Model Penal Code provisions. Foster, 99 Il. 2d at 52, 457 N.E.2d at 407;
see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-2, Committee Comments, at 458-60 (Smith-Hurd
1972) (citing Model Penal Code provisions and commentary).
478Foster, 99 Ill. 2d at 52-53, 457 N.E.2d at 407. The court stated:
While impressed with the logic of the state's interpretation of section 8-2(a),
we are troubled by the committee's failure to explain the reason for deleting
the words "two or more persons" from the statute. The committee comments
to section 8-2 detail the several changes in the law of conspiracy that were
intended by the 1961 amendment. The comments simply do not address the
unilateralfbilateral issue. The state suggests that the new language was so clear
on its face that it did not warrant additional discussion. We doubt, however,
that the drafters could have intended what represents a rather profound change
in the law of conspiracy without mentioning it in the comments to section 8-2.
Id. The court also dismissed the state's argument that section 8-2(b)'s elimination of
the impossibility defense supported a unilateral interpretation. Id. at 54, 457 N.E.2d at
408. In conclusion, the court relied on the legislature's failure to amend the statute after
intermediate appellate decisions had held for a bilateral interpretation as persuasive
evidence that the legislature intended a bilateral-conspiracy provision. Id. at 54-55, 457
N.E.2d at 408 (citing People v. Hill, 108 Ill. App. 3d 716, 439 N.E.2d 549 (1982), and
People v. Ambrose, 28 Ill. App. 3d 627, 329 N.E.2d 11 (1975)). But see Garcia v. State,
271 Ind. 510, 516-17, 394 N.E.2d 106, 110 (1979) (upholding a unilateral interpretation
of the Indiana conspiracy statute even though committee comments accompanying the
proposed final draft stated that the legislature did not seek to change the prior conspiracy
statute with its amendment adopting the Model Penal Code's language). The Garcia
court commented:
We are unable to determine with certainty what the commission intended by
this comment, i.e. whether the enactment would merely restate the definition,
without changing the result, or whether the law relative to the offense, except
for the elimination of enumerated defenses, would remain unchanged. If the
former were intended by the commentor, it can only be viewed as a mental
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To avoid this situation, legislatures should ensure that com-

mentary accompanying the statute make its purpose clear. The
commentary accompanying Delaware's statute eliminating the

impossibility defense for conspiracy provides an appropriate
example:
[This section] takes what the Model Penal Code calls a "unilateral approach." That is, attention is focused on each individual's culpability. He has no defense which rests solely
on another party's incapacity, irresponsibility, or obedience
to law. Thus, if he solicits a person to commit an offense,
his crime is complete at that point, and it is irrelevant to his
own liability that the person solicited does not commit the
offense because of some legal incapacity or irresponsibility,
or because
he did not know that the conduct solicited was
479
criminal.

3. Attempt to Commit Crimes in the Nature of Attempt
In contrast to conspiracy to attempt (or solicit) and attempt
to conspire, complete elimination of the attempt-to-attempt construction is not desirable. American jurisdictions have recognized the validity of offenses such as attempted burglary 80
attempt to entice minors with intent to commit sexual assault, 48 1
and, to an increasing extent in those states with traditionally
lapse and proofreading oversight; as it is clear upon the face of the act that
defenses available under the multilateral concept were to be eliminated.
Id. For other state-court decisions interpreting conspiracy statutes to embody the unilateral approach, despite the failure of legislatures to address the issue directly in
accompanying commentary, see People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 96-100, 411
N.Y.S.2d 922, 926-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 1004, 394 N.E.2d 288,
420 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1979); People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 6-17, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011,
1013-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); State v. Marian, 62 Ohio St. 2d 250, 253-54, 405 N.E.2d
267, 270 (1980); State v. St. Christopher, 305 Minn. 226, 231-35, 232 N.W.2d 798, 80103 (1975).
479 Commentary to 58 Del. Laws, ch. 497, § 1, now codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 523 (1987) (quoted in Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152, 154 (Del. 1975)). Section
523(b) states:
It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal conspiracy that, because of
irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or because of unawareness of the criminal nature of the agreement or the conduct contemplated or
of the defendant's criminal purpose or because of other factors precluding the
mental state required for commission of the conspiracy or the crime contem.
plated, one or more of the defendant's coconspirators could not be guilty of
the conspiracy or the crime contemplated.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 523(b) (1987). Section 523(a) eliminates the impossibility
defense for solicitation. Id. § 523(a).
4m See supra notes 227-233 and accompanying text (discussing a case that rejected a
challenge to the attempted-burglary construction because it was an attempt to attempt).
481See supra notes 204-224 and accompanying text (discussing cases that uphold the
attempted-sexual-assault construction).
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defined assault, attempted aggravated assault. 482 To minimize
the inchoate nature of these object offenses, legislatures have
narrowly defined them as substantive offenses. 4 3 The two constituent-element approaches used are proscription of constituent

acts toward the object offense and proscription of means (possession) offenses.
a. Constituent-element approaches applied to burglary.
Crimes that are derived from the long-established offense of
burglary follow both approaches. 484 In its modem phase, burglary generally has been defined as the unauthorized entry of a
structure with the intent to commit a crime therein. 485 In addition, most jurisdictions treat both criminal trespass 48 6 and pos48 7
session of burglary tools as substantive offenses.

Criminal trespass can be viewed as burglary rendered free of
its inchoate element, the intent to commit another crime. 48 8 This
substantive offense serves at least two functions. First, it allows
the courts to punish illegal entry without proving an intent to
commit another crime. 48 9 The basis of punishment, however, is

not only that the illegal entry represents a harm, but also that
482 See supra notes 169-203 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial debate
over the validity of the attempted-assault construction).
481For discussion of statutes employing an essential-element approach, see supra
notes 81-98 and accompanying text. The rationale behind this approach is similar to
that of the unequivocality approach to attempt. See supra note 44 (explaining the
standard).
4 For discussion of the common-law origins of burglary, see supra notes 66-69 and
accompanying text.
48 For discussion of the modem definition of burglary, see supra notes 71-75 and
accompanying text.
416 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1980). The Model Penal
Code section that most state criminal-trespass statutes follow provides that one who
knowingly enters or remains in a building without license or privilege, or who enters or
remains in a place as to which notice against trespass is given, is guilty of the substantive
offense of criminal trespass. Id.
4
For a listing of statutes prohibiting the possession of burglary tools, see supra note
81.
48 In modem criminal codes, illegal entry frequently is included as a subsection of a
criminal-trespass statute. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.05-.17 (McKinney 1987); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503(a)(1) (Purdon 1983). Criminal-trespass statutes have a
broader purpose than the prevention of burglary. Many are intended to apply to tenants
who refuse to move after notice of eviction, itinerants who occupy private buildings for
shelter, and estranged spouses who defy court orders to stay away from their spouses'
premises.
489 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1980) (punishing
knowing trespass in a building or occupied structure); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 221.2 commentary at 92 (Proposed Official Draft 1980) (noting that such conduct, in
effect a lesser included offense of burglary, is properly treated as the most serious form
of criminal trespass because the fear or apprehension may still remain).
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the perpetrator likely had another criminal purpose for his entry. 490 Second, the offense of criminal trespass allows the courts,
in jurisdictions that define burglary as breaking and entering
with the intent to commit a felony, to punish those who perform
491
an illegal entry to commit a misdemeanor.
Criminal sanctions for possession of burglary tools exemplify
the proscription-of-means approach. Like criminal trespass,
such sanctions punish the commission of an essential element
of the parent crime. 492 Possession of burglary tools, however, is
an act that is clearly more preparatory than is illegal entry, which
493
at least constitutes an element of the offense of burglary.
Viewed as the gathering of the means to effect an illegal entry
to commit another crime, possession of burglary tools can be
conceived as representing an attempt to attempt to attempt to
commit larceny, robbery, murder, or some other ultimate
offense.
Nevertheless, the rationale behind treating both criminal trespass and possession of burglary tools as separate substantive
offenses is sound. In either case, it is highly probable that the
actor intends to commit a burglary. 494 This conclusion reflects
490 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, WORKING
PAPERS 899 (1970) (noting that an intruder's presence may cause a property holder to
fear for the safety of his person or property even though the intruder cannot be shown
to have intended anything more than the illegal entry).
491For a list of burglary statutes that apply only to felonies and specific misdemeanors,
see supra note 75.
492 The possession of burglary tools is not strictly essential, in that many entries can
be made and burglaries consummated without the use of special tools. Most entries of
commercial properties that are wired with alarms, however, require special equipment.
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, supra note 36, at 27.
493Possessional offenses usually merely evince a preparatory status that the law
designates as a substantive offense rather than as an actual harm in itself. Possessional
prohibitions have been justified by one court as "the practical necessity of punishing in
certain circumstances a person against whom nothing can be proved except possession."
Regina v. Grant, [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 165, 179 n.3.
494Hall, CriminalAttempt-A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability, 49 YALE
L.J. 789, 816 (1940). In discussing possession of burglary tools as an example of
essential-element offenses, Professor Hall stated:
Certain harmful consequences do not appear in the inchoate crimes, but it is
plain that the existence of the anti-social situation greatly increases the probability of their occurring. Inchoate crimes are not a lesser degree of the relevant
major harms; possession of burglar's tools is not a lesser degree of burglary.
Nor is the relationship causal; it depends rather upon insight into social phenomena. If we know the harm which it is sought to effect, we recognize the
inchoate crime as representing the necessary, preliminary pattern of behavior;
hence we segregate such specific fact-clusters and penalize the doer. Such an
anti-social situation regardless of how it may be distinguished sociologically
from "ultimate" harmful consequences is, of course, independently criminal,
legally.

Id. (emphasis in original).
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judicial and other observation of human behavior; it is so com'495
monly held as to merit the description "common sense.
Thus, the basis for liability is experiential rather than merely
positivist. 496 Illegal entry and possession of burglary tools are

crimes not only because the state has made them crimes, but
also because common experience has indicated that they are
preparatory acts that frequently lead to burglaries. 497 Thus, they

fulfill a major purpose of the criminal law-the prevention of
social harm. 498 The prohibited acts are sufficiently dangerous to
justify intervention and to shift the burden to the actor to justify
his behavior as legally permissible. 499 Any perceived unfairness
in the imposition of liability can be addressed by adjusting the
sentence within the range of punishment prescribed for the
crime.
b. Proscription of constituent acts. Other examples of the
proscription-of-constituent-acts approach include sanctions
against the use of instruments or other means to induce a
495But see Benton v. United States, 232 F.2d 341, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (overturning
a statute that punished possession of burglary tools because it lacked a mens rea
requirement); G. FLETCHER, supra note 148, at 198 (warning that possession offenses
that require only possession and knowledge raise the possibility that courts could convict
without proof that the individual intended to harm anyone with the materials that he
possessed).
49 Compare Regina v. Grant, [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 165, 179 n.3 (characterizing possession offense as an attempt-like prohibition attributable to the "practical necessity of
punishing in certain circumstances a person against whom nothing can be proved except
possession") with G. FLETCHER, supra note 148, at 197-202 (categorizing possession
crimes without mens rea requirements as positivist, because they reflect policy decisions
that are based on the concept of fair warning).
497
See Dawkins, Attempting to Have in Possession, 5 OTAGO L. REV. 172, 176-77
(1981) (possessory offenses are directed at incipient or inchoate criminality).
491Hart, supra note 375, at 402-03.
499
The outer limit of this approach is exemplified by the Model Penal Code's loitering
provision, which makes it a crime if one "loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a
manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm
for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity." MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6
(Proposed Official Draft 1980). Compare, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 35862 (1983) (holding unconstitutionally vague a loitering statute that required a suspect to
provide "credible and reliable identification" to satisfy an inquiring police officer) with
Porta v. Mayor, City of Omaha, 593 F. Supp. 863, 866-70 (D. Neb. 1984) (distinguishing
the statute in Kolender from Omaha, Nebraska ordinance based on the Model Penal
Code provision, and upholding the Omaha ordinance because it gave less discretion to
police officers). The ordinance in Portaallowed a suspect to identify and explain himself
to an inquiring police officer, and allowed the explanation to serve as a basis for dismissal
of criminal prosecution if the court found the explanation sufficient to dispel the officer's
concerns for nearby persons or property. But see Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d
830, 834 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding same ordinance as that at issue in Porta unconstitutionally vague because ambiguity of provision for suspect identification and lack of
guidelines for police officer's assessment of suspect's explanation would not prevent
arbitrary law enforcement).
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miscarriage 500 and the enticement of minors into a structure to
engage in sexual activity.501 Although the criminalization of
abortion is controversial, sexual assault of minors draws both
universal public condemnation and a growing concern. 02 The
Wisconsin enticement statute that was relied on in Huebner v.
State50 3 illustrates the constituent-act approach: "Any person 18
years of age or over, who, with intent to commit a crime against
sexual morality, persuades or entices any child under 18 years
of age into any vehicle, building, room or secluded place is
guilty of a class C felony. '' 504 This statute defines the prohibited
act in terms not of sexual activity but of persuading a minor to
enter a vehicle or structure with the intent to use the child
sexually.50 5 Because such an act must occur in a secluded place,
the enticement of the minor to such a place is an essential act
50 6
toward the culmination of a sexual assault.
In recent years, state legislatures have applied this approach
to a variety of traditional completed crimes, such as auto theft,507
510
For a listing of statutes punishing abortion in terms of the use of instruments or
drugs to induce a miscarriage, see supra note 92.
501
For a listing of statutes punishing the sexual enticement of minors, see supra note
94. For discussion of constituent-element crimes, see supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
502 See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT

405-18 (1986) (discussing legal developments aimed at halting child pornography); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 102-07 (1984)

(presenting recommendations for state legislative action to protect children from sexual
abuse, including extended statutes of limitations in cases of sexual assault of minors
and increased public access to arrest and conviction records of those charged with sex
offenses against children); S. GOLDSTEIN, THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
1-14, 31-33 (1987) (outlining difficulties faced by law-enforcement agencies in investigating sexual exploitation of children and noting that, although underreported, sexual
abuse is alarmingly common); Chaze, Now, Nationwide Drive to Care Child Abuse,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 1984, at 73-74.
503 33 Wis. 2d 505, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967).
54Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.12.
-'0 33 Wis. 2d at 513, 147 N.W.2d at 650.
506Id. at 513-14, 147 N.W.2d at 650. For discussion of Huebner v. State, see supra
notes 208-224 and accompanying text.
507
For statutes that punish the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, see, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 499b (West 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-516 (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 165.05-.06, .08 (McKinney 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (Vernon 1974);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.070 (1988).
For statutes that punish people who obscure the identity of a vehicle, see, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-8-22 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-6 (West Cum. Supp. 1988); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit 21, § 1841 (West 1983) (farm machinery); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 9A.56.180 (1988).
For statutes that punish the unlawful failure to return rented property, see, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1806 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a129 (West 1985) (property covered under this section may be rented or borrowed; the
property is protected against both failure to return and encumbrance); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 637:9 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-420 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 22-30A-13 (1988).
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larceny, 5 8 and shoplifting. 5 9 The increasingly used constituentact approach parallels the Model Penal Code's substantial-step
approach, which allows a court to punish behavior in its list of
illustrative actions through use of a general attempt statute. 510
c. Possessionoffenses. Possession offenses are more widely
used than are constituent-element statutes. Along with possession of burglary tools, American legislatures most frequently
punish possession of: illegal firearms (such as automatic weapons and sawed-off shotguns), 51' explosives, 512 forged and counterfeit articles and devices for making them, 513 gambling devices
515
and records, 514 obscene materials with intent to distribute,
devices for theft of telecommunications services, 5 6 bootleg
51 8
sound recordings with intent to sell, 517 eavesdropping devices,
0 For statutes that punish the removal or altering of identification numbers, see,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.260 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-305 (1986); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 817.235 (West 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § l1c (Law. Co-op. 1980);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-616 (1985).
" For statutes that punish the concealment of merchandise, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE
§ 18-4626 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-49 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1620(A)(2) (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-602(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988); VA. CODE § 18.2103 (1988).
o10
For the text of the Model Penal Code's illustrative listings of substantial steps, see

supra note 46.
s" See supra note 85 (listing statutes).
512 See supra note 86 (listing statutes).
513 See supra note 82 (listing statutes).
514 For statutes that punish possession of gambling devices, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 330a, 330b, 330.1, 330.4 (West 1988) (slot machines); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1810-105 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-24 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-5-4 (Burns

1985 & Cum. Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:37-7 (West 1982).
For statutes that punish possession of gambling records, see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 712-1224, -1225 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 955 (1983); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 572.050, -.060 (Vernon 1979 & Cum. Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 225.15,
-.20 (McKinney 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.132, -.137 (1985).
For statutes that punish possession of lottery tickets, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1401 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.12 (West 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 750.373 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:37-6 (West 1982); W. VA. CODE § 61-10-11b
(1984).
51; See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.247
(West 1987) (obscene pictorial representations of minors); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-10
(1981 & Cum. Supp. 1988) (with intent to sell to minors); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 22-24-29 (1988) (with intent to disseminate to minors); Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-302(a)(ii)
(1988).
516 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 850 (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 907 (1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 557A (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-113.5

(1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-409.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988) (includes devices for theft of
other services).
517 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-82 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-603, -604
(1986); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1323, -1324 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-1129 (1982);

W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50 (1984).
518See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3008 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 635 (West
1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.04 (West 1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-6703 (1987); N.Y.

PENAL LAW § 250.10 (McKinney 1987).
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and goods with altered or removed identifications.5 1 9 Other ju-

risdictions have made more creative use of the possession offense by criminalizing, for example, possession of "stink
bombs," cockfighting implements, and medical prescription
blanks .520
By most standards of proximity, none of these offenses would
52
constitute an attempt to commit a specific completed crime. '

The act of obtaining one of these instruments comes at least a
step prior to the act of using it to commit a crime. 522 Nevertheless, there is a great likelihood that the holder of these materials

will use them in the commission of a completed crime, even if
he does not manifest a specific intent to commit a crime such
52 3
as murder, bank robbery, or extortion.
As with the constituent-acts approach, however, there are
limitations to the proper use of possession offenses. Only a few

materials have unequivocally criminal uses.52 4 Statutes regulating the possession of firearms and explosives take into account
the legal uses of these articles by requiring that those who
purchase them register the purpose for which they will be
used. 525 Thus, the presumption behind punishment of unauthorized possession is that a person who fails to follow regulatory

519See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.270 (1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-6-326(1)(b)
to -326(3) (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 637:7-a (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3941 to -943 (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1988); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.11 (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1988).
520See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-28 (1985) (proscribing possession of noxious substances, including "stink bombs"); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 337g (prohibiting possession
of horse-racing drugs within a racing enclosure), 597(c) (forbidding possession of cockfighting implements) (West 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-8 (1988) (punishing possession of a prophylactic vending machine in a place lawfully accessible to
minors); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-918 (1982) (forbidding possession of a whiskey still).

-21For a discussion of the various proximity standards, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
522 Some of these offenses, however, such as possession of goods with altered identification, raise a presumption that the possessor has completed a crime, although the
authorities cannot prove all of the elements of the completed crime.
m For a recent discussion of the validity of criminalizing the attempt to possess
prohibited articles, see Dawkins, supra note 497. The article, however, generalizes from
New Zealand cases concerning attempts to possess illegal narcotics.
524 A legislature can create an offense regarding an object with equivocal uses by
adding an extra condition that is indicative of criminal intent. See, e.g., N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-23-08.4 (1985) (forbidding duplication of keys that are marked with legends
such as "do not duplicate" but preserving the affirmative defense that such duplication
was authorized). See generally Robbins, supra note 11, at 398-419 (discussing the
importance of an objective check on subjective intent to avoid convictions for equivocal,
ambiguous, or neutral acts).
52 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-14-9 to -11 (1988) (proscribing, with
exceptions, possession of unlicensed firearms).
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channels to obtain dangerous materials intends to use them for
526
an illegal purpose.
In the context of fully operational weapons, this presumption
is sound. A related offense, such as possession of unassembled

bomb paraphernalia, however, would criminalize a more equivocal act. Many of the materials used to construct bombs have

other legal purposes. Consequently, the government does not
regulate their sale. Unless these materials have little or no other

use except in explosive devices, judicial intervention is not
justified. It is as likely, or almost as likely, that their possessor
had a legitimate use for them as an illegitimate one. Although
proscribing the possession of unassembled bomb paraphernalia
could aid in preventing completed crimes, a broadly drawn stat-

ute might infringe too greatly on the rights of innocent
individuals.527
d. The applications of attempt to constituent-element offenses and other crimes in the nature of attempt. The constituentact and proscription-of-means statutes have substantial inchoate
elements, as compared with the completed crimes from which
they are derived. Thus, prosecutors' attachment of inchoate

liability to them has resulted in appellate challenge as attempts
to attempt. 528 The Model Penal Code's drafters sought to resolve
326 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4) (McKinney 1987) (establishing a presumption of
unlawful intent if weapons or explosives are not registered).
527Nevertheless, South Dakota and Texas specifically punish the unauthorized possession of components for explosive or destructive devices. Compare S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 22-14A-13 (1988) ("Any person who possesses any substance, material,
or any combination of substances or materials, with the intent to make a destructive
device without first obtaining a permit from the Department of Public Safety to make
such device, is guilty of a class 5 felony.") with TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.10(a)
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1988) ("A person commits an offense if the person knowingly
possesses components of an explosive weapon with the intent to combine the components into an explosive weapon for use in a criminal endeavor."). Although both statutes
include a mens rea requirement, it is questionable whether these requirements clarify
what materials the statute proscribes. Furthermore, the intent requirement merely makes
the statutes' construction circular, because the intent to make an explosive device is
inferred from possession of materials that remain undefined.
528See People v. Berger, 131 Cal. App. 2d 127, 127, 132, 280 P.2d 136, 137, 139 (1955)
(upholding a conviction for attempted use of means to induce a miscarriage); Greenwood
v. United States, 225 A.2d 878, 880 (D.C. 1967) (upholding a conviction for attempted
unauthorized usb of a motor vehicle); Thomas v. State, 351 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (requiring a jury instruction on attempted possession of burglary tools),
rev'd, 362 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1978) (attempted possession of burglary tools is not a crime);
Vogel v. State, 365 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (reversing a conviction
for attempted possession of burglary tools); Silvestri v. State, 332 So. 2d 351, 354-55
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (holding that the crime of attempted possession of cocaine does
exist), aff'd, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1976); Nichols v. State, 248 So. 2d 199, 199-200 (Fla.
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this problem by arguing that an act is a proper object of inchoate
liability if it is of sufficient gravity to constitute a substantive
offense.52 9 Yet, jurisdictions have declined to recognize the
crimes of attempted possession of burglary tools 530 and 5at3
tempted use of medical instruments to induce a miscarriage. '
The rule stated by the Code's drafters is an over-generalization. The varying natures and potential harms of the constituentact and possession offenses require separate determinations of
whether inchoate liability should attach to them. This is an area
of the criminal law in which judicial discretion is necessary to
effectuate the public policies underlying inchoate liability.
Legislatures, however, should provide guidance to the courts
by indicating which of the essential-element offenses are
properly the objects of attempt liability. Legislatures can best
provide this guidance by including attempt provisions within the
statute that punishes the substantive constituent-act or possession offense. 5312 To avoid the situation that plagued the Florida
courts in the late 1970's, 533 legislatures should adopt a statutory
provision similar to that of Alaska:
[A] person may not be charged under [the general attempt
provision] if the crime allegedly attempted by the defendant
is defined in such a way that an attempt to engage in the
conduct constitutes commission of the crime
proscribed
534
itself.
At the same time, however, the legislature should not preclude
application of the general attempt statute to the remaining essential-element statutes. This approach would retain some disDist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the crime of attempted possession of marijuana does
exist); Commonwealth v. Willard, 179 Pa. Super. 368, 369, 116 A.2d 751, 752 (1955)
(reversing a conviction for attempted use of means to induce a miscarriage).
59 See supra note 230 (quoting commentary to the Model Penal Code).
530Thomas v. State, 362 So. 2d 1348, 1349 (Fla. 1978); Vogel v. State, 365 So. 2d
1079, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
511E.g., Commonwealth v. Willard, 179 Pa. Super. 368, 369, 374-75, 116 A.2d 751,
752, 754 (1955) (holding that the general attempt statute did not apply to a provision
that forbade the use of an instrument to procure an abortion, because that provision
itself dealt with an attempt).
532See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-69 (1985) (sexual enticement). The provision states:
"It shall be unlawful for any person with lascivious intent to entice, allure, persuade or
invite, or attempt to entice, allure, persuade or invite, any child under 16 years of age
to enter any vehicle, room, house, office or other place for the purpose of [sexually
abusing the child]." Id. (emphasis added).

133For a review of Florida's problem, occasioned by the inclusion of attempt liability
in some criminal statutes, see supra notes 259-269 and accompanying text.
534ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.150(1) (1983).

1989]

Double Inchoate Crimes

cretion in the judiciary to extend liability to reflect changes in
53 5
public policy.
4. Attempt to Assault
Attempt to assault, the subcategory of double inchoate crimes

that has engendered the most analysis and controversy, merits
separate consideration. Simply to treat the crimes of assault or
aggravated assault as separate substantive offenses fails to re-

solve the controversy.53 6 Such an approach merely glosses over
the fact that, even for aggravated assaults, the definition of

assault as an attempt to commit a battery lies at the core of the
offense. 537 Almost half of the states, however, have eliminated

assault as battery,
the double inchoate dilemma by 5redefining
38
and eliminating the latter offense.
Several states, however, retain traditional definitions of assault. Despite the logical awkwardness of the attempted-assault
construction, the treatment of aggravated assaults as substantive
offenses presents the least burdensome means to extend crimi51s Certainly, attempt liability should not be attached to such offenses as frequenting
or residing in a house of prostitution. Not only do these offenses lack sufficient seriousness, as many contend about the offense of simple assault, but they are merely
forms of attempt to commit prostitution. For a discussion of the benefits of circumscribing judicial discretion to create double inchoate crimes, see supra notes 440-444 and
accompanying text.
536See State v. Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 584-85, 346 P.2d 115, 120 (1959) (treating assault
with a deadly weapon as a separate substantive offense, even though the definition of
assault at common law was attempted battery with present ability) (superseded by
statute, as stated in State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688, 679 P.2d 1354 (1984)).
1
See Perkins, supra note 194, at 84, 87 (criticizing the approach taken in State v.
Wilson, in which the court treated assault as a substantive offense). But see United
States v. Locke, 16 M.J. 763, 765 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (treating assault as a substantive
crime by redefining it to include intentional threatening).
538 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.200, -.230 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 611-613 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1987); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 120.00, -.10 (McKinney 1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (Page 1987).
These provisions are based on the Model Penal Code's assault provision. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1980). The section defines simple assaulta misdemeanor offense-to include: attempts to cause, or knowingly or recklessly
causing, injury; negligently causing injury with a deadly weapon; and attempts to cause
fear of injury by physical menace. The section defines aggravated assault-a felony
offense-to include: attempts to cause, or knowingly or recklessly causing, serious
bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life; and attempts to cause or knowingly causing bodily injury with a deadly
weapon. Among the twenty-three states that have merged assault and battery into a
single assault offense, fifteen have eliminated traditional assault from its definition.
These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas.
This approach reflects a policy decision to treat the new crime of assault like the old
crime of battery and to treat the attempt to commit assault as the old crime of assault.
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nal liability to those acts that present the greatest potential harm
to the public. The other approach-the redefinition of "present
ability" or "proximity" in relation to the danger inherent in an
actor's intention and the nature of his acts in the individual
case 5 3 9 -presents too great a potential for distortion of these

concepts and, consequently, inconsistent decisions.5 40

The redefinition of assault as intentional frightening also fails
to resolve the attempted-assault problem adequately. This definition imposes liability on an actor only if he causes his victim
to fear bodily harm.5 41 Thus, as in the Florida case of State v.
White, 542 many acts that were formerly punished as attempts to
commit battery are now punished as attempted assaults, because
the victim is unaware of the threat to his person. 43 This approach resolves the question of whether assault is a substantive
crime by removing its inchoate elements.5 4 4 The approach results, however, in the treatment of acts that were formerly
categorized as assault as the lesser included offense of attempt
to assault.5 45 Thus, the definition of assault as intentional frightening should serve only as an adjunct to the traditional

definitions .546
"'9See supra note 435 and accompanying text (discussing a Colorado Supreme Court
case that suggests this approach).
540See supra note 439 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which the court
distorted the concept of present ability to impose assault liability on the defendant).
541 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.011 (West 1976). The section provides: "An 'assault' is an

intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another,
coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a wellfounded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent." Id. Florida is
currently the only American jurisdiction to define assault solely in terms of intentional
threatening.
542 324 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1975). For discussion of State v. White, see supra notes 197202 and accompanying text.
-13See 324 So. 2d at 631 (stating that it is unnecessary to expand the definition of
assault to include attempts to injure victims who are unaware of attack, because the
general attempt statute will reach those situations). Under the Florida statute's definition
of assault, for example, a sniper who misses his intended victim would be guilty not of
assault, but of attempted assault. Id.
5"See
United States v. Locke, 16 M.J. 763, 765 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (holding that the
general attempt statute applies to assault because the definition of assault includes the
concept of intentional frightening); State v. White, 324 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 1975)
(holding that the general attempt statute applied to the aggravated-assault statute, which
was defined in terms of intentional frightening, because the legislature did not intend to
exempt "bushwackers" from punishment).
5 See White, 324 So. 2d at 631 (reversing a conviction under the aggravated-assault
statute, which was defined in terms of intentional frightening, and holding that the
defendant was guilty only of attempted aggravated assault because his victim was
unaware of his attack).
546For a listing of states that punish intentional frightening, see supra note 59. Another
useful adjunct to generalized assault statutes is the constituent-act approach. The most
common example of this approach is a statute punishing one who points a firearm at
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As with other attempts to commit crimes in the nature of
attempt, legislatures should denote those forms of assault to
which attempt liability should attach by including the attempt
in the definition of the substantive offense. Again, the reason
for this approach is to provide the courts with guidance concerning public policy without eliminating judicial discretion.
To the extent that a limitation on judicial discretion in this
area is necessary, legislatures can provide that simple assault is
an improper object of attempt liability. 47 Although it may appear
to be inconsistent with the treatment of aggravated assaults as
substantive offenses, this approach has sound policy bases.
Opening simple assault to attempt liability, particularly where
assault is defined as intentional frightening, would burden the
criminal-law courts, since prosecutors would charge persons
whose acts do not constitute a substantial danger to the public.5 48
Because the different levels of the criminal-justice system would
dispose of many of these cases before they got to trial (because
they were not worth the time and effort),5 49 those that did reach
defendants, and
trial would place an undue burden on their 550
aspect.
arbitrary
an
on
take
would
punishment
B. ProposedInchoate-CrimeStatutes
To a great extent, the attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation
statutes proposed in the American Law Institute's Model Penal
IDAHO CODE § 18-3304 (1987); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-34 (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.16 (West 1983).

another. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-102 (1988);

-4 If a legislature eliminates attempt language from the assault statute, it will require
courts to apply a general attempt statute to punish one who purposely attempts to cause
another bodily injury. Cf. State v. Laurie, 56 Haw. 664, 673-74 & n.5, 548 P.2d 271,

278 & n.5 (1976) (holding that, although the defendant may not have violated the assault
statute that required him to cause "serious bodily injury" because the victim's injuries

were not major, he nevertheless was guilty of attempted assault). This approach eliminates the possibility that courts will apply a general inchoate statute to an attempt
provision included within the assault statute.
548See Arnold, supra note 154, at 65 (asserting that it is unwise to "punish attempts
at ordinary assaults which carry light penalties").
m9 See Perkins, supra note 194, at 86 (arguing that, if criminal assault were defined
as intentional threatening, the offense "would include any number of futile attempts to
frighten or startle that are too insignificant to be added to the category of crime").

110It is unlikely, however, that such convictions are constitutionally suspect. Because

convictions would stem from assault and attempt statutes, a defendant probably could

not successfully challenge these statutes on void-for-vagueness grounds. Although the
general language of most attempt and assault statutes gives courts broad discretion to
decide whether they will punish particular behavior, both types of statutes give courts

some guidance concerning the limits of their discretion and give notice to potential
offenders.
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Code mitigated the need to use double inchoate constructions.
The attempt statute's extension of liability to acts earlier in the
preparatory continuum, the conspiracy statute's adoption of the
unilateral approach, and the inclusion of a solicitation statute
removed many of the gaps that were left by previous and some
existing codifications of inchoate crimes in American
jurisdictions.
The Code provisions still need some refinement, however.
The definitional provisions are unnecessarily verbose or overly
complex, or both. This over-written quality detracts from the
salient policy considerations of each inchoate crime. Accordingly, the final section of this Article surveys the strengths and
weaknesses of the Code's three major inchoate provisions and
recommends revisions of those provisions.
1. Attempt
The central source of disagreement over what constitutes an
acceptable definition of attempt focuses not so much on the
mens rea, or guilty mind, but on the actus reus, or overt act:
The mens rea of an attempt is the same as that of the substantive crime, but the actus reus of an attempt has not been
defined with the same precision; there is merely a general
principle that an actus reus is constituted when steps have
been taken toward the commission '55of the substantive crime
which are "sufficiently proximate. 1
The acts tending toward commission of different completed
crimes will vary as the nature of the crimes differs. Even within
a single category of completed crimes, actors will employ different means to achieve their ends. Hence, the argument that
courts should treat attempt as an adjunct of each completed
crime rather than as an overly refined rule with general application has a great deal of merit. 552 Most American jurisdictions
have accepted this premise not by attaching an attempt provision to each completed crime statute, but instead by adopting

511 Smith,

Two Problems in CriminalAttempts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 422, 447 (1957).
5-1See supra note 355 (discussing the need for judicial flexibility to extend crimes).
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constituent-element offenses that criminalize preparatory acts
553
toward a broad range of specific crimes.
Nevertheless, every criminal code needs a general attempt
statute. Such statutes give the courts discretion to apply the
principles of attempt liability where the legislature has failed,
through oversight or lack of foresight, to provide a basis for
intervention and punishment of preparatory acts that manifest
potential societal harm.5 54 Such statutes can also set the necessary limits on judicial discretion.
Accordingly, a general attempt statute must balance two conflicting factors: (1) the community's need for effective crime
prevention; and (2) the need to draft criminal statutes that eliminate or, at least, minimize interference with innocent, neutral,
or ambiguous conduct.5 55 The Model Penal Code's attempt provision takes a different approach from most previous attempt
formulations in that it shifts emphasis from the second factor to
56
the first.
The drafters suggested that the primary difference between
the Model Penal Code formulation and that of previous attempt
formulations was its definition of the required act as "an act or
omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in [the] commission of the crime. '557 They
contended that the substantial-step formulation "shifts the emphasis from what remains to be done, the chief concern of the
proximity tests, to what the actor has already done. That further
major steps must be taken before the crime can be completed
does not preclude a finding that the steps already undertaken
558
are substantial.
The term "substantial step" alone adds little precision to an
attempt definition. Courts in states that have adopted the substantial-step language often continue to rely on pre-existing com113 For discussion of the increasing use of possession offenses and constituent-act
offenses, see supra notes 81-95, 487-535 and accompanying text. See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (proscribing possession of instruments of crime, such as weapons); id. § 5.07 (prohibiting offensive weapons).
5m See supra note 355 (quoting Thurman Arnold's view that the law of attempt is
necessary to give courts the discretion to extend crimes, without distorting statutory
language, to the myriad of factual situations they confront).
55 Note, Effects of the Neiv Illinois Code on Prosecutionsfor Inchoate Crimes, 1963

wAsH. U.L.Q. 508, 518-19.

116 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Model Penal Code's
attempt provision).
57 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 329-31 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
-11Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
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mon-law formulations of proximity. 5 9 In this respect, the Model
Penal Code language is no more precise than that of New York's
attempt statute, which provides for the punishment of a person
who, with intent to commit a crime, "engages in conduct which
560
tends to effect the commission of such crime.
The crux of the Model Penal Code's attempt statute is its
nonexhaustive list of instances of conduct exemplifying a substantial step. 561 The denoted acts serve as an objective basis for
discovering something about a person's intentions and character.5 62 The listing suggests that the basis of attempt liability is a
probability estimate that an observed mode of conduct will more
563
often than not lead to completed criminality.
Consequently, the inclusion of the list of examples is essential
to the definition of attempt. 564 Not only does it make clear that
this definition of attempt encompasses acts theretofore treated
as mere preparation, but it also provides, through practical example, an objective basis for finding attempt liability. The statement that "[c]onduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial
step ...

unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's crim-

59 See, e.g., State v. Fish, 621 P.2d 1072, 1077 (Mont. 1980) ("[I]t is a well-established
principle that an attempt must consist of more than mere preparation and that there
must be some overt act in furtherance of the offense charged."). Conversely, at least
two courts have adopted the Model Penal Code formulation even though the relevant
statute used a common-law definition. United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 117-20
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 (1977); State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 132,
357 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 910 (1978).
5" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.00 (McKinney 1987); see ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-

1001 (1978) (dropping the word "substantial" from the "substantial step" requirement);
R. PERKINS & R. BoycE, supra note 13, at 611 (defining criminal attempt as a "step
towards a criminal offense with specific intent to commit that particular crime"). Indeed,
the drafters of the Code stated that "[w]hether a particular act is a substantial step is
obviously a matter of degree. To this extent, the Code retains the element of imprecision
found in most of the other approaches to the preparation-attempt problem." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 329 (Proposed Official Draft 1985); see Robbins,
supra note 11, at 419-39 (comparing New York and Model Penal Code formulations).
6' MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1985); see supra note 46
(discussing § 5.01(2)).
562DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, supra note 36, at 29.

-' But see Katz, Dangerousness:A Theoretical Reconstruction of the Criminal Law,
19 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 5 n.6 (1969) (criticizing the Model Penal Code's implicit use of
probability estimates in reliance on conduct to prove criminal purpose and
dangerousness).
s64 See Note, Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy Under the Proposed California
Criminal Code, 19 UCLA L. REV. 603, 609-10 (1972) (arguing that omission of the
substantial-step examples would have served to retain much of the existing body of
case law and would have done little to alleviate problems that the common-law approach
created).
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inal purpose" may appear to be tautological to some. 565 It is

unclear whether the drafters of the Code thought it unwise to
make more explicit the experiential basis of their approach.

Also, the commentators' insistence on the importance of the
566
substantiality and corroboration requirements in the definition

has led most states to adopt only the general parts of the definition.5 67 However, there is no real harm in retaining the substantial-step language, if only to emphasize the need to protect

5 68
individuals from liability for equivocal conduct.

As argued earlier, the Code's tripartite definition of attempt

is unnecessary because the clause containing the substantialstep language is sufficiently inclusive.5 69 Thus, the definition of

attempt should read as follows:
(1) (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of the crime, he purposely does or omits to do
anything that, under the circumstances as a reasonable
person would believe them to be, is an act or omission
constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct
570
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
' Katz, supra note 563, at 5 n.6. Katz stated:
The [Model Penal Code] formulation requires that the act be "a substantial
step in a course of conduct" and be "strongly corroborative" of criminal
purpose. I cannot see how this formulation avoids tautology. If the act (taken
as a unit) is a substantial step in a course of conduct which is clearly criminal,
it is necessarily strongly corroborative of a criminal purpose. If an act is
strongly corroborative then it is, by definition, a substantial step. The allimportant criminal purpose is established by inference from conduct which is
a substantial step, i.e., conduct which is strongly corroborative. Thus the
[Code's] formulation, while appearing to be defining two distinct elements
which are established by independent data, really only requires a single element: conduct which is relatively unambiguous in its relation to completed
criminality. Lack of ambiguity entails the conclusion that the conduct is a
substantial step, and clears the way for an inference of criminal purpose.
Id.
56 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 commentary at 329-31 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).
567 Only one state includes the examples in its statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-

49 (West 1985). Three other states, however, include the examples in their official
commentaries. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-500 (1985);

OR. REv. STAT. § 161.405 (1985). For a discussion of the ambiguities in the impossibility
provisions of the Model Penal Code, see Robbins, supra note 11, at 422-30.
'6 Further, the strongly-corroborative language is also necessary to support a recommended view of the impossibility defense. See Robbins, supra note 11, at 419-43.
569 See supra note 46; see also Robbins, supra note 11, at 441-42 (recommended
attempt statute).
"0Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1985). For reasons that
I argue elsewhere, see Robbins, supra note 11, at 419-43, the Model Penal Code
provisions for the impossibility defense to crimes of attempt are flawed, and should be
replaced by the following provision:
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The advantage of the substantial-step reification over a formula
that punishes an act that "tends to effect" or "tends toward" a
completed crime is in its amenability to further definition. Thus,
the definition should continue:
(2) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step
under this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the
actor's criminal purpose.
(3) Without negativing the sufficiency of other conduct, the
following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal
purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law:
(a) lying in wait, searching for, or following the contemplated victim of the crime;
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim
of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its
commission;
(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime;
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle, or enclosure in
which it is contemplated that the crime will be
committed;
(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime that are specially designed for such
unlawful use or that can serve no lawful purpose of
the actor in the circumstances;
(f) possession, collection, or fabrication of materials to be
employed in the commission of the crime, at or near
the place contemplated for its commission, if such possession, collection, or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor in the circumstances;
in conduct con(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage
57
stituting an element of the crime. '

Those jurisdictions that have codified a broad spectrum of possession offenses might opt to exclude subsections (e) and (f).
Their inclusion, however, might prove to be beneficial in closing
statutory gaps.
(b) In a prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that it was factually
or legally impossible to commit the crime that was the object of the attempt.
Other features of an attempt statute, such as renunciation of criminal purpose, are
beyond the scope of this Article. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(3), (4) (Proposed
Official Draft 1985).
5' Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (corresponding
Model Penal Code language).
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2. Conspiracy

Although it has been widely criticized, the unilateral theory
of conspiracy embodied in the Model Penal Code provision is a
valid approach in a penal law that emphasizes the prevention of
crime. The theory is prefigured in the Code's attempt provision,
which treats the solicitation of an innocent agent as a substantial
step toward commission of a crime.5 72 The act of soliciting another to aid in commission of a crime is sufficiently dangerous
to justify judicial intervention.5 73 In addition, the Code's inclusion of an overt-act provision ensures the need for extrinsic
corroboration. 574 More important to the discussion of double
inchoate crimes, the unilateral theory of conspiracy eliminates
much of the need for charges of attempt to conspire. 575
The language of the Model Penal Code's conspiracy provision, however, inadvertently opens itself to use in other double
inchoate constructions. The provision suggests that one is guilty
of conspiracy if he agrees with his co-conspirators to "engage
in conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. ' 576 The thrust of this section is
that one may be found guilty of conspiracy even if the object
crime is not completed. The imprecision of the language, however, suggests the appropriateness of the constructions of conspiracy to attempt and conspiracy to solicit. A charge of conspiracy to commit the completed crime is logically preferable to
577
either of these constructions.
Furthermore, the incorporation of the language of facilitation
in the conspiracy statute broadens the scope of conspiracy lia- Id. § 5.01(2)(g).
573Id.

§ 5.03 commentary at 388. The drafters reasoned that
[t]he act of agreeing with another to commit a crime, like the act of soliciting,
is concrete and unambiguous; it does not present the infinite degrees and

variations possible in the general category of attempts. The danger that truly
equivocal behavior may be misinterpreted as preparation to commit a crime is

minimized; purpose must be relatively firm before the commitment involved
in agreement is assumed.
Id.
574
Id. § 5.03(5).
-'7 See supra notes 422-431 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of need for

the conspiracy-to-attempt construction).
576MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (emphasis added).
The section also proscribes an agreement "to aid ... in the planning or commission of
such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime." Id. § 5.03(1)(b)
(emphasis added).
-' See supra notes 422-431 and accompanying text (noting judicial criticism of the

conspiracy-to-attempt construction).
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bility to people who lack the specific intent to participate in the
conspiracy. 78 Such an extension of liability based more on a
complicity rationale than on an inchoate-crime policy belongs

578 Facilitation addresses the kind of accessorial conduct in which the actor aids the
commission of a crime with knowledge that he is doing so, but without any specific
intent to participate therein or to benefit therefrom. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)
commentary at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953). The drafters of the Model Penal Code used
as an example the defendants in United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), aff'd,
311 U.S. 205 (1940). In Falcone, a group of sugar and yeast merchants sold their products
over a period of time to persons engaged in the manufacture of moonshine liquor. Id.
at 580. On the basis of the merchants' probable knowledge of their products' illegal use,
the government unsuccessfully sought to prove the merchants' complicity in a conspiracy. Id. at 581-82.
Thus, the original draft of the Model Penal Code sought to punish both those who
performed an act tending toward the commission of a crime, but who did not specifically
intend to assist in its commission, and those who acted with a specific intent. The
drafters stated:
Conduct which knowingly facilitates the commission of a crime is by hypothesis
a proper object of preventive effort by the penal law unless, of course, it is
affirmatively justifiable. It is important in that effort to safeguard the innocent
but the requirement of guilty knowledge serves that end-knowledge that there
is a purpose to commit the crime and that one's behavior renders aid.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) commentary at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
The drafters eliminated the language incorporating the facilitation standard from its
complicity provision. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 34 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). Nevertheless, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws included a general facilitation provision in its proposed Federal Criminal Code.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 1002 (1971); 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF

FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 127, at 160. At present, only four states codify
facilitation. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1004 (Cum. Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 506.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00 (MeKinney
1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-02 (1985). The Kentucky statute is typical:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation when, acting with knowledge that
another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he engages in
conduct which knowingly provides such a person with means or opportunity
for the commission of the crime and which in fact aids such person to commit
the crime.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985). For a discussion of the
New York statute, which punishes one who, "believing it probable that he is rendering

aid," facilitates a crime, see Sobel, The Anticipatory Offenses in the New Penal Law:
Solicitation, Conspiracy,Attempt and Facilitation,32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 257, 269-73
(1966).
Facilitation is generally regarded as a lesser included offense of an accomplice statute,
but not of statutes punishing substantive offenses, even where the defendant is prosecuted as an accomplice. See State v. Politte, 136 Ariz. 117, 121, 664 P.2d 661, 665
(1982); People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61, 64-65, 439 N.E.2d 376, 377-78, 453 N.Y.S.2d
660, 661-62 (1982). But see Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Ky. 1977)
(on remand, defendant was held to be entitled to instructions on criminal facilitation of
attempted murder and assault in the second degree); Recent Decision, Facilitation:
Should It Be RegardedAs a Lesser Included Substantive Offense When ProsecutionIs
Based on the Defendant's Complicity?, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1051, 1054-56 (1983)
(arguing that it should). Several commentators have noted the importance of the crime
for plea-bargaining purposes. Sobel, supra, at 271; Comment, A New Crime: Criminal
Facilitation, 18 Loy. L. REV. 103, 114 (1971); Recent Decision, supra, at 1055-56.
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in a separate statute. Consequently, the Model Penal Code's
definition of conspiracy should be amended to read as follows:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons
to commit a crime if he agrees with such other person or
persons that they or one or more of them will engage in a
or is planned to
course of conduct that constitutes such crime
579
culminate in the commission of the crime.
The "course of conduct" language, derived from the attempt

provision, serves the same purpose as the "attempt or solicitation" language without creating its attendant confusion.
3. Solicitation
The language of the Code's solicitation provision, like that of
its conspiracy provision, is overly complicated. The solicitation
statute punishes one who "with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating [the commission of a crime] commands, encourages
or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that
would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime
or would establish his complicity in its commission or attempted
commission. '580 This language raises the possibility of a solicitation-to-attempt construction. As with conspiracy to attempt,
one does not solicit another to attempt to commit a crime. 8 '
Indeed, the relevance of the attempt's failure or success to the
solicitation is even less than is its relevance to a conspiracy
charge: in a solicitation, the importuned party is not required to
perform any act toward the object crime. 582 Thus, the attempt
language is superfluous.
519Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(I) (Proposed Official Draft 1985). Other features
of a conspiracy statute, such as scope of the conspiracy, multiple objectives, joinder,
venue, renunciation of criminal purpose, and duration of the conspiracy, see id.
§§ 5.03(2)-(7), are beyond the scope of this Article.
' 0 Id. § 5.02(l) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 373 (Supp. IV 1986), quoted
in supra note 137.
-18See supra note 363 and accompanying text (suggesting that people conspire or
solicit to commit the ultimate offense and do not conspire or solicit to attempt to do
so).
112The intent of the Code's drafters is made somewhat clearer by the accompanying
commentary:
It ordinarily should not be necessary to charge an actor with soliciting another
to attempt to commit a crime, since a rational solicitation would seek not an
unsuccessful effort but the completed crime; the charge, therefore, should be
one of solicitation to commit the completed crime. But in some cases the actor
may solicit conduct that he and the party solicited believe would constitute the
completed crime, but that, for reasons discussed in connection with the defense
of impossibility in attempts, does not in fact constitute the crime. Such conduct
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Further, as with the conspiracy provision, the solicitation
provision incorporates the language of facilitation. 5 3 Again, this
language should be eliminated. The statute should read as
follows:
(1) A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if he
commands, encourages, or requests another person to engage in a course of conduct designed to culminate in the
commission of the crime 584
or that would establish his complicity in its commission.

In addition, the second subsection of the Code's solicitation
provision should be adopted:
(2) It is immaterial under [the first section] that the actor fails
to communicate with the person he solicits to commit a
crime if his conduct
85
communication.

was designed to effect such

This paragraph incorporates the double inchoate crime of attempt to solicit within the definition of solicitation. Although
only two states currently prohibit such actions by statute, 586 this
practice is consistent with a subjective theory of inchoate criminality. The attempt to communicate a solicitation manifests a
criminal intent as surely as does a communicated solicitation.5 87
In addition, it permits intervention prior to the completion of
by the person solicited would constitute an attempt ... . and the actor would
therefore be liable ... for having solicited conduct that would constitute an
attempt if performed.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 commentary at 373-74 (Proposed Official Draft 1985) (foot-

notes omitted). The reasoning of the Code's drafters is fallacious. If the act solicited is
not a crime, then the solicitant is not guilty of an attempt, nor is the solicitor guilty of
criminal solicitation.
ml For a discussion of facilitation, see supra note 578 and accompanying text.
"4 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1985).

585Id. § 5.02(2). Other features of the crime of solicitation, such as renunciation of
criminal purpose, see id. § 5.02(3), are beyond the scope of this Article.

.6 HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-510(2) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3303(b) (Vernon

Cum. Supp. 1987).
587MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 commentary at 381-82 (Proposed Official Draft 1985).

The commentary states:
[T]he last proximate act to effect communication with the party whom the
actor intends to solicit should be required before liability attaches on this
ground. Conduct falling short of the last act should be excluded because it is
too remote from the completed crime to manifest sufficient firmness of purpose
by the actor. The crucial manifestation of dangerousness lies in the endeavor
to communicate the incriminating message to another person, it being wholly
fortuitous whether the message was actually received. Liability should attach,
therefore, even though the message is not received by the contemplated recipient, and should also attach even though further conduct might be required on
the solicitor's part before the party solicited could proceed to the crime.
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the object offense in the event that an uncommunicated solicitation is intercepted before it is presented to a willing solicitant.
CONCLUSION

Criminal attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation punish inchoate
criminality-conduct falling short of the completed object offense. Because the inchoate offenses are aimed at actors who
specifically intend to commit another offense and who, by hypothesis, ignore the sanction for the object offense, they provide
no significant general deterrence. They do, however, permit lawenforcement personnel to intervene and prevent the intended
harm. Moreover, inchoate crimes perform other important penological functions by permitting punishment of those who demonstrate a disposition toward criminality before they do any real
harm-particularly when the failure to complete the offense is
fortuitous, as when the bullet misses its intended victim.
Most American jurisdictions punish inchoate offenses on the
basis of relatively short attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation
statutes that contain abstract conceptual terms with universal
application. This practice confronts courts with the task of determining, in each of the infinite number of fact situations that
may arise, the precise point at which inchoate liability attaches.
Because general inchoate statutes are abstract and vague, courts
in the past have used a rigid conceptual approach to analyze
those offenses' abstract concepts logically.
Not only has this conceptual approach failed to achieve the
predictability and certainty of result that is ostensibly its greatest
value, it has also failed to promote the purposes and policies
behind inchoate liability, principally the prevention of social
harm. Thus, courts in recent years have taken a more functional,
policy-oriented approach to inchoate liability. These courts look
first to whether the policy of the criminal law indicates that an
individual's acts are sufficiently dangerous to society to warrant
judicial intervention and punishment. Only then do they address
the issue that the conceptual approach takes up first-whether
the particular jurisdiction's definition of attempt, conspiracy, or
solicitation allows a court to punish those acts. One result of
this functional approach is that an increasing number of courts
have created double inchoate crimes during the last hundred
years.

HarvardJournalon Legislation

[Vol. 26:1

Critics of this approach suggest that these courts have, in
effect, created common-law crimes, an authority denied them
by statute in most states. A strong argument can be made that
the due process concept of notice outweighs the necessity for
courts to prevent harm to society through double inchoate
crimes. But inchoate crimes, despite their recent treatment as
separate, generalized categories, are very different from substantive crimes. Their abstract nature requires a higher degree
of judicial interpretation and discretion than substantive offenses do. The court that fails to analyze a double inchoate indictment in terms of the predictive and preventive purposes of
inchoate liability shirks its duty to shape its legislature's criminal
code into a rational and coherent body of law.
This Article is not a call for untrammeled judicial discretion
in the area of inchoate liability. Indeed, with the above historical
survey and model statutes, it suggests an integrated legislative
policy toward inchoate liability that would eliminate the need
for conspiracy-to-attempt and attempted-conspiracy formulations. This proposal entails the adoption of unilateral-conspiracy
and solicitation statutes similar to those of the Model Penal
Code.
The Article demonstrates, however, that there is no simple
formulation that will eliminate entirely the need for indictments
for attempts to commit crimes in the nature of attempt. Partial
solutions that have already been accepted in some jurisdictions
include the adoption of various constituent-element offenses and
redefined assault provisions that merge assault and battery. But
the need still remains for courts to decide in individual cases
whether the predictive and preventive purposes of attempt liability require their application to substantive offenses with significant inchoate elements. For a realistic rationalization of this
area of the law, I submit that they do.

